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ABSTRACT 
Sarah Louise Scott 
Invoking the Tooth Fairy Twice, or How to Identify Cases of Ad Hoc  
 Hypothesis Acceptance  
(Under the direction of John T. Roberts) 
 
 The light in the refrigerator comes on every time that you open the refrigerator 
door. Svetlana says that it turns on because of a little man that lives inside.  When you 
ask Svetlana why we never see or otherwise detect the little man, she responds that it 
must be that the little man is invisible, inaudible and has no mass. A frustrated observer 
might justly label these posits concerning the little man ‘ad hoc’.  Yet, what does this 
charge of ad hocness amount to?  What makes something ad hoc?  My dissertation sets 
out to answer this question.   
 Previous philosophers of science have unsuccessfully attempted to answer this 
question: for instance, they have explained ad hocness in terms of unfalsifiability, or in 
terms of the absence of additional test implications, or in terms of the intentions of 
scientists modifying theories in the face of recalcitrant evidence.  What is different about 
my approach is that, unlike its predecessors, it successfully avoids the Quine testability 
problem, while still successfully diagnosing ad hocness in our canonical examples of the 
phenomenon.  In this account, ad hocness is equated with jumping to conclusions: adding 
hypotheses into a theory in order to deal with disconfirming evidence when such an 
addition is not otherwise warranted. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: How Do We Determine When Something is Ad Hoc? 
 
I.  The Big Bang Theory, Dark Matter Theory and the Problem of Ad Hocness 
 
The Big Bang Theory is now widely accepted by scientists as the explanation of 
the beginnings of our universe.  This theory claims that, at the beginning of our universe, 
about 12 to 14 billion years ago, all matter was in a very small volume1.  This volume 
began rapidly expanding.  The universe that we see now is a result of this expansion.  The 
theory postulates that the velocity of expansion was greatest at the time of the Big Bang 
and has been slowing down ever since. Two of the reasons why this theory is so popular 
are that it predicts correctly (1) that Helium and Hydrogen are the predominant elements 
in the universe and (2) the specific proportions of these elements in the universe. 
(Freedman Kaufmann 648-651)  It also helps explain why observations that led to 
Hubble’s law2 indicate that the universe is expanding, when, previously, many scientists 
had thought that the universe was static – neither expanding nor contracting. 
                                                 
1 See, for example: Freedman, R.A. and Kaufmann, W. J.  Universe Stars and Galaxies.  
W.H. Freeman and Co., New York: 2002.  640 – 661.   
 
2 Hubble’s Law is a statement of the direct relationship between the distance to a galaxy 
and the redshift of its spectral lines.  The greater the distance of a galaxy, the greater its 
redshift and the greater the redshift, the greater the galaxy’s velocity will be.  The law can 
be formulated in the following manner: v = H0d, H0 being the Hubble constant and v 
being the velocity of a given galaxy and d being the distance of that galaxy from the 
Earth. (Freedman and Kaufmann 641)   (Freedman and Kaufmann 598-599) 
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  However, there are two problems that have arisen with respect to the predictions 
of this theory: one is that the Big Bang Theory in combination with other theories and 
presumed knowledge seems to imply that the universe is too young to have formed the 
galaxies that we see now; the second is that the velocity of individual galaxies as they 
spin around their centers is very fast – much faster than previously thought.  The velocity 
of a galaxy as it rotates around its center is proportional to the amount of mass and the 
average distance of this mass from the center. Yet, as in our galaxy, for example, the 
orbital speeds of objects and gas clouds on the distant edges of a galaxy are about the 
same as those for objects near to the center of rotation for a galaxy3 4.  The amount of 
observed matter and the amount of visible matter postulated by the Big Bang theory 
would indicate that galaxies ought not rotate in the manner that they do.  So, it would 
seem that current theories plus current estimates of mass of galaxies leads to false 
predictions about how galaxies spin.   
Maintaining the correctness of the Big Bang theory, this finding implies that there 
is a lot more matter in these galaxies than can be accounted for with the ‘normal matter’ 
                                                 
3 So, for example, if the galaxy rotated like a cd does when being played, then the Sun 
and the stars would always keep the same position relative to each other – something that 
is not observed to happen.  That the entire galaxy moves at about the same orbital speed 
explains, in part, why the observable heavens do not stay constant for us over time. (573, 
575) 
 
4 A concise alternative characterization of the problem: “Virtually all observed spiral 
rotation curves are flat (or rising) to the limits of the observations, implying that the mass 
density decreases approximately as 1/r².  The luminosity however falls off faster, 
exponentially.  Thus, the ratio of mass density to luminosity density increases with radial 
distance, requiring the presence of a halo of dark matter, which becomes increasingly 
dominant with increased nuclear distance.”  Rubin, Vera C.  “Galaxy Dynamics and the 
Mass Density of the Universe.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, Vol. 90, No. 11 (June 1, 1993), 4814-4821.  This quote can be 
found on p. 4815 
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(matter such as that which we can see using telescopes, etc., and that which surrounds us) 
that was created in the Big Bang.  It is even more matter than can be explained by so-
called dim matter: the matter that constitutes dwarf stars and planets that does not emit 
much radiation and, so, cannot be detected by our current instruments.  According to the 
Big Bang Theory, there cannot be enough of this matter to explain the phenomena that 
scientists have observed; these types of objects would not have nearly enough mass to 
explain why the outer edges of a galaxy have the orbital speeds that they do.5 (Freedman 
Kaufmann 574-575) In order to save the Big Bang theory in the face of disconfirming 
evidence without modifying their other theories, scientists needed to postulate the 
existence of a large amount of non-visible, exotic matter: dark matter, so named because 
it does not emit or absorb light.  If the matter did either of those things, we would have 
noticed it before now.   
Postulating dark matter, as well, can solve the first problem - that the universe is 
too young to have formed the galaxies within our universe.  If there were large amounts 
of neutral matter, besides normal matter, found in the universe, this neutral matter would 
have sped up the formation of galaxies.  This is because, unlike normal matter, which had 
to change from a plasma of particles kept smooth by radiation into a neutral gas which 
would allow fluctuations in the density of the matter necessary for the formation of 
galaxies6, this dark matter was already neutral and, so, could have started contracting 
                                                 
5 A similar problem is found when looking at our observations of the orbital speed of 
galaxy clusters.  
  
6 The transformation from a smooth plasma to complex structures is concisely stated in 
“Extracting Primordial Density Fluctuations”:  
    “Shortly after the Big Bang, the universe was smooth to a precision of one part in 105.  
We can measure this smoothness in cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation – 
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earlier, speeding up the galaxy forming process.  This matter, as noted above, would also 
explain why it is that there seems to be a lot more matter in individual galaxies than it 
appears: the matter that helped speed up the galaxy-forming process is still found within 
these galaxies.7   
 To solve these problems, an enormous amount of dark matter has to be 
postulated: according to some views, it makes up as much as 95% of the total mass of our 
universe.  This is a very surprising claim and it is made in order to get the Big Bang 
Theory out of trouble.       
Isn’t it rather strange that scientists began to postulate dark matter because of the 
mass discrepancies that they were observing?  Certainly, the Big Bang Theory has been 
considered a success but, perhaps, it is ultimately incorrect?  Or, notice that the scientists’ 
calculations of the velocity of galaxies are based on the laws of gravitation – perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                 
photons that provide us with a record of conditions in the early universe, because they 
were last scattered about 300,000 years after the Big Bang.  To a remarkably precise 
degree, the early universe was characterized by isotropic homogeneous expansion.  
However, temperature fluctuations have been measured in the CMB, and complex 
structure surrounds us.  There is a simple connection: The seeds of large-scale structure 
were infinitesimal density perturbations that grew through gravitational instability into 
massive structures such as galaxies and galaxy clusters.”  (1405) 
 
Gawiser, Eric and Silk, Joseph.  “Extracting Primordial Density Fluctuations.” Science, 
New Series, Vol. 280, No. 5368 (29 May 1998), 1405-1411.   
 
7 As stated in Rubin: 
     “Nearly 60 years ago, Zwicky and Smith discovered that individual galaxies in the 
Coma and Virgo clusters of galaxies have velocities so large with respect to the mean 
cluster velocity that their mutual gravitational attraction would not be sufficient to bind 
the clusters.  Hence, either clusters are expanding and galaxies are dispersing (contrary to 
observation) or the total mass in the clusters is larger than that implied by the luminous 
material.  Zwicky called this the “missing mass.”  For many years, this conclusion was 
relegated to the “things we don’t understand” file and assumed to be a mysterious 
property of galaxy clusters.  Not until we discovered the need for dark matter in 
individual galaxies did these early observations join the mainstream of astronomical 
research.” (4819) 
 5
these laws are incorrect? Is it possible that scientists postulated the existence of dark 
matter for no other reason than to save their theories of the creation of the universe and of 
gravitational laws when these theories were threatened by recalcitrant evidence?  Does 
this make postulating dark matter suspect or, somehow, problematic?  Is not the 
postulation of dark matter an example of what scientists and philosophers call an ad hoc 
hypothesis?  
 
II.  Planck and Blackbody Radiation 
 
In 1900, Max Planck published “On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of 
the Normal Spectrum”8, where he addressed the problems encountered by the Rayleigh-
Jeans proposal in explaining black body radiation, as well as those of Wien’s 
explanation9.  All bodies emit radiation: as the temperature of the body increases, the 
total energy emitted by the body increases.  The Rayleigh-Jeans proposal successfully 
predicted the energy emitted in radiation of the longer wavelengths but was not able to 
account for the energy emitted in radiation of shorter wavelengths.  Wien’s proposal 
successfully predicted the shorter wavelengths’ energy but not the longer ones’.  Both of 
these accounts were based upon the then-popular wave theory of light10.  Planck’s 
account of blackbody radiation, on the other hand, was able successfully to account for 
all wavelengths of emissions.   
                                                 
8 Planck, Max.  “On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal 
Spectrum.”  Annalen der Physik.  D. ter Haar, ed.  Pergamon Press, 1967.  82 
 
9 For a further explanation of Wien’s law, see Freedman and Kaufmann 102-103 
 
10 See, for example, Young’s account of light. 
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Yet, this success came at a cost.  In order to reconcile what people had postulated 
about electromagnetic energy with the observed data concerning the intensity of the 
radiation emitted by a black body at certain wavelengths, Planck had to introduce h – 
now known as Planck’s constant.  The introduction of h did not seem to be scientifically 
justified: instead, Planck seems to have introduced it because its introduction made his 
mathematical formula  get the same results as had been observed.  Also, the equation 
seems to imply that energy itself is quantized, which, at the time, was not considered a 
viable position and, at the very least, did not have any direct evidence to back it up.   
Does this example seem to be an example of an ad hoc hypothesis introduction?  
Max Planck, himself, seemed to think that it was.  And, his motivation for its introduction 
was to save at least part of a certain theory of electro-magnetic energy against adverse 
evidence.  On the other hand, this hypothesis was demonstrated to be, in fact, correct.  
Einstein, in his examination of the photoelectric effect, seemed to demonstrate that this 
energy is quantized.  Planck’s hypothesis has also been exceedingly valuable when used 
as a part of other scientific endeavors.11   
How is this example similar to the dark matter example?  Well, in both, 
something seems to be postulated in order to maintain the correctness of a given theory – 
Planck’s constant was postulated in order to maintain a certain theory of electro-magnetic 
energy, while dark matter was postulated in order to maintain dynamical laws12 and the 
                                                 
11   I return to this example in chapter 5, section X. 
  
12   That is, Newton’s second law – “A change in motion is proportional to the motive 
force impressed and takes place along the straight line in which that force is impressed” 
(Newton 416) – and Newton’s law of gravitation – “planet B will gravitate in turn toward 
all the parts of planet A, and its gravity toward any one part will be to its gravity toward 
the whole of the planet as the matter of that part to the matter of the whole[…]The 
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Big Bang theory.  Also, the existence of non-visible matter seems to go against the 
previously popular belief that all matter must, in principle, emit radiation.  Analogously, 
the introduction of Planck’s constant implied that energy is quantized, against the then-
popular wave theory of light.   
How are these two examples different?   Well, it might be argued that, in the dark 
matter example, later experiment has not yet validated it in the way that Einstein’s 
experiments involving the photoelectric effect, which he successfully explained in terms 
of quantized electromagnetic energy.13  Also, it may be argued, we know what these 
quanta are made of, while the composition of dark matter is still quite mysterious.  
Finally, Planck’s constant was introduced to help a well-respected theory of electro-
magnetic energy, while dark matter was introduced in order to help the Big Bang theory 
in conjunction with gravitational theory and acceleration theory.  Are these theories on 
                                                                                                                                                 
gravitation toward each of the individual equal particles of a body is inversely as the 
square of the distance of places from those particles.” (Newton 811)  
 
Newton, Sir Isaac.  The Principia.  I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, trans. 
University of California Press: Berkley, 1999.  
  
  Or, a modern translation: the second law: F = ma, where F = net outside force, m 
= mass of object and a = acceleration of object. (Freedman and Kaufmann 80) Universal 
gravitation: F = G(m1m2/r2), where F is the gravitational force between two objects, G is 
the universal constant of gravitation,  m1 and m2  are the masses of the two objects and r is 
the distance between the objects.   
 
13  One place in which Einstein demonstrates the need for quantized electromagnetic 
energy is in “On a Heuristic Point of View Concerning the Production and 
Transformation of Light.” 
 
Einstein, Albert.  “On a Heuristic Point of View Concerning the Production and 
Transformation of Light.”  Einstein’s Miraculous Year: Five Papers That Changed the 
Face of Physics.  John Stachel, ed.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.  165-
198. 
 
 8
the same footing as electro-magnetic energy theory, or the Big Bang theory?  We might 
argue, “No”.   
In fact, the initial modern explanation of gravitation might be considered by some 
to be ‘ad hoc’.  Newton himself did not consider his own law of gravitation entirely 
satisfactory.  He was uneasy about the need to postulate ‘action at a distance’ – the idea 
that a body exerts force on another body while there is no physical contact between the 
two bodies.  Newton denied the existence of action at a distance in all other physical 
interactions and, so, the need to postulate it in the case of gravity seemed a bit 
unsatisfactory.  One of the criticisms leveled against Newton was, in fact, the need to 
postulate action at a distance for universal gravitation.  While gravitational theory has 
been revised since Newton, the problem of action at a distance still remains.  And, as has 
been noted by Mordehai Milgrom14, an opponent of dark matter theories, two major 
changes have already been made to Newton’s dynamics: “[t]he first upgraded Newtonian 
dynamics to the theory of relativity – both the special theory (which changed Newton’s 
second law) and the general theory (which altered the law of gravity)[…] The two proven 
extensions of Newtonian dynamics come into play under extreme conditions, such as 
extreme speeds (special relativity) or extremely strong gravity (general relativity).”15   He 
                                                 
14 Milgrom’s MOND theory is the main challenger to dark matter theories.  Interestingly, 
there have been new studies done on the orbits of stars, using observations from the 
Sagittarius stream (the remnants of the Sagittarius dwarf elliptical galaxy which has been 
captured by the Milky Way galaxy), that seem to match the predictions of MOND theory.   
 
Ibata, Rodrigo and Gibson, Brad.  “The Ghosts of Galaxies Past.”  Scientific American, 
April 2007.  40-45.  Discussion on inset, p. 44.  
 
15 Milgrom, Mordehai.  “Does Dark Matter Really Exist?” Scientific American, August 
2002.  42-52.  Quote found on p. 44. 
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goes on to note that another extreme condition might well be extreme size, and galactic 
scales would certainly fall under this heading.  
As we’ve noticed in the last two examples, hypotheses that have been labeled ‘ad 
hoc’ during some scientific period are hypotheses introduced when there has been a 
problem facing an accepted theory.  There are other canonical introductions that have 
been discussed in the literature.  We will turn to one of these next: specifically Ptolemaic 
astronomy.   
Before we get to this example, a cautionary note must appear. With the 
forthcoming Ptolemaic example, as well as other examples that will arise, we will have to 
make sure to distinguish between thinking that a hypothesis is ad hoc and thinking that it 
is just wrong or false.  Newton’s second law is a good example to use for this distinction.  
The second law – that the external force on an object is equal to its mass multiplied by its 
acceleration – does not hold for objects that are moving at rates near to the speed of light 
(3 x 108 m/sec).  Until Einstein demonstrated this failure, however, the second law was 
thought to be one of the cornerstones of physical theory.  The second law was 
demonstrated to be wrong but it was never really charged with being ‘ad hoc’.  One of the 
concerns that arises when discussing potential examples of ad hoc introductions of 
hypotheses is how to distinguish between hypotheses that are introduced in an ad hoc 
manner and those that are simply wrong.  I will return to this subject in more detail in 
section X of this chapter and in chapter 5, section III - especially footnote 13.  Right now, 
while we are trying to compare putative instances of ad hoc introductions, it will be 
enough to keep that concern in the background of our minds. 
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I will now turn to another, canonical example of ad hocness: Ptolemaic 
astronomy.  I will use this case to explicate my methodological account of ad hocness and 
to critique other accounts because the Ptolemaic astronomy case is far less complicated 
than the dark matter case and is one about which we have definite intuitions. I will leave 
the dark matter case as an interesting project for the reader.   
 
III.  Introduction to the Project and To Ptolemy 
 
My project is to define a methodological test for determining whether a 
hypothesis acceptance is ad hoc.  In order to demonstrate this test’s usefulness and its 
superiority to other proposed definitions of ad hocness, I will here present a theory that 
many philosophers have claimed used ad hoc modifications16 and that peoples’ intuitions 
                                                 
16 Thomas Kuhn, for example, speaks about Ptolemaic astronomy in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  As he is interested mainly in “paradigm shifts” (his 
phrase), he cites Ptolemaic astronomy and the emergence of Copernican astronomy as 
one of the most famous paradigm shifts.  That he is dealing with similar issues as this 
paper is clear from the following quote: “For some time astronomers had every reason to 
suppose that these attempts [solutions to minor discrepancies] would be as successful as 
those that had let to Ptolemy’s system.  Given a particular discrepancy, astronomers were 
invariably able to eliminate it by making some particular adjustment in Ptolemy’s system 
of compounded circles.  But as time went on, a man looking at the net result of the 
normal research effort of many astronomers could observe that astronomy’s complexity 
was increasing far more rapidly than its accuracy and that a discrepancy corrected in 
one place was likely to show up in another.”[italics mine] (Kuhn 68) 
Kuhn later identifies the nature of these sorts of actions: “By themselves they 
[epistemological counterinstances] cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, 
for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by 
anomaly.  They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their 
theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.” (Kuhn 78) 
 
Kuhn, Thomas.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962 
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label as being modified in an ad hoc manner.  The theory that I will present is that of 
Ptolemaic astronomy.  I will then characterize why Ptolemy’s account does make ad hoc 
modifications, and I will also test other theories of ad hocness using this example. I claim 
that other theories of ad hocness either do not capture the sense in which the 
modifications Ptolemy makes are rationally impermissible, or do not characterize these 
modifications as ad hoc at all.  The theories that I will be examining are Howson and 
Urbach’s and Michael Strevens’s versions of Bayesianism17, Jarrett Leplin’s account of 
ad hocness18 and Malcolm Forster, Christopher Hitchcock and Elliott Sober’s curve 
fitting theory19.  First, however, let’s look at Ptolemy’s account. 
 
IV.  Ptolemy and Astronomical Motion 
                                                 
17 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter.  Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd 
Ed.  La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1993. 
 
Strevens, Michael.  “The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.”  The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52 (2001), 515-537. 
 
18 Leplin, Jarrett.  “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis.”  Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5  #4 (Feb. 1975), 308-245.   
 
Leplin, Jarrett.  “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.”  The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 33 (1982), 235-249. 
 
19 Forster, Malcom and Sober, Elliott.  “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or 
Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.”  The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), 1-35. 
 
Hitchcock, Christopher and Sober, Elliott.  “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the 
Risk of Overfitting.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55 (2004), 
1-34.  
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 Ptolemy’s account of astronomical motion in The Almagest20 begins with 
Ptolemy’s eight main theoretical commitments: 1) the movement of the heavens is 
spherical; 2) the heavens themselves are spherical; 3) heavenly objects are spherical; 4) 
the Earth is spherical; 5) the Earth is the center of the heavens; 6) the fixed stars are so far 
away from the Earth that the Earth is like a point to them; 7) the Earth does not, itself, 
move in any way; 8) there are 2 motions to the heavens. (Ptolemy 7)  
 The movement of the heavens is spherical because, as Ptolemy says, the stars 
seem to be moving daily from the same initial starting point in the sky.  If the movement 
were not spherical, we would not observe this phenomenon to occur.  The movements of 
the planets are also, then, circular, as they are a part of the heavens.  What Ptolemy 
means by a circular orbit seems to be an orbit that is circular in shape, where the heavenly 
body passes through equal arcs of the circle in equal times.21 (Ptolemy 86-87)   
The heavens themselves are spherical because ether, of which the heavens are composed, 
has “the finest and most homogenous parts” (Ptolemy 8) of all bodies.  As its parts are 
homogenous, its surface must be made of homogenous parts.  The only 3-dimensional 
geometrical figure that fits this description is a sphere.  Thus, the heavens must be 
spherical. (Ptolemy 8)  Ptolemy then goes on to discuss why it is that heavenly objects 
are spherical.  According to Ptolemy, heavenly objects are spherical because, if they were 
another shape, they would not look circular from all angles.  That is, if heavenly bodies 
                                                 
20 Ptolemy, Claudius.  The Almagest.  Britannica Great Books, Vol. 16.  R. Catesby 
Taliaferro, trans.  Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.  1987.  1-480  
   
21 This analysis appears also to be supported by Ptolemy’s analysis of the composition of 
the heavens and the composition of heavenly bodies.  “As they are made of homogeneous 
parts and, as a result, move circularly because things that are homogenous will move in a 
homogeneous manner, so too does it seem that their speed must also be homogeneous, 
never speeding up or slowing down.” (Ptolemy 8-9) 
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were some other shape, I might see them as circular from North Carolina while someone 
in Taiwan might see them, instead, as a narrow strip.   This does not occur and, so, 
heavenly bodies must be spherical.   
 Ptolemy also asserts that the Earth is spherical.  This is for several reasons.  One 
reason that the Earth must be spherical is because, when we are sailing on a body of 
water, mountains ‘come up’ from out of the sea as we get nearer to a certain land mass.  
If the Earth were not circular, then we ought to be able to see the mountains from across 
the body of water, instead of them being revealed as we come closer to land. (Ptolemy 9)  
 Additionally, Ptolemy argues that the Earth must be spherical because of the 
differing times when people, located on different parts of the Earth, see eclipses.  People 
in the East report proportionally later times of observance than do those in the West.  
These time differences are proportional to the distances between the places where 
observations were being made.  If the Earth were anything other than a sphere, then the 
time differences of the reports would not be proportional to the distances between the 
observation locations.  (Ptolemy 8-9) 
 Having discussed his first four commitments, Ptolemy goes on to discuss the 
reasons for his commitment to the Earth being in the center of the heavens.  Where would 
the Earth be located if it were not located in the center of the heavens?  It would either be 
on the axis of the heavenly sphere but closer to one pole or the other of the heavenly 
sphere, equidistant from the poles but not on the axis of the heavenly sphere, or neither 
on the axis nor equidistant from the poles.  Ptolemy again uses the appearances of the 
heavens to motivate his rejection of these three alternative locations for the Earth. 
(Ptolemy 9-10)  If the Earth were located closer to one of the poles, Ptolemy argues, then 
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the plane of the horizon would cut the heavens into two unequal parts.  This cannot be 
happening, however, because half of the parts of the zodiac are always above the horizon 
and half are always below, no matter where you are on the Earth.  If the Earth were 
located closer to one of the poles, then we would not expect to encounter such an even 
split between the parts of the zodiac that we did and didn’t see. (Ptolemy 10)  If the Earth 
was not on the axis of the heavenly sphere, Ptolemy thinks, the equinoxes would not 
occur when they actually do, halfway between the solstices.  Rather, an equinox would 
occur nearer to one solstice than to another because the Earth would be off the axis of the 
heavenly sphere.   He claims that “[i]t is absolutely agreed by all, however, that these 
distances are everywhere equal because the increase from the equinox to the longest day 
at the summer tropic are equal to the decreases to the least days at the winter tropic.” 
(Ptolemy 9)  As the increases are equal, the Earth must be found on the axis of the 
heavenly sphere.  The appearances seem to contradict both the Earth’s being off the axis 
and the Earth being closer to one of the poles than the other, so the third option is also 
eliminated, it just being a combination of the first two options.  So, Ptolemy thinks he has 
shown that the Earth must be in the center of the heavens.   
 Next, Ptolemy explains his commitment to the Earth’s having the ratio of a point 
to the heavens.  He notes two things: firstly, the measurements of angular distances of the 
stars are the same, no matter where on Earth you might make the measurement; secondly, 
that, from every observation point on the Earth, the horizon cuts the heavens exactly in 
half.  Ptolemy claims that this would not happen if the Earth were larger than as a point to 
the heavens.  Instead, a point drawn through the center of the Earth would cut the heavens 
in half but lines drawn from the surface would not. (Ptolemy 10) 
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  Then, Ptolemy asserts his reasoning for why the Earth does not fall in the way 
that other objects on Earth do.  The Earth is a much greater magnitude, Ptolemy claims, 
than the heavy bodies that are found on it.  The Earth’s greater magnitude absorbs the fall 
of these heavy bodies that are attracted towards its center.  If the Earth were to fall, in 
proportion to its size as those of the heavy bodies, Ptolemy says, then the Earth’s 
movement would leave the other bodies behind, its movement being so much the greater.  
Thus, all the animals and objects on the Earth would be left in the air, with no Earth 
beneath them. (Ptolemy 11) 
 Ptolemy’s final assumption is that there are two movements in the heavens.   The 
first movement is “that by which everything moves from east to west, always in the same 
way and at the same speed with revolutions in circles parallel to each other and clearly 
described about the poles of the regularly revolving sphere.” (Ptolemy 12)  What sort of 
movement is Ptolemy thinking about with this description?  It looks like he is talking 
about the way in which the heavenly bodies seem to all rise and set in the same direction, 
keeping their angular distances with respect to each other the same. (Ptolemy 13)  
However, there is another, additional movement.  This movement is “that according to 
which the spheres of the stars make certain local motions in the direction opposite to that 
of the movement just described [the east to west movement] and around other poles than 
those of that first revolution.” (Ptolemy 12-13)  This is a movement Ptolemy ascribes to 
the sun and the planets, in contrast to the fixed stars, which move only according to the 
first movement.  Ptolemy has already asserted that planetary movement is regular, so he 
cannot ascribe non-uniform movement to explain this motion. Instead, he claims this 
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movement to be a regular movement, where this movement is on a “circle oblique to the 
equator.”22 (Ptolemy 13)   
 It is unclear whether Ptolemy created his theory of planetary motion with all of 
these assumptions in place, for it could be claimed that Ptolemy wrote the introduction of 
the Almagest after completely hammering down all the details and modifications of his 
theory.  I do not wish to engage in historical debate over whether this is the case or not.  
Instead, suppose he did have all of these theoretical commitments.  Suppose that he 
arrived at this theory on the basis of the evidence described and then some new evidence 
came to light.  This new evidence seems to contraindicate the theory, forcing Ptolemy to 
then modify some part of his theory/auxiliary hypotheses.  Are all of the modifications 
that Ptolemy makes non-ad hoc?     
 The case for which I will consider this question is Ptolemy’s treatment of the 
motion of the sun, as the sun is the first heavenly body whose apparent movement 
Ptolemy considers.  The rest of the heavenly bodies whose orbits Ptolemy attempts to 
describe all build on the geometry he uses in describing the sun’s orbit.23  
                                                 
22 Imagine the sun, for example, getting carried about with the fixed stars in the heavenly 
sphere.  While the sun is getting carried about in this manner, it is also traveling around 
the ecliptic (concentric to the location of the Earth, albeit at an angle to the equator) in the 
direction opposite of its 1st movement.  If we were to hold the heavenly sphere fixed, the 
sun would be moving from west to east at an oblique angle to the equator.    
 
23 In addition, the other heavenly bodies’ orbits admit of 2 anomalies instead of just one, 
while the sun’s admits of just the first.  The first anomaly is described as the heavenly 
body appearing to describe unequal arcs in equal time around the ecliptic.  The second is 
the zodiacal anomaly, (Ptolemy 272 fn.1) which explains why certain heavenly bodies 
appear to have retrograde motion.  The first anomaly can be explained by either of 
Ptolemy’s 2 hypotheses that will be outlined, below.  The second, he claims, can only be 
explained by the epicycle hypothesis. (Ptolemy 291)  It has been Ptolemy’s exposition of 
the orbit of the moon and of the planets that has been especially criticized, previously: 
Copernicus attacks modifications made for the moon’s orbit - that the epicycle need not 
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  The sun, as well as the other heavenly bodies, is thought to move at a regular 
pace, never speeding up nor slowing down.  This is because the sun is posited to move in 
a perfectly circular orbit.  As Ptolemy states this: “the straight lines, conceived as 
revolving the stars or their circles, cut off in equal times on absolutely all circumferences 
equal angles at the centres of each” (Ptolemy 86) As a result, the sun’s movement ought 
to be observed as completely regular.  Ptolemy notes, however, that in the data collected 
both by Hipparchus and by himself, the sun does not appear to move completely 
regularly.  Instead, it seems to have an inconstant speed – that is, it does not seem to 
describe equal arcs in equal time.  Its seasonal movement back and forth speeds up and 
slows down.24     
 However, Ptolemy still maintains that all movements of the heavens are circular.  
Thus, this motion of the sun, the one causing its apparent anomaly, must also be perfectly 
circular, though it makes the sun’s movement seem imperfectly circular25.  The way that 
he explains this apparent anomaly is through the use of either epicycles or eccentrics.  As 
Ptolemy states: 
                                                                                                                                                 
move around the center of the circle it moves on as long as it moves regularly around a 
point near the Earth [the equant] (Copernicus 677) - and others have attacked the amount 
of epicycles and eccentrics needed for some of the planets.  However, I wish to 
concentrate on Ptolemy’s first steps, to see if his initial commitments were warranted.  I 
discuss Ptolemaic theory as a series of added epicycles in chapter 2, section VI, as well as 
in chapter 3, section VI, and in chapter 5, section XI.  I also allude to it in chapter 4, 
section II. 
 
 Copernicus, Nicolaus.  On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres.  Britannica Great 
Books, vol. 16.  Charles Glenn Wallis, trans.  Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.  
1987. 505-844 
 
24 From now on, I will abbreviate this phenomenon to ‘the sun’s anomaly’.   
 
25 By the sun’s movements being imperfectly circular, I mean that the sun appears to pass 
through unequal arcs in equal times around a circle.   
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 But the cause of this irregular appearance can be accounted for by 
as many as two primary simple hypotheses.  For if their movement is 
considered with respect to a circle in the plane of the ecliptic concentric 
with the cosmos so that our eye is the centre, then it is necessary to 
suppose that they make their regular movements either along circles not 
concentric with the cosmos, or along concentric circles; not with these 
simply, but with other circles borne upon them called epicycles.  For 
according to either hypothesis it will appear possible for the planets 
seemingly to pass, in equal periods of time, through unequal arcs of the 
ecliptic circle which is concentric with the cosmos. (Ptolemy 87)  
 
So what, exactly, do the two potential modifications entail?  The first proposes that the 
sun revolves in a perfect circular orbit, describing equal arcs in equal times, where the 
orbit’s center does not coincide with the location of the Earth.  Thus, when our eyes view 
the sun’s orbit, it appears that the sun describes unequal arcs in equal time because the 
sun will be farther away from us at its apogee and closer at its perigee and, therefore, its 
apparent speed will seem different in these two locations – appearing to move more 
quickly at the perigee and more slowly at the apogee.  This option is what Ptolemy calls 
the hypothesis of eccentricity: the sun is posited to move around a circular orbit eccentric 
to the ecliptic circle that is concentric to the heavenly sphere.  (Ptolemy 87) 
 The second also proposes that the sun revolves in a perfect circular orbit, 
describing equal arcs in equal times.  However, this circular orbit itself orbits on a circle 
whose center is coincident with the location of the Earth (a deferent). (Ptolemy 87)  Thus, 
it will appear to the observer located in the center of the ecliptic that the sun is not 
moving in a perfect circular orbit because the rotation of the epicyclical circle around the 
ecliptic will make the sun appear to move more quickly through certain arcs of the 
ecliptic and more slowly through others. (Ptolemy 87) With the hypothesis of the 
epicycle, it does not need to be the case that the heavenly body revolving on the epicycle 
 19
will appear to move more quickly at the perigee and more slowly at the apogee, as with 
the eccentric hypothesis.  Rather, the heavenly body’s apparent speed at these two 
locations will depend on the direction in which the epicycle is rotating. (Ptolemy 87) 
 So, Ptolemy realizes that he cannot coherently maintain all aspects of his original 
8 hypotheses.  Instead, he will have to either reject his astronomical theory altogether 
(which he does not do) or he will have to modify some part of this theory so that the 
theory will again accord with all the available evidence.  In order to account for the 1st 
anomaly that the sun’s movement exhibits, and still maintain his theory, Ptolemy must 
modify the idea that all heavenly bodies move in a perfect circle whose center is 
coincident with the Earth’s location.  Does he have a way to choose between the 2 
hypotheses?  He cannot determine the superiority of, say, the eccentric hypothesis over 
the epicycle hypothesis by examining the empirical data.  As he states:  
 And it must be understood that all the appearances can be cared for 
interchangeably according to either hypothesis, when the same ratios are 
involved in each.  In other words, the hypotheses are interchangeable 
when, in the case of the hypothesis of the epicycle, the ratio of the 
epicycle’s radius to the radius of the circle carrying it [the deferent] is the 
same as, in the case of the hypothesis of eccentricity, the ratio of the line 
between the centres (that is, between the eye and the centre of the 
eccentric circle), to the eccentric circle’s radius (Ptolemy 88) 
 
This statement makes clear that Ptolemy thinks that the two hypotheses are empirically 
adequate to the same degree for use as explanation of the 1st anomalies.  In fact, he 
demonstrates through the use of geometric proofs that both will explain the sun’s 
apparent orbital anomaly. (Ptolemy 88-93)  Given that both’s results are empirically 
identical, it’s not immediately clear that Ptolemy has a basis for choosing between the 
two.  Yet, choose he does.  He chooses the eccentric hypothesis to explain the sun’s 
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anomaly and proceeds to use it for all of the other heavenly bodies whose orbits he 
describes in order to explain this 1st anomaly.  And Ptolemy chooses to use the eccentric 
hypothesis as the most reasonable explanation of this anomaly, even though he continues 
to insist that the two hypotheses are interchangeable. (Ptolemy 291, e.g.)  Ptolemy claims 
that “it would be more reasonable to stick to the hypothesis of eccentricity which is 
simpler and completely effected by one and not two movements.” (Ptolemy 93)  So, 
because it is simpler, Ptolemy will use the hypothesis of eccentricity rather than that of 
the epicycle to explain the 1st anomaly. 
 Here, two questions arise.  Is Ptolemy accepting the hypothesis of eccentricity, or 
is he just using it as a matter of convenience? If he is accepting this hypothesis over the 
other, is he making an ad hoc move?   
 Again, I do not wish to engage in a historical debate.  So, I will sidestep the first 
question.  Suppose that Ptolemy is accepting the hypothesis of eccentricity.  Let us focus 
on the second question.  Intuitively, I claim, this is an ad hoc – and, therefore, rationally 
impermissible – move.  The eccentricity hypothesis and the epicycle hypothesis are 
empirically equivalent.  Ptolemy claims that the eccentricity hypothesis is simpler26, yet 
one might argue that it requires more of a deviation from the first principles set out by 
Ptolemy; after all, the eccentric hypothesis does require the ecliptic to no longer be 
concentric with the heavenly sphere.   And, as was discussed earlier, Copernicus was 
quite suspicious of the equant, which seems akin to the eccentric in that the circle in 
question no longer has the Earth as its center and is no longer concentric with the 
heavenly sphere.   
                                                 
26   I discuss his claim of simplicity in more detail in chapter 4, section V. 
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 I do not believe that this is my intuition alone, either.  Certainly, philosophers 
such as Kuhn (cited earlier) have upheld Ptolemaic theory modification as emblematic of 
an ad hoc move, although they do not necessarily agree on why this is so.  Additionally, 
most who have discussed the ad hoc nature of Ptolemy’s theory modification see it as a 
bad thing: that is, something like a vice, or rationally impermissible, or illicit in some 
way.   
 So, I argue, other theories of what makes a hypothesis introduction or acceptance 
ad hoc will need to illustrate why Ptolemy’s theory modification is, in fact, ad hoc, as 
well as illustrating why this modification is a vice in some way.   If they do not, then they 
will have to satisfactorily explain why their conclusions go against our common 
intuitions concerning the Ptolemy case.  And, I claim, none of the theories being 
considered will fulfill these obligations.   
 Before I get to the more contemporary views, however, I would like to examine 
the traditional view of ad hocness.  The traditional view originated with Karl Popper and 
a version of his account is clearly outlined by Carl Hempel in Philosophy of Natural 
Science27.  These two views, although not identical, are similar in spirit.  I will refer 
almost exclusively to Hempel’s account, although I will return briefly to Popper’s 
account of ad hocness where it differs from that of Hempel’s.   
 
V.  Hempel and Popper on Ad Hocness 
 
                                                 
27  Hempel, Carl.  Philosophy of Natural Science.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice – Hall, 
inc., 1966.  29-30 
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 Hempel asserts that hypotheses introduced ad hoc are objectionable in science.  
He claims that they are objectionable because a hypothesis introduced ad hoc is 
introduced “for the sole purpose of saving a hypothesis seriously threatened by adverse 
evidence; it would not be called for by other findings and, roughly, speaking, it leads to 
no additional test implications.” (Hempel 29)  He later admits that there is no precise 
criterion for deciding whether or not a hypothesis has been introduced ad hoc: there are 
only defeasible prima facie indicators, such as whether the hypothesis leads to additional 
predictions, and whether there is other evidence that corroborates the hypothesis.28  As he 
says: “is the hypothesis proposed just for the purpose of saving some current conception 
against adverse evidence, or does it also account for other phenomena, does it yield 
further significant test implications?” (Hempel 30)   
 So, Hempel thinks that there are two different indicators of ad hocness that tell us 
when a hypothesis ought to be considered ad hoc.  The first indicator is that an ad hoc 
hypothesis is one that is introduced solely to save a theory from adverse evidence.  The 
second, related, indicator is that an ad hoc hypothesis does not have any additional test 
                                                 
28     I should note that there are some very appealing intuitions that seem to underly the 
traditional account.  One appealing intuition is the idea that ad hocness is always 
objectionable in science and ad hoc hypotheses ought not to be permitted or, at least, 
censured as a result of their being ad hoc.  Scientists themselves certainly use the term ad 
hoc in a pejorative sense and condemn hypotheses with this appellation.  Another 
appealing intuition motivating the traditional account is the idea that the hypothesis is 
introduced to solve only one problem in the face of recalcitrant evidence – the particular 
problem that arose due to this evidence.  This, intuitively, seems to be a problem because 
the solution seems to be a band-aid applied to a theory in order to save it.  (Part of 
Leplin’s criteria seems motivated by this intuition.  See chapter 3, section II.)  Shortly, I 
will discuss major problems with the way that the traditional account of ad hocness is 
formulated from these intuitions, and at least one other intuition motivating the traditional 
account that motivates other, more modern accounts of ad hocness that I think is 
misguided.  However, I will motivate my positive account in part by these appealing 
intuitions that seem to motivate the traditional account. 
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implications. Before looking at several criticisms of this view, it is important to examine 
further what Hempel’s account signifies.   
Hempel first characterizes an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced solely to 
save a theory from adverse evidence.  The intuition behind this indicator for ad hocness 
seems to be that a hypothesis ought not be introduced just because it saves a theory.  
Thus, the first indicator seems related to the second because it condemns hypotheses that 
are just introduced to fix one problem.29  Suppose I were a proponent of a certain theory.  
I introduce a hypothesis into this theory, where my sole justification is to save this theory.  
This sort of hypothesis introduction might then be looked upon as quite suspect: I do not 
have any other reasons to introduce the hypothesis other than the recalcitrant evidence 
that made an adjustment of this theory necessary.  Since my motives to introduce this 
hypothesis are suspect, won’t it be more likely that this hypothesis is suspect and, thus, 
that it will be less likely that my now modified theory is true or empirically adequate?   
If a hypothesis is ad hoc, on Hempel’s view, it cannot have any additional test 
implications besides the problem that it is supposed to help the theory to which it is being 
added solve.  There are two ways in which this indicator can be understood: either there 
will be no other test implications in that historical context at that time, given what 
scientists know or think possible at the time, or there will be no other test implications in 
principle for the hypothesis.  I will examine these two options when I come to my 
criticism of Hempel’s view.   
                                                 
29 These are indicators and not criteria because it is not clear whether Hempel is claiming 
that each is sufficient on its own for determining whether or not a hypothesis is ad hoc, or 
whether both conditions need to be fulfilled in order for a hypothesis to be ad hoc.  At the 
end of the section on the first indicator of ad hocness, I will consider what might happen 
if both are necessary conditions of ad hocness.  
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Karl Popper’s related view30 is that ad hoc hypotheses are unfalsifiable: that is, 
that there are no experiments different than the one that caused the hypothesis to be 
introduced into a given theory that can be performed where there is an opportunity for the 
hypothesis to be demonstrated false.  These two criteria are related because both trade on 
the idea that an ad hoc hypothesis is one whose only implication is the accommodation of 
the recalcitrant evidence so that scientists may still uphold their theory.  An example that 
Hempel uses (Hempel 28-29) is the horror vacui theorists.  As late as the 17th century, 
people believed that nature abhors a vacuum and, so, something like a suction pump 
works because “water rushes up the pump barrel to fill the vacuum created by the rising 
piston.” (Hempel 28-29)  Yet, Torricelli had already found evidence that air is 
pressurized and Pascal had already performed the Puy-de-Dome experiment, which 
demonstrated that a suction pump raised water to a lesser height when on top of the Puy 
de Dome in Auvergne than did it when of top of Diepe, which is at a much lower altitude 
than the Puy de Dome.  These findings seem to disconfirm that nature abhors a vacuum, 
as it would seem strange that nature would abhor a vacuum in one place more than 
another.  As Pascal said, “Does nature abhor a vacuum more on mountains than in 
valleys, more in wet weather than in clear weather?  Does she not hate it equally on a 
belfry, in an attic, and in the yard?”31   Instead, Torrecelli and Pascal’s findings seem to 
                                                 
30 See, for example: 
 
Popper, Karl.  Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to the Logic of 
Scientific Discovery.  Routledge: New York, 1992.  © 1983. 
 
31 Pascal, Blaise.  The Physical Treatises of Pascal: the equilibrium of liquids and the 
weight of the mass of the air. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937.  429 
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maintain Pascal’s thesis, that there are vacuums and that the weight of the mass of the air 
is the cause of the height of water in a suction pump.  
In the face of this evidence, the horror vacui theorists might have proposed the 
following hypothesis: nature does abhor a vacuum more in certain places and at certain 
times than others. And experiments done at different times and places will help us 
determine where it is that nature abhors vacuums more.  Hempel would label this sort of 
hypothesis ‘ad hoc’ because it does not look like this hypothesis will give us any 
additional test implications other than those of Pascal, whose evidence the hypothesis 
was supposed to mitigate.32  And Popper would agree that this hypothesis was 
unfalsifiable because the amount that nature abhors a vacuum will just be whatever 
readings are obtained at certain places and at certain times: there is no way to create an 
experiment where there is a possibility of disconfirmation for this hypothesis.33 
 
VI.  Problems for Hempel’s First Indicator 
 
 Hempel’s two indicators, however, are not adequate for determining ad hocness. 
Hempel’s first indicator – that an ad hoc hypothesis is one introduced solely to save a 
                                                 
32 For an additional example of the sort of hypothesis that Hempel considers ad hoc, see 
Hempel’s discussion of the funiculus hypothesis. (Hempel 29)  I’ll discuss the funiculus 
hypothesis in chapter 4, section VI. 
 
33 I will maintain that there will be (insurmountable) problems faced when claiming that a 
hypothesis has no additional test implications, or that a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, in 
section VII.  There is a related discussion for Hempel’s 2nd criterion in section VI.  Right 
now, I am just trying to describe the traditional view in more detail.  This includes giving 
examples characterizing how the proponents of the traditional view thought that they 
could show how a certain hypothesis is ad hoc and motivating the intuitions behind the 
view. 
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theory from adverse evidence –  runs into trouble.  It seems to commit us to claiming that 
ad hocness depends on the psychology of the scientists introducing the hypothesis.  
Here’s an example to illustrate this point:  Scientists Kevin and Brian work together to 
create a new hypothesis.  They create and then introduce this hypothesis because there 
has arisen new evidence that is inconsistent with the current theory T.  They are 
committed to the same scientific background, have read the same articles, and are 
committed to the same theories.  Everything about their respective situations is exactly 
the same with one exception: Brian is motivated to introduce this hypothesis because he 
knows that the President really likes theory T and will generously fund any project that 
‘saves’ theory T.  Kevin, on the other hand, realizes that this new hypothesis will also 
predict other phenomena that will likely occur, based on the new evidence that has been 
found. 
 If we are to side with Hempel and claim that an ad hoc hypothesis is one where 
there are no other motivations (NOM), then it looks as if we are committed to one of the 
following claims: (a) the hypothesis is not ad hoc if we look at the motivations of Kevin 
but it is if we look at Brian’s motivations; (b) the hypothesis is sort of ad hoc – because 
the two scientists’ motivations were different; (c) the hypothesis is ad hoc – at least, until 
Brian realizes that it does predict other phenomena over and beyond theory T and, thus, T 
+ hypothesis is a better predictor than T alone.  (c) does not seem to be a very satisfactory 
option because it more heavily weighs Brian’s motivations without giving justification 
for this.  Yet, options (a) and (b) both force us to give up the idea that something is either 
ad hoc or not.   
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 There is, here, a dubious connection between the reasonableness of a scientist34 
adopting a given hypothesis (barring other major problems) and what the scientist was 
actually thinking at the time.  Appropriate theory modification is a matter of following 
the correct procedures.  It is in following these procedures that the scientist will be likely 
to make the appropriate modifications.  It does not matter why it is that the scientist is 
following these procedures, nor does it matter if the scientist understands how the 
procedure works.   
 Additionally, it might well be the case that a certain hypothesis introduction ends 
up being a benefit for a given theory, even though the scientists introduced it NOM-ly.  
An example would be Planck’s introduction of h in order to solve the problems that arose 
for the then-current theories of black body radiation.  As stated previously, Planck 
himself thought that this hypothesis introduction was ad hoc.  Yet, Einstein later 
validated this introduction.  Would, then, we want to say that this hypothesis introduction 
was ad hoc but that it was a good introduction, nonetheless?35   
 NOM does not construe ad hocness as always a vice, thus going against scientific 
and philosophical tradition concerning the usage of this term. Scientific tradition is such 
                                                 
34 Or, perhaps, it being justified to adopt. 
 
35   I am using this example merely in order to motivate our intuitions concerning the 
nature of ad hocness.  Using this example is a bit misleading, as I claim (in chapter 5, 
section X) that, in introducing h, Planck created a new blackbody radiation theory instead 
of modifying one of the existing theories.  Thus, his action is not one that can be 
evaluated for ad hocness.  However, in the context in which the example is currently 
being discussed, the important element is that Planck introduced it solely to reconcile the 
existing blackbody radiation theories with the evidence.  The example could be changed 
so that, in fact, Planck was modifying an existing theory instead of changing over to a 
new theory.  Thus, I think that my use of this example, albeit not truly an example of an 
ad hoc act, is harmless.   
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that a charge of ad hocness always gives negative connotations.  Yet, on views that rely 
on NOM, ad hoc hypotheses need to be divided into a ‘good ad hoc’ category and a ‘bad 
ad hoc’ category.  This is because the motives of scientists cannot alone cause a 
hypothesis adoption itself to be either good or bad.36 
 A skeptical reader might view the Kevin and Brian example with suspicion.  He 
might think that this story is being set up as if Kevin and Brian have identical situations 
except for one insignificant difference in their motivations.  Yet, the objection goes, this 
difference ought not be considered insignificant.  The only way that this difference would 
be insignificant, the skeptic claims, is if the example presupposes a consequentialist 
methodology.  In ethics, consequentialism is the view that what counts, morally, are the 
outcomes of actions.  Whatever action will cause the greatest good or the least bad will 
be the morally right action.  According to ethical consequentialists, there is no difference 
between a boy scout helping an old lady across the street because he wants to show his 
respect for the elderly and the boy scout doing so because he wants to impress his 
girlfriend, as long as the same consequences occur.  Like consequentialists in ethics, the 
skeptic claims, there can be consequentialists in scientific methodology.  And, as in 
                                                 
36 It is true that, on my view, it can become a good thing that some hypothesis is a part of 
a given theory, when it wasn’t previously.  However, seeing the eventual benefit of 
having the hypothesis as part of a theory does not erase the fact that the acceptance of this 
hypothesis into the theory was ad hoc and that the scientist committed a methodological 
error in accepting it at the time that she did.  I have a detailed discussion of the 
combination of ad hocness with other virtues and vices in chapter 5, section XIII.  A 
hypothesis acceptance is either ad hoc, or it is not.  A scientist commits a methodological 
error in accepting an ad hoc hypothesis.  There might be epistemological reasons for 
accepting such a hypothesis, despite its being ad hoc.   
    As I was just discussing elements of my own view, I was being much more careful in 
stating what can be labeled ‘ad hoc’.  On my account, only certain types of hypothesis 
acceptances can be labeled ‘ad hoc’.  I discuss my reasons for this distinction in section 
XI of this chapter, as well as in chapter 5, section I. 
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ethics, there is also another way to view scientific methodology that is not recognized in 
the Kevin and Brian example.  This would be a deontological view of scientific 
methodology, where the motivations of the scientists are the most important criterion for 
the acceptability of their actions.   
 The Kevin and Brian example, by claiming this difference in motivations is 
insignificant, is presupposing a consequentialist conception of the situation: that is, Kevin 
and Brian were committed to the same theory, were aware of the same recalcitrant 
evidence and came up with the same hypothesis to save the theory in the face of this 
evidence.  Therefore, supposing consequentialism, Kevin and Brian’s hypotheses ought 
to be evaluated the same.  However, the skeptic continues, this conclusion only follows 
given the presupposed consequentialism.  Yet, there is a very important difference 
between Kevin’s situation and Brian’s situation: they have different motivations to 
introduce this hypothesis.  Having read all of the same literature and being committed to 
the same background, etc., gives both of them access to the same sorts of motivations.  
Kevin acted according to the correct motivation and, so, is justified to believe that the 
new hypothesis is true37.  Brian, on the other hand, did not have as his motivation the 
correct motivation to introduce the hypothesis.  Yet, he, too, had the correct motivation at 
his disposal.  Therefore, Brian is not justified in believing that the new hypothesis is true.  
Therefore, in Brian’s case, the hypothesis is not on the same footing as in Kevin’s case.  
So, in fact, scientist’s motivations are very important in deciding whether a certain 
hypothesis is ad hoc or not.   
                                                 
37 I am not using ‘true’ in any strong sense here.  You can insert your favorite term, such 
as ‘empirically adequate’.  The critique and my response will not depend on the term.   
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 This reply to my objection rests on a misunderstanding of what is going on when 
a hypothesis is labeled as ‘ad hoc’.  This is because, in discussing which one of these 
scientists is justified in believing that the hypothesis is true, the reply is making ad 
hocness an epistemological matter.  However, ad hocness is a methodological concern.  
Labeling a hypothesis ‘ad hoc’ is to claim that the scientific endeavor went wrong in its 
procedures.  An account of ad hocness will give scientists a rule for determining whether 
or not the acceptance of a hypothesis is a permissible act.  It is a far different issue as to 
whether or not a scientist is justified in believing that a hypothesis is true.  It will be up to 
the proponent of the methodological account to demonstrate that it is a good account that 
will cause scientists that follow it to get the right results.  However, the scientists 
themselves don’t need to be justified in their beliefs in order to use the methodology to 
prevent ad hoc acts.  
 In Experience and Prediction38, Hans Reichenbach touches on a similar point 
when he speaks about the distinction between context of discovery and context of 
justification.  This distinction arises in his discussion of epistemology and what scientific 
epistemology entails. (Reichenbach 6-7, 382)  Reichenbach claims that epistemology 
concerns itself with the way that scientific information is disseminated to others, and not 
the way the scientist himself comes to accept this scientific information. (Reichenbach 6-
7)  As he says, when discussing the theory of induction: 
 What we wish to point out with our theory of induction is the logical 
relation of the new theory to the known facts.  We do not insist that the 
discovery of the new theory is performed by a reflection of a kind similar to 
our exposition; we do not maintain anything about the question of how it is 
                                                 
38 Reichenbach, Hans.  Experience and Prediction.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1938. 
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performed – what we maintain is nothing but a relation of a theory to facts, 
independent of the man who found the theory. (Reichenbach 382) 
 
In this quote, Reichenbach separates the way in which a theory is discovered from the 
way in which the theory is justified to others.  While he is not discussing ad hocness and 
his emphasis in this book is the context of justification, the separation of justification and 
discovery helps to strengthen my claim that whether a person is justified in believing a 
hypothesis true is a different question than whether he used the right methodology to 
arrive at this hypothesis.    
Here is an example in order to clarify the way in which justification separates 
from methodology.  There are several mechanics that work at a garage that is noted for its 
excellence in auto repair.  There are several ways that the different mechanics in this shop 
determine what procedures they need to undertake in order to fix the cars that come into 
their shop.  Some of the mechanics hook up the cars to a computer that has been pre-
programmed to interface with the computer chips in the cars in order to determine what 
repairs need to be made.  Some of the mechanics use the algorithms that the computer 
uses in order to determine the needed repairs.  The rest have a detailed understanding of 
the components of the cars, how the computer chips work to make the car operate and 
how certain types of problems cause certain issues.  The diagnostic computer doesn’t 
understand what it’s doing: it has been programmed to produce certain results given 
certain inputs.  Those mechanics that are using the computers don’t need to understand 
how the diagnostic computers work, either.  And they could just be using the diagnostic 
computers because they know that the boss really wants them to do so and the mechanics 
that use the computers get more money from the boss.  The story might be similar for 
those that use the algorithms.  Those mechanics also don’t need to have good reasons to 
 32
use the algorithms and also don’t need to understand how these algorithms work.  In this 
garage, all the mechanics get the same results, even though they have different reasons 
for arriving at these results.  And, therefore, the system by which they fix the cars is still 
good, even though not all of the mechanics understand how the system works and not all 
of them are using the system because of a motivation to fix the cars properly – some are 
using the system just because the boss will pay them more if they do. 
The mechanic situation is analogous to the situation that a scientist faces when 
trying to determine whether or not a certain hypothesis introduced to save a theory in the 
face of recalcitrant evidence is ad hoc.  Some scientists might well understand how the 
procedure for determining a non-ad hoc act works and some scientists might not.  Some 
might have motivations other than the motivation for more predictions.  However, none 
of this matters, as long as the system for determining ad hoc and non-ad hoc acts works 
well.  Scientists might well have unsavory motives.  We are just interested in giving them 
a good system – a good rulebook – to follow.  This rulebook doesn’t tell them what 
motivations to have.  It just tells them what is acceptable to do, given a certain input.   
This rulebook-model of methodology covers all of scientific practice.  I will not 
attempt to defend all of the different chapters of this rulebook, as this is outside of the 
scope of my discussion.  There is, however, a page of this rulebook that concerns ad 
hocness.  This page is the one that I am interested in examining.  And it is this page that 
lets scientists know whether a given hypothesis ought to be accepted into a theory, given 
that theory, its background, and the recalcitrant evidence facing that theory.  Based on a 
specific input, the scientists will be able to use this page of the rulebook in order to create 
an appropriate output.   
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So, in the case of Kevin and Brian, it would be inappropriate for the rulebook – 
the system for determining whether or not a certain act is ad hoc – to give them two 
different rules to follow.  This would be inappropriate because they have identical inputs.  
These inputs are identical because the only difference between Kevin’s situation and 
Brian’s situation is each person’s motivation, which does not factor in to what is relevant 
according to the rulebook.  Kevin might still be justified to believe that his hypothesis is 
true, and Brian might not be.  However, the rulebook or the system, given the same 
inputs, must give them the same output at the same time.  
 
VII.  Treating Hempel’s Indicators as Criteria to be Jointly Fulfilled and the Problem of 
Additional Test Implications  
 
I have been treating the Kevin and Brian example in terms of Hempel’s first 
characterization of ad hocness alone.  As I stated above, Hempel was not clear whether 
the two characterizations were just two good ways to tell if a given hypothesis is ad hoc, 
or if they were two criteria, both of which need to be fulfilled, in order for a hypothesis to 
be ad hoc.  In case the latter is true, let us re-examine the Kevin and Brian situation, 
adding the condition that hypotheses lead to no additional test implications.  Kevin is still 
motivated by the realization this new hypothesis might also predict other phenomena that 
will likely occur, based on the new evidence that has been found.  Brian is still motivated 
by the realization that the President really likes theory T and will fund whoever tries to 
save it in the face of recalcitrant evidence.  Does the addition of the second formulation, 
seen as an additional criterion for ad hocness, cause a difference in the outcome of this 
example?  At first glance, it might seem that it does.  After all, Kevin thinks that this 
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hypothesis might lead to additional test implications. Perhaps it actually will lead to 
additional implications. Since both of them are introducing the same hypothesis to the 
same theory in the face of the same recalcitrant evidence, it might seem that neither of 
them did something ad hoc in introducing the identical hypotheses.   
 However, a problem arises.  How can it be determined whether or not a 
hypothesis leads to additional test implications besides that of the (formerly) recalcitrant 
evidence?  After all, most, if not all, of the time, to claim that a hypothesis leads to 
additional test implications seems to presuppose a lot about background conditions and 
about other hypotheses.  For example, suppose we have a hypothesis that is introduced to 
save a certain theory.  It was introduced because part of the theory claimed that the sky 
was blue and the sky was observed to be red on a certain occasion.  The hypothesis that is 
introduced replaces the previous part of the theory that claimed the sky was blue.  It says 
that the sky will be red at certain times and blue at certain times, and that barometric 
pressure will rise and fall, according to what color the sky is.  On the face of it, it looks 
like this hypothesis will lead to additional test implications: the amount of barometric 
pressure that will exist given a certain sky color.  Suppose, then, that we observe that the 
barometric pressure does seem to rise and fall based on the color of the sky.  Did this 
hypothesis predict these phenomena?  
All by itself, the barometer-sky hypothesis doesn’t lead to predictions.  Auxiliary 
hypotheses need to be combined with the hypothesis to lead to any predictions 
whatsoever.  The auxiliaries that need to be supposed in conjunction with the hypothesis 
are hypotheses such as the barometer is well-constructed, or that the scientists observing 
the barometer and the sky color are competent observers of such phenomena.  It doesn’t 
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look like we can claim that a single hypothesis, by itself, will lead to additional test 
implications. 
 This problem is very similar to what A.J. Ayer encountered in Language, Truth 
and Logic.39  While he is not concerned with ad hocness, the problems that he encounters 
will cause even greater problems for accounts of ad hocness that require there to be 
additional test implications.   
These problems arise while Ayer is trying to explain verificationism. To Ayer, the 
only statements that are meaningful are either analytic – such as statements of logic – or 
empirical hypotheses that admit of truth or falsity.  All other statements are 
“metaphysical” and meaningless.  As Ayer states:  
[W]e shall maintain that no statement which refers to a “reality” 
transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly have any 
literal significance: from which it must follow that the labours of those who 
have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production 
of nonsense. (Ayer 34)  
 
 Thus, the statements that metaphysicians make are meaningless because they fail to 
adhere to the guidelines that determine that which makes a statement significant. (Ayer 
35)   
 The question then becomes, what makes a statement significant?  What makes it 
express a genuine empirical hypothesis, capable of being either true or false? Ayer uses 
the criterion of verifiability40 in order to determine the significance of statements.  This 
                                                 
39 Ayer, A.J.  Language, Truth and Logic.  2nd ed.  New York: Dover Publications, inc., 
1946 
 
40 I will describe Ayer’s formulation of this criterion found in the introduction to the 
second edition of Language, Truth and Logic, as this formulation has been crafted in 
response to objections to the manner in which Ayer first formulated it.  Throughout the 
previous and following discussion, I will also use the term ‘statement’ in place of  
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criterion consists in the following: a statement is directly verifiable if it is an observation 
statement, or if it plus one or more observation statements entails an observation 
statement.  A statement is indirectly verifiable if : “in conjunction with […] other 
premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible 
from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include 
any statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of being 
independently established as indirectly verifiable.” (Ayer 13)  If a statement is neither 
directly nor indirectly verifiable, it is not a genuine statement, as it is not expressing a 
genuine empirical hypothesis.   
 Ayer reformulated the verification principle to its above shape as a result of a 
criticism brought against his original formulation: that, if properly formulated, any 
statement whatsoever can be considered directly verifiable.  Unfortunately, Ayer’s 
reformulation still allows any statement whatsoever to be considered directly or indirectly 
verifiable, and, thus, capable of being either true or false.  All that needs to be done is to 
create a disjunction between the statement in question and some statement that is 
verifiable.  Therefore, every statement whatsoever can be considered literally meaningful.  
So, Ayer’s delineation between meaningful and non-meaningful statements in philosophy 
is an empty one.  Crispin Wright, in Realism, Meaning, and Truth41, illustrates this 
devastating problem quite clearly: 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘sentence’ or ‘proposition’, as Ayer proposes in the introduction, again in response to 
objections against the use of the latter words in the first edition. 
 
41 Wright, Crispin.  Realism, Meaning, and Truth.  2nd edition.  Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993.  281 
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 Let N be any ‘nonsensical’ statement, and O1 and O2 any pair of 
observation statements which are logically independent of each other.  
Then consider the statement 
 
A: Either O1 or (not-N and not-O2) 
 
Conjoined with O2, A entails O1.  But O2 alone does not entail O1 (by 
hypothesis).  So A is directly verifiable.  Therefore, since N, conjoined 
with A, entails O1, which is not entailed by A alone (assuming that not-N 
and not-O2 do not collectively entail O1), N also passes as indirectly 
verifiable. (Wright 281) 
 
So, it looks like any statement whatsoever can be either directly or indirectly verifiable.  
All that is needed is the proper formulation of a statement that is directly verifiable, 
which includes some ‘nonsensical’ statement in the right relationship to the rest of the 
statement.  This ‘nonsensical’ statement will end up, as a consequence, as indirectly 
verifiable and, so, as a genuine statement.  Yet this ‘nonsensical’ statement is 
‘nonsensical’ because it is going to be exactly the sort of statement that Ayer wished to 
exclude from the set of statements that are meaningful, as it is going to be the sort of 
statement that Ayer wished to claim was unverifiable.  Therefore, Ayer cannot 
demonstrate that certain statements, and not others, lead to test implications. 
 If Ayer can’t demonstrate that certain statements can and certain statements 
cannot lead to test implications, how can it be demonstrated that something might or 
might not lead to additional test implications?  This seems to be the problem facing 
Hempel’s second characterization of ad hocness.   
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VIII.  More on the Ayer Testability Problem 
 
 This discussion of Ayer’s problem and how it relates to Hempel's second 
indicator of ad hocness leads us into a discussion of the difficulty this second indicator 
faces, either in conjunction with the first indicator or by itself. Typically, in mature 
sciences, we cannot test a single hypothesis in isolation. So, if the requirement for non-ad 
hocness is that the hypothesis by itself leads to additional test implications, all hypotheses 
will be ad hoc.  However, we can always tinker with the auxiliary hypotheses.  Because 
we can do so, and if we allow a given hypothesis to be tested in conjunction with 
auxiliaries, we can engineer the auxiliaries in such a way that no hypothesis will be ad 
hoc because all hypotheses will lead to additional implications.42 
Ayer formulates the problem a bit differently when he says: “it is never just a 
single hypothesis which an observation confirms or discredits, but always a system of 
hypotheses.” (Ayer 94)  There might well be other hypotheses or some fact about the 
universe that we are missing when we claim that something is not testable.  Or, we might 
illicitly combine certain hypotheses with another in order to claim that the hypothesis is, 
in fact, testable.  This is the problem of independent testability.  It appears that a 
                                                 
42   Duhem speaks of this problem, as well as Quine.  Later, I will refer to this problem of 
independent testability as the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem.   
 
Duhem, Pierre.  The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.  New York, Atheneum, 1962.  
Pp. 180 – 218. 
 
Quine, W.V.  “Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”  The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1(Jan., 1951).  20-43 
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hypothesis is (almost) never independently testable and, so, it is unclear whether a 
hypothesis might seem untestable because of a problematic auxiliary hypothesis, or 
whether the hypothesis really doesn’t lead to any test implications at all.   
 
IX.  A Critique of Popper’s Conception of Ad Hocness 
  
 In a related manner, suppose we were to say, as Popper did, that ad hoc 
hypotheses are bad because they let you protect your theories from falsification without 
being independently testable.  And suppose we were to determine whether or not a 
hypothesis alone is independently testable. Again, we run into this problem: what does it 
mean to be ‘independently testable’?  As Duhem notes in The Aim and Structure of 
Physical Theory, an experiment can never condemn an isolated hypothesis but only a 
whole theoretical group.  In an experiment that is supposed to test a hypothesis, the 
scientists derive a prediction of a fact from the hypothesis in conjunction with a set of 
auxiliary theories and hypotheses that the scientists already accept.  So, the experiment 
cannot show, e.g., that a specific hypothesis is false.  Therefore, it does not seem that any 
hypothesis is independently testable.  If no hypothesis is independently testable, as was 
noted previously, then certainly no hypothesis can lead to additional test implications by 
itself.  Therefore, this distinction does not seem to be an adequate one, as it would make 
all hypotheses ad hoc43.   
                                                 
43 Also, see Bamford for a detailed discussion of Popper’s distinction. 
 
Bamford, Greg.  “Popper’s Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, 
and Scientific Practice.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 
2 (June, 1993), 335-355. 
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 On the other hand, if we were to claim that testability of a hypothesis means that a 
hypothesis, in conjunction with certain auxiliary hypotheses, is testable, then all 
hypotheses would seem to be testable.  This problem is the exact problem Wright 
mentions for Ayer’s view in the quotation above.   
For example, let us take up the hypothesis that God exists.  This hypothesis might 
not seem, on the face of it, testable.  Yet, we might add a few auxiliary hypotheses: 
whatever God wants, happens; God wants the sun to set; God wants the wind to blow.  
Does the sun set?  Yes.  Does the wind blow?  Yes.  Therefore, we can test whether or 
not God exists.  And, according to this test, we now have evidence that God exists.   
 Clearly, we would need restrictions to be placed on the auxiliary hypotheses.  Yet, 
this, too, will lead us to trouble. A way in which we might restrict the auxiliaries so as not 
to allow for such tinkering might be to limit them to the ones that we have already 
accepted, or to the ones that we think are true, or something like that.   
 If we were to limit the auxiliaries to ones that we think are true, we might be able 
distinguish legitimately testable hypotheses from those such as the ‘God exists’ 
hypothesis.  That will depend, of course, on whether or not we think that the auxiliaries 
added to ‘God exists’ are true.  However, there is the possibility, at least, that we might 
be able to go further in making a distinction between testable hypotheses and untestable 
ones, using the ‘believe to be true’ criterion.   
 Yet, limiting the auxiliaries to those that we believe to be true will not be enough 
to fully overcome the testability problem.  We still can add hypotheses that we believe to 
be true to some other hypothesis in such a way that this hypothesis will be rendered 
testable, no matter what it posits.  For example, I might believe that the hypothesis ‘the 
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world is round’ is true.  All I need to do is to add this hypothesis to any hypothesis 
whatsoever and I will make that hypothesis testable.  And changing the restriction to 
include only those auxiliaries that we have already accepted seems to have the same 
problem.   
 Instead, we might claim that a hypothesis is testable only if, when combined with 
one or more auxiliary hypotheses that we already believe to be true, we can infer some 
observation statement not previously inferable from the auxiliary hypotheses alone.  This 
formulation would get around the previous objection because the additional testability in 
the previous objection will arise from the auxiliary hypotheses alone – in that case, ‘the 
world is round’ hypothesis.  However, this does not get rid of all objections to this 
formulation of testability.  Suppose you have a hypothesis H, and suppose A is ‘either ~H 
or else R’, where R is some testable hypothesis that you already believe.  A will be true, 
according to you, and A & H entail observation statements that are not entailed by H 
alone.  And this sort of situation can be constructed for any such hypothesis.  So, even 
limiting the auxiliaries in this way will not be enough to fully overcome the testability 
problem.   
 Instead, the criterion of testability ought to be eliminated from any appropriate 
characterization of ad hocness, or so I claim.   
 I am not yet done critiquing traditional conceptions of ad hocness.  The most 
compelling, but still misguided, view I will discuss in a bit more detail.  This is the 
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characterization of ad hocness as a state of incessant modifications, made famous, in part, 
by Thomas Kuhn.44 
 
X: Ad Hocness as the State of Incessant Modifications 
 
 Consider the following case: 
Ptolemy case45: Ptolemaic astronomy is a geocentric theory that posits circular 
orbits for the heavenly bodies.  In order to explain why the heavenly bodies appear 
not to travel in circular orbits, Ptolemaic astronomy posits for each of the heavenly 
bodies some combination of eccentrics (circular orbits whose centers are not 
concentric with the Earth’s) and epicycles (circular orbits whose centers are on 
circular orbits known as deferents).  A proponent of Ptolemaic astronomy makes 
planetary observations that cannot be explained by the posited epicycles and 
eccentrics.  Therefore, she adds some epicycles to the model.   
 
On the repeated modifications view, it is the historical background that causes a 
hypothesis adoption to be ad hoc. In this history, a theory has encountered a series of 
empirical problems, each of which is fixed with a similar (minor) patch.  The 
philosopher’s Ptolemy case just described is a canonical example for this view. I’ll agree 
that there do seem to be too many (similar) hypotheses adopted in order to save 
Ptolemaic astronomy.  So, why doesn’t this view get to the heart of what it is to be ad 
hoc? 
The impropriety cannot rest solely on the idea that we are accepting these 
hypotheses into our theory just because there is evidence that seems to disconfirm the 
                                                 
44 See footnote 16 of this chapter for Kuhn’s characterization of Ptolemaic astronomy in 
this manner.   
 
45 This example is not, in fact, historically accurate.  However, I am going to use this as 
an example because it has become a canonical example of ad hocness. 
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theory.  If the distinction just were this, then there would be no real way to differentiate 
between the Ptolemaic sort of case and a non-ad hoc case where a theory has been 
repeatedly (and similarly) modified, as in the case of Newtonian mechanics before the 
advent of relativity.46  The emphasis, on this view, is placed on the historical background.  
So, it is not just that the auxiliaries have been tinkered with to fit the facts but especially 
that this sort of tinkering has happened before.47 Yet, theories are continually being 
modified in some way or another in order to fit the facts, and there is no clear way48 to 
determine which of these modifications qualify as ‘tinkering’ and which are not.  As 
there is no clear way to make this distinction, there is no real way to determine whether 
or not the background is the appropriate sort of background in order for a specific 
hypothesis adoption to be considered ad hoc.   
                                                 
46   I discuss the postulation of Neptune and of Vulcan as two such examples of non-ad 
hoc acts. These examples are found in chapter 5, section V. 
 
47  In an article by George Musser in Scientific American, he quotes Robert Scherrer of 
Vanderbilt University as saying the following: 
          “As my senior colleagues used to say, “you only get to invoke the tooth fairy 
once.”  Right now we have to invoke the tooth fairy twice: we need to postulate a yet to 
be discovered particle as dark matter and an unknown source for dark energy.  My model 
manages to explain both with a single field.” 
    Scherrer is speaking in favor of his theory of scalar dark matter and against traditional 
theories.  He seems to be subscribing to some version of the repeated modifications 
account of ad hocness.  In the same article, Sean Carroll criticizes Scherrer’s view, 
claiming that there is a nagging problem in that Scherrer’s theory requires laws of physics 
to possess a unsuspected symmetry.  As Carroll says, “such symmetries are possible, 
although they appear somewhat contrived.” [italics mine]   
 
Musser, George.  “Scaled-Up Darkness: Could a Single Dark Matter Particle be Light-
Years Wide?”  Scientific American, Aug. 30 2004.   
 
48 When I am stating that there is no clear way to make this distinction, I am gesturing 
towards a problem that is much more pressing than merely an issue of vagueness as to 
where, exactly, one category begins and the other ends.  Lots of notions have vague 
boundaries, after all.   
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We might have a good reason to think that a theory that has been faced with an 
enormous amount of instances of recalcitrant evidence in a (shortish) period of time 
ought to be discarded.  However, thinking one ought to discard one’s theory is something 
different from claiming that an ad hoc move has been made.  
Or, to put the point slightly differently:  suppose a scientists holds a theory for 
which recalcitrant evidence comes to light.  In this type of situation, there are always 
three choices for the scientist.  Option A: The scientist can discard her theory.  Option B: 
The scientist can accept a hypothesis that makes the evidence no longer disconfirming.  
Option C: The scientist can do nothing, recognizing that there is a tension, or even an 
inconsistency, between the evidence and her theory plus the background but deciding to 
hold off doing anything about it for the time being.  To discard one’s theory is to take 
option A.  To commit a potentially ad hoc act, on the other hand, is to take option B.49   
Of course, Kuhn’s version of this view also included the notion that complexity 
was increasing faster then accuracy, which is a more nuanced view than the one critiqued 
above.  However, Kuhn’s version is not satisfactory because of serious issues on how to 
determine simplicity and the appropriate relationship between complexity and accuracy.50   
                                                 
49 I discuss these options in more detail in chapter 5, section I.  I also use them when 
critiquing Sober and Forster’s account of ad hocness in chapter 4, section VI. 
 
50 Graham Priest, for example, discusses the problem of determining when a curve is 
simpler than another in “Gruesome Simplicity”.  Elliot Sober and Malcolm Forster refer 
to this problem in their paper, “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad 
Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.”  They claim to avoid the 
problem by discussing sets of curves.  I critique their view in chapter 3.    There is a 
further, although related, problem for Kuhn in that the complexity warranted for a 
solution to a particular problem would seem to depend radically on the specific theory 
and the significance of the problem.    
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There is another version of this view worth mentioning. It states that ad hoc 
hypotheses are those that lead to no new test implications other than the piece of evidence 
they were introduced in order to avoid, or one very similar in content to previous 
adoptions.  Thus, we have an ‘automatic recipe’51 in the cases of ad hoc modifications 
and we don’t in other cases of non-ad hoc (repeated) modifications.    
This version will not work, either, for two reasons.  Firstly, there is the test 
implications problem associated with Hempel’s 2nd guideline.  The second is that this 
version will categorize some hypothesis additions as ad hoc when they seem, intuitively, 
not to be.  In Newtonian mechanics, neither the positing of an extra-Uranian planet, as in 
the example above, nor the positing of an intra-Mercurial planet seems intuitively ad 
hoc.52  Yet, in this example, there are repeated modifications of the same kind.53 The 
Ptolemy case also adds similar hypotheses, yet is an intuitive example of ad hocness.  
The problem arises in how to distinguish these two examples, according to the repeated 
modifications view.54 
                                                                                                                                                 
Priest, Graham.  “Gruesome Simplicity.”  Philosophy of Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sept., 
1976), 432-437. 
 
 
51 I owe this formulation of the repeated modifications account to Marc Lange. 
 
52 And philosophers such as Jarrett Leplin argue that these examples are not ad hoc. 
 
53  A problem with the orbit of a certain planet is found and, in order to reconcile 
Newtonian astronomy with the evidence, the existence of a massive body in a certain 
region of space is postulated. 
 
54   In chapter 5, section V, I discuss this objection in more detail.  There, I acknowledge 
that it is not a knock-down argument against this version of the repeated modifications 
account: maybe there needs to be a certain number of similar modifications in order for 
the modifications to be considered ad hoc.  However, this objection ought to, at least, be a 
concern for the ‘automatic recipe’ advocates.  Also, the first objection is, in my opinion, a 
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I have, until now, been applying the term ‘ad hoc’ either to hypotheses or to their 
introduction, as this is how the more traditional accounts have applied the term.  
However, I think that the term ought to be applied to other types of acts.  I will now turn 
to what types of acts can be ad hoc.  
 
XI.  What can be Ad Hoc? 
 
 Notice, so far, I have been quite vague as to what sort of thing can be considered 
‘ad hoc’ mainly because the traditional view chiefly refers to hypotheses when discussing 
what can be ‘ad hoc’.  However, it is an open question as to what can qualify as being ad 
hoc.  
Among the candidates for ad hocness, there is the possibility raised in Hempel 
that it is only appropriate to label hypotheses as ad hoc.  Although hypotheses are often 
what are labeled ad hoc in the literature, I do not wish to claim this.55  The same 
hypothesis might be introduced in two difference circumstances but might differ with 
respect to ad hocness in these circumstances. As the circumstances into which the 
hypothesis is introduced seem to make a difference as to whether or not the hypothesis is 
labeled ‘ad hoc’, it seems strange to label hypotheses themselves as ad hoc.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
knock-down argument against the ‘automatic recipe’ version of the repeated 
modifications account.  
 
55 Many people do seem to talk about, e.g., hypotheses as being ad hoc.  However, I wish 
to claim that it is not, in fact, the abstract object ‘hypothesis’ that is actually being labeled 
ad hoc.  The statement, “this is an ad hoc hypothesis” seems, instead, to be shorthand for 
something along these lines: “The introduction or acceptance of this hypothesis was an ad 
hoc move” – where the application of ‘ad hoc’ may or may not be context-dependent.   
 
 47
difference in ad hocness for the same hypothesis in two different circumstances occurs 
because a hypothesis does not, by itself, have the sort of qualities that we might wish to 
attribute to something that is ad hoc.  There does not seem to be anything inherently 
problematic with the hypothesis that the moon is made of green cheese, for example: 
there may well be certain instances in which this hypothesis would be perfectly 
acceptable.  Instead, it seems that the act either of introducing or accepting a hypothesis 
is the sort of thing that is qualified to be ad hoc.56   
Instead of hypotheses themselves, then, it looks like what can be labeled ad hoc 
are acts.  The obvious candidates for these acts are the introduction of a hypothesis and 
the acceptance57 of a hypothesis.  The introduction of a hypothesis is distinguished from 
the acceptance of a hypothesis in that the introduction of a hypothesis is how that 
particular proposition came to be entertained as a hypothesis at all, while the acceptance 
of a hypothesis is an additional step.  Once a hypothesis has been introduced, scientists 
will have to think that the hypothesis, given the theory to which it is added, is true or 
                                                 
56 This distinction is an important one to make, in part because of the issues raised when 
considering testability.  There will likely be other issues raised in considering something 
like an act ad hoc, different than in considering a hypothesis ad hoc.  Greg Bamford, in 
“Popper’s Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content and Scientific 
Practice”, highlights this point.  He notes that people often equivocate between talking 
about a hypothesis being ad hoc and the way that the hypothesis is introduced as being ad 
hoc.  Yet, theories and hypotheses are propositions and moves are not.   Only a 
proposition can be tested: a move cannot. (Bamford 336 -340)  So, there is another way 
in which theories of ad hocness that have testability as a criterion go astray, if these 
theories really are using ‘ad hoc hypothesis’ as a placeholder for ‘the introduction or 
acceptance of this hypothesis is an ad hoc move’, as I suggest in the previous footnote.   
 
57 I wish to sidestep, here, the issue of whether something that is accepted is thereby 
believed to be true or empirically adequate, in a van Fraassen sense.  Insert your preferred 
position; it will not affect this discussion.  I return to this point in chapter 5, section XVI.   
 
van Fraasen, Bas.  The Scientific Image.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.   
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empirically adequate or well supported before they accept that hypothesis.  Merely 
introducing a hypothesis does not require this additional step.   
 The introduction of a hypothesis – even one for which we do not seem to have 
any additional predictions or additional corroborating evidence – is perfectly o.k.  
Different standards govern the introduction of a hypothesis than govern the acceptance of 
a hypothesis. It might well be rationally permissible to introduce a hypothesis that you do 
not think is a very good claim, for example, if you have no other candidates to solve 
some problem. Or, suppose you are sitting around discussing disconfirming evidence for 
your theory with some other scientists and you say, “What if hypothesis Y were the 
case?”  Even if this hypothesis, were it to have been accepted, would have fulfilled your 
criteria for ad hocness, it does not seem right to claim that the introduction of this 
hypothesis is ad hoc.  All that you are doing is throwing the idea around to see where it 
might take you.  There is not enough commitment to hypothesis Y to think that any 
methodological error has occurred. 
 Suppose, instead, that you accepted hypothesis Y into your theory.  By accepting 
it, you are taking an additional step.  Instead of, say, merely entertaining the possibility of 
Y, you are committing to the claim that Y is likely to be empirically adequate, or true, 
given the theory to which it is added.  In this case, there is enough of a commitment that 
there will be a methodological error being made if it turns out that accepting this 
hypothesis would be ad hoc, according to your criteria for ad hocness.58    
 In other words, accepting a hypothesis into a theory is a much more serious action 
than merely introducing a hypothesis.  The appropriate action that can qualify as being ad 
                                                 
58  I discuss the differences between introducing and accepting a hypothesis again in 
chapter 5, section I and in chapter 5, footnote 13.    
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hoc, then, must be the act of accepting a hypothesis, as ad hocness is a serious 
methodological error and needs to be paired with a more serious action. 
 
XII. Conclusion  
 
 We have seen that Hempel’s two guidelines are neither individually necessary nor 
jointly sufficient for determining ad hocness.  And, we have seen that there are problems 
with any of the repeated modifications accounts of ad hocness.  So, there must be 
something else wrong with the objectionable hypothesis acceptances that we have 
described, above, than what those accounts of ad hocness would tell us.  It will now be 
helpful to examine some other views of ad hocness, in order to see what they got right 
and what they got wrong.  The examination and critique of these other views of ad 
hocness will lead the way to my positive view of ad hocness, which I claim includes the 
good elements and intuitions both of the traditional view of ad hocness and these other, 
more recent views, while excluding the bad elements of the same.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two  
Why a Bayesian Account of Ad Hocness Is Not Satisfactory 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  
 I will argue that Bayesian accounts of ad hocness are, ultimately, unsatisfactory. 
Several of my objections will be criticisms of Bayesianism in general, while others will 
be criticisms of a specific version of Bayesianism as introduced by Michael Strevens in 
“The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”.  Firstly, then, I will outline the basic 
Bayesian approach and how it characterizes ad hocness, using Colin Howson and Peter 
Urbach’s discussion in Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach.1    I will then 
outline the differences between their characterization of ad hocness and that of Strevens’s 
Bayesianism and will apply both to several examples.  Finally, I will show why either 
Bayesian-type approach is unsatisfactory in characterizing ad hocness, using, in part, 
Branden Fitelson and Andrew Waterman’s paper, “Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary 
Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.”2 
 
 
                                                 
1 Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter.  Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 2nd 
Ed.  La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1993. 
 
2 Fitelson, Branden and Waterman, Andrew.  “Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary 
Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 56 (2005), 293-302. 
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II.  Introduction to the Bayesian Approach 
 
 
 The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning has become a popular one, due to 
its response to the problem of induction: that is, how to determine whether or not a 
particular theory is the right one (or the likely one), given that all evidence for such 
theories is empirical evidence.  It proposes a probabilistic induction, where a given theory 
or hypothesis is deemed more or less probable, based on the scientists’ degrees of belief 
about them and how these degrees of belief ought to change given some particular 
evidence that bears on that theory or hypothesis. (Howson Urbach 9)   I will need to go 
into more detail for all of these elements.  What I will turn to first, however, is the 
theorem that all Bayesians utilize in order to determine the probability of some 
hypothesis or theory given the empirical data: Bayes’s Theorem. 
 Bayes’s Theorem can be stated in the following form: 
 
  P(a | b) = (P(b | a) P(a))/ P(b), where P(a), P(b) >0 (Howson Urbach 28) 
 
P(a | b) represents the probability of the hypothesis a, given the evidence b, which is 
equal to the likelihood of the evidence given the hypothesis multiplied by the initial 
probability of the hypothesis, all divided by the probability of the evidence. (Howson 
Urbach 28)   
 So, in order to determine how much some piece of evidence affects (negatively or 
positively) the probability of a certain hypothesis or theory (being true), the scientist just 
needs to determine what the relevant prior probabilities were – those before the evidence 
came to light – and plug them into the theorem.   
 52
 Of course, this depends on there being some principled way to determine the prior 
probabilities needed to complete this equation: clearly, the probabilities cannot just be 
determined by a roll of the dice, or by picking numbers out of the air.  If they were so 
determined, there would be no reason to believe the Bayesian when she said that her 
theory was a good theory of confirmation.   
 The standard method of describing the prior probabilities is to speak in terms of 
fair betting odds. (Howson Urbach 75-76)  Given a certain hypothesis, the fair betting 
odds of that hypothesis would be ones where, if someone were to take those odds and bet 
for the hypothesis, there would be no expectation of an advantage or disadvantage as 
opposed to betting against the hypothesis. (Howson Urbach 75)  These odds, then, are the 
prior probability of the hypothesis, or the degree of belief in that hypothesis. P(a) is the 
bet that the hypothesis is true. P(b | a), then, will be the odds of the evidence, given the 
truth of the hypothesis.  This would be a conditional bet on b, given a. (Howson Urbach 
81-82) And these bets, as they do not predict a net advantage for either betting for or 
against, obey the probability calculus.3  This is important because, as Howson and 
Urbach claim: 
 [I]f a set of betting quotients fails to satisfy the probability calculus, then were 
anybody to bet indifferently on or against the associated hypotheses, at the odds 
determined by those quotients, he or she could be made to suffer a net loss (or gain) 
independently of the truth or falsity of those hypotheses.  The importance of this 
                                                 
3 Howson and Urbach present a series of arguments for this claim (Howson Urbach 78-
95), which I will defer to, here.  The thrust of these sections seems to be that there are so 
many different arguments, starting in different places, that lead to the same conclusion – 
the probability calculus.  As they say: “The latter [probability calculus] seems, in other 
words, to be a sort of invariant of different ways of defining uncertainty, or as Lindley 
puts it, “inevitable”, meaning that the choice of any plausible way of mathematically 
measuring uncertainty will lead to it.  This convergence of arguments has a powerful 
cumulative effect and increases our conviction that the probability calculus corresponds 
to some quite objective feature of subjective uncertainty.” (Howson Urbach 95) 
 53
result lies in the corollary, that betting quotients that do not satisfy the probability 
axioms cannot consistently be regarded as determining fair odds. (Howson Urbach 
79) 
 
In other words, if these ‘fair odds’ do not satisfy the probability calculus, the probabilities 
associated with these odds will not represent justified prior probabilities.   
  There are two elements of this description that are stressed, rightly, by Howson 
and Urbach.  The first is that there need not be a propensity to bet in favor of the 
hypothesis if the odds are fair, much less does there need to be an acceptance of a bet on 
those, or greater, odds. (Howson Urbach 77)  There may be many reasons as to why a 
person would not actually entertain, or make, a bet even if the odds are considered fair.  It 
is enough that there is no perceived advantage or disadvantage to someone that would bet 
for the hypothesis rather than against it.  Secondly, Howson and Urbach stress that this 
discussion of subjectively fair odds needs only that people sometimes perceive odds as 
being fair.  There do not, in fact, have to be fair odds at all in order for there to be 
subjectively fair odds and, therefore, justified prior probabilities. (Howson Urbach 77)   
 
III.  Confirmation and Ad Hoc Hypotheses 
 
 Confirmation or disconfirmation of a theory or hypothesis comes as a result of 
comparing the prior probability of that theory or hypothesis to the posterior probability of 
that theory or hypothesis, given the evidence that has come to light.  If the prior 
probability of the hypothesis is greater than the posterior probability, then that evidence 
disconfirms the hypothesis. If the prior probability is lower than the posterior probability, 
then the evidence confirms the hypothesis. (Howson Urbach 117-118)  
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 In order to determine the posterior probability of a hypothesis, then, it is 
necessary to know the prior probability of the hypothesis, the prior probability of the 
evidence and the prior probability of the evidence given the hypothesis.  
 Consider the following case.  There exists some evidence e’ that disconfirms ha.  
Due to the prior probabilities, it is determined that a is to blame.  Hypothesis a’ is to 
replace the auxiliary or set of auxiliaries, a, refuted by the evidence.   According to 
Howson and Urbach, the posterior probability of a’ given e’ and given any other relevant 
information, needs to be greater than .5 in order for that hypothesis to be deemed 
‘acceptable’, which means that the hypothesis is more likely to be true than false.  The 
acceptability of a hypothesis given e’ and other relevant information will be impacted by 
the prior probability of this hypothesis.   
 The theory t to which a’ is being added will also be examined to see if it credibly 
accounts for e’.  As Howson and Urbach state, “[i]t would do so only if t & a’ was 
sufficiently credible; since P(t & a’|e’) [is less than or equal to] P(a’|e’)4, this would be 
the case only if a’ was itself acceptable, in the sense indicated.” (Howson Urbach 158).  
So, a theory with an unacceptable modification would be treated with suspicion and 
considered improbable.  The probability of that theory plus the modification given the 
evidence and other relevant information will be less than the probability of the modifier 
hypothesis given the evidence and other relevant information, and the probability of an 
unacceptable hypothesis given the evidence and other relevant information will be less 
than .5.  This will render the probability of the theory plus this hypothesis less than .5, 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, both of these probabilities ought to be conditional on the evidence and 
the background.  So, for example, P(t & a’|e & b) instead of just P(t & a’|e’).  However, I 
am taking the background out as it will not affect the outcomes of the probabilities I am 
discussing.   
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which would cause the theory plus this hypothesis not to be acceptable: that is, less likely 
to be true than false. (Howson Urbach 158)   
 The discussion of the acceptability and unacceptability of hypotheses and the 
acceptability and unacceptability of theories plus modifying hypotheses is important to 
Howson and Urbach’s discussion of ad hoc hypotheses.  This is because Howson and 
Urbach disagree with the traditional account of ad hocness in thinking that the term ‘ad 
hoc’ is not always a pejorative, although they do not seem to take issue with Hempel’s 
criteria for ad hocness.5  Howson and Urbach present several examples of ad hoc 
hypotheses/theories6 (Howson Urbach 147-149) in order to support this position.  Several 
examples are ones where the additional modification is, intuitively, problematic but the 
postulation of Neptune to account for the perturbations of Uranus is one where the 
modification is, intuitively, unproblematic.  Yet, all the examples they label ‘ad hoc’, in 
that “[i]t is not likely that they [the new theories] would have been put forward except in 
response to particular empirical anomalies, hence the label “ad hoc”, which suggests that 
                                                 
5 According to Hempel, a hypothesis is ad hoc if it is introduced “for the sole purpose of 
saving a hypothesis seriously threatened by adverse evidence; it would not be called for 
by other findings and, roughly, speaking, it leads to no additional test implications.” 
(Hempel 29)  Howson and Urbach seem to embrace the idea that ad hocness just is the 
introduction for the sole purpose of saving a hypothesis or theory being so threatened.  
They do take issue with how the traditional view determines both the no additional test 
implications requirement and a related requirement of no independent evidence, claiming 
that these requirements are untenable as formulated by the traditional view.  (Howson 
Urbach 154-157, 158-161)  I am sympathetic to at least some of their claims and have 
criticized the traditional account in a similar spirit in chapter 1, sections VIII and IX.  
 
6 Howson and Urbach appear to be using the terms ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ 
interchangeably in this discussion.  I have already presented an argument for why it is 
only the acceptances of hypotheses that can be properly labeled ‘ad hoc’, in chapter 1, 
section XI. However, their argument does not seem to rest heavily on some other notion 
of what can be properly labeled ‘ad hoc’.  So, if my argument has been convincing, you 
may read ‘acceptances of hypotheses’ when Howson and Urbach are speaking of ad 
hocness of theories or hypotheses. 
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the theory was advanced for the specific purpose of evading a difficulty.” (Howson 
Urbach 149)  So, in both the cases where the modification due to disconfirming evidence 
seems problematic and in the case where it does not, these modifications are considered 
ad hoc because they were modifications made in response to this disconfirming evidence.   
 So, Howson and Urbach claim, there seem to be cases where some theory is 
plausible, such as the theory of the existence of Neptune, even though it is ad hoc.  
Therefore, ad hocness must sometimes be acceptable, against the traditional view.  And, 
according to them, an acceptable ad hoc hypothesis or theory is one where the probability 
of that hypothesis or theory, given the evidence and relevant background, is greater than 
.5: where it is more likely true than false.  Considering a theory plus some ad hoc 
hypothesis, the acceptability of that theory will be determined, in part, by the 
acceptability of the ad hoc hypothesis because the probability of the theory plus the 
hypothesis, given the evidence and relevant background, will be at most equal to the 
probability of the hypothesis, given the evidence and relevant background.7 (Howson 
Urbach 157-158) 
                                                 
7 Howson and Urbach state explicitly that ad hoc hypotheses or theories can be either 
acceptable or unacceptable.  However, they do seem to imply that it is more likely that ad 
hoc hypotheses or theories will be unacceptable, in the conclusion of their discussion of 
the Bayesian treatment of ad hoc hypotheses:  
 “The Bayesian approach, incidentally, explains why people often respond 
immediately with incredulity, even derision, on first hearing certain ad hoc hypotheses.  It 
is hardly likely that their amusement stems from perceiving, or even thinking that they 
perceive, that the hypothesis leads to no new predictions.  Surely it is more likely that 
they are reacting to what they see as the utter implausibility of the hypothesis.” (Howson 
Urbach 158) 
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 I will not assess the adequacy of Howson and Urbach’s Bayesian account of ad 
hocness yet.  First, I will turn to Strevens’s Bayesian account of ad hocness, highlighting 
the differences between his and Howson and Urbach’s. 
  
IV.  Michael Strevens’s Bayesian Account of Ad Hocness  
 
 In “the Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”, Michael Strevens main 
focus is on modifying the Bayesian approach in order to address the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
problem.8  After outlining this solution, he applies his version of Bayesianism to the 
identification of ad hoc hypotheses.9 10  While his solution of the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
                                                 
8 See  Chapter 1, section VII for a discussion of this problem.   
 
9 Strevens, like Howson and Urbach, seems to use ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ fairly 
interchangeably throughout his discussion of ad hocness.  Sometimes, he talks about ad 
hoc theories and sometimes about ad hoc hypotheses.  I will use his language, for the 
most part, with the caveat that I will later speak of ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ non-
interchangeably in Chapter 5.  
 
10   Strevens thinks that the standard Bayesian approach is not enough to solve the Quine-
Duhem-Ayer problem – how to distribute blame among the main hypothesis and its 
auxiliaries when disconfirming evidence arises – because it does not take into account 
situations where the disconfirming evidence, in addition to falsifying ha, adds some 
additional information.  This additional information does not indicate anything about the 
falsity of ha but might still impact the confirmation of either h or a.  He modifies the 
Bayesian probability notation to include this additional information when calculating the 
posterior probabilities. (Strevens 520)  
      I do not go into these details because they do not affect his discussion of ad hocness.  
While his solution allows for additional information given by the evidence to affect the 
posterior probabilities, the (interesting) majority of cases are ones where Strevens claims 
that he can equate the partial posterior probability (the prior probability of, say, h plus the 
change in probability of h due to the falsification of ha) with the actual posterior 
probability of, e.g., h (the prior probability of h plus the change in probability of h due to 
the falsification of ha plus the change in probability of h because of information that is 
irrelevant to the falsification of ha).  These cases occur when the probability of e given h 
and ~a is equal to the probability of e given ~(ha). (Strevens 531)  I will not get into the 
details of which sorts of cases will be ones where these two probabilities are not equal: I 
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problem diverges from Howson and Urbach, Strevens follows Howson and Urbach in 
subscribing to a standard definition of ad hocness11: the differences between Strevens and 
Howson and Urbach arise in their interpretation of Bayes’s theorem and how these 
interpretations make distinctions between types of ad hoc hypotheses. 
  Suppose there is a hypothesis and its auxiliaries, ha, and disconfirming evidence 
e.  Suppose also that h is rescued from falsification by a’, where ha’ is not disconfirmed 
by e.  Then, a’ would be ad hoc if it were introduced solely to save h from the 
disconfirmation brought about by e. (Strevens 533)  Strevens, in the spirit of Howson and 
Urbach12, then divides the cases of ad hocness into two: desperate rescues and glorious 
rescues.  A desperate rescue, according to Howson and Urbach, is one where the rescue 
by an ad hoc hypothesis causes h to be much less credible.  A glorious rescue, on the 
other hand, is one where the rescue by an ad hoc hypothesis causes the probability of the 
ad hoc hypothesis to be greatly increased. (Strevens 534)  
 There are two ways in which Howson and Urbach’s account differs from 
Strevens’s.  The first is in what sorts of probabilities are to determine the gloriousness or 
desperateness (or, the acceptability or unacceptability) of a rescue, once an ad hoc 
                                                                                                                                                 
will grant Strevens that most cases are going to be of the type where the two probabilities 
are, in fact, pretty much equal.  What I am interested in outlining, however, is how 
Strevens thinks that his partial posterior probability theory will deal with cases of 
seemingly ad hoc hypotheses.  And, so, I will concentrate on the differences between 
Strevens’s account of ad hoc hypotheses and that of Howson and Urbach.   
 
11   See, for example, Hempel’s account of ad hocness and my discussion of it in sections 
V-VII of chapter 1.   
 
12  He is identifying these cases in the spirit of the 2nd edition of Howson and Urbach.  
The first edition’s description of ad hocness makes it a purely pejorative term. 
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hypothesis has been introduced13 to save the theory or hypothesis from disconfirming 
evidence.  For Howson and Urbach, it is the posterior probability of the new hypothesis 
given the evidence and any other relevant information, that will determine whether the ad 
hoc hypothesis introduction is a ‘good’ introduction (one where the scientist follows 
proper Bayesian reasoning) or a ‘bad’ introduction (one where the scientist does not 
follow proper Bayesian reasoning).  Strevens does not think that this way of determining 
good and bad introductions explains enough.  Specifically, he thinks that it does not 
explain why the probability of the new hypothesis increases in a glorious rescue, nor does 
it explain why the probability of the main hypothesis or theory decreases in a desperate 
rescue. (Strevens 534)  Strevens believes that he can answer these questions by focusing 
on their prior probabilities.  I will use the example that Strevens does – the discovery of 
Neptune – in order to illustrate the distinction that Strevens makes. 
 According to Strevens, posterior probabilities14 have the following features that 
apply to glorious and desperate rescues: 
Recall that, when ha is falsified, h suffers more when P(h) is smaller and P(a) 
is larger[…]  If P(h) is very high[…] it will decrease very little upon the 
falsification of ha.  Central hypotheses with lower probabilities will suffer 
                                                 
13 I am using ‘introduce’ because that is the verb that both Howson and Urbach and 
Strevens use when discussing ad hoc acts.  In my own account, the difference between 
introducing a hypothesis and accepting a hypothesis is important.  However, I do not 
think that either Howson and Urbach’s or Strevens’s accounts are sensitive to this 
distinction.  If preferred, read ‘accept’ where I state ‘introduce’ in discussion of these two 
accounts.   
 
14   Strevens himself is referring to partial posterior probabilities – the probabilities that 
can be seen as equivalent to the posterior probabilities when the evidence impacts the 
probability of, say, h, only insofar as it falsifies ha.  As he thinks that cases where 
glorious or desperate rescues can occur are cases where these two are equivalent (see 
Strevens 533), I will use the more familiar ‘posterior probability’ as opposed to 
Strevens’s phrase ‘partial posterior probability’. 
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more from the refutation of ha; their rescue will be accompanied by a more 
embarrassing probability loss. (Strevens 535) 
 
Here, P(h) is short for the prior probability of the main hypothesis or theory and P(a) is 
short for the prior probability of a group of auxiliary hypotheses.  The posterior 
probabilities of the main hypothesis or theory given the evidence that falsifies ha will be 
dependent on the prior probabilities of the main hypothesis and the group of auxiliaries.  
Suppose h has a high prior probability and a has a low one.  Then, an ad hoc hypothesis 
introduction that, when combined with h, accommodates e, will get an increase in 
probability. Suppose, on the other hand, that h has a low prior probability and a has a 
high one.  Then, an ad hoc hypothesis introduction will not get as high an increase in 
probability – if an increase at all.  (Strevens 535)  And, since the posterior probabilities 
dictate what counts as a glorious or desperate rescue, and since these are determined 
largely from the relevant prior probabilities, it is these prior probabilities that will 
ultimately determine whether or not an ad hoc hypothesis introduction is a glorious or a 
desperate rescue.   
 In the case of the discovery of Neptune, Strevens claims, the addition of the 
auxiliary hypothesis that postulated Neptune’s existence was an example of a glorious 
rescue.  The prior probability of h (Newtonian theory) was very high at the time and, so, 
the falsification of ha (where a = no other planets) would not greatly depress the posterior 
probability of h.  Additionally, Strevens claims, the ad hoc hypothesis that was added is 
the most plausible of the alternatives and, so, its posterior probability will also increase 
when combined with h.  As Strevens states it: 
In summary, a glorious rescue occurs roughly when P(h) is considerably 
higher than P(a), while a desperate rescue occurs roughly when P(h) is 
considerably lower than P(a).  In words, a glorious rescue occurs when the 
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auxiliary hypothesis receives most of the blame for a false prediction, and is 
rightly discarded by researchers in favor of some other auxiliary hypothesis 
that makes the correct prediction. (The degree of glory, I remark in passing, 
is perhaps inversely proportional to the prior probability of the ad hoc 
hypothesis.)  A desperate rescue occurs when the central hypothesis receives 
most of the blame for a false prediction, but where researchers cling to the 
central hypothesis and discard the evidently superior auxiliary. (Strevens 
535-536) 
 
In a glorious rescue, then, the auxiliary hypothesis gets disconfirmed the most by the 
evidence and this will happen when the prior probability of the main hypothesis is much 
higher than the prior probability of the auxiliary.  In a desperate rescue, the main 
hypothesis gets disconfirmed the most by the evidence, because its prior probability was 
very low in relation to the prior probability of the auxiliary, yet scientists keep the main 
hypothesis and get rid of the auxiliary, ad hocly introducing another.  
 There is a second way in which Howson and Urbach’s and Strevens’s accounts 
differ.  Howson and Urbach distinguish between ‘good’ ad hoc introductions and ‘bad’ ad 
hoc introductions by determining whether or not the posterior probability of the 
hypothesis, given the evidence and the relevant background, is greater than .5 – where the 
hypothesis is more likely to be true than false.  If this probability is greater than .5, then it 
was a ‘good’, or acceptable, ad hoc introduction.  If it is less than .5, then it was a ‘bad’, 
or unacceptable, ad hoc introduction.  Strevens does not make this distinction.  Instead, 
whether a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ad hoc introduction occurs – whether there is a glorious or a 
desperate rescue – will be determined by the damage done to the probability of the main 
hypothesis as a result of the disconfirming evidence.  If the main hypothesis’s probability 
was not damaged, then it is a glorious rescue.  If it was badly damaged, then it is a 
desperate one.   
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 Before critiquing both Bayesian accounts, I will apply both accounts of ad 
hocness to several examples, beginning with the Ptolemy example.   
 
V. The Bayesians versus Ptolemy 
 
 I am going to apply both Bayesian accounts of ad hocness to this and the other 
examples, due to the two differences in determining good and bad ad hoc introductions 
that they have.  I will start with Strevens’s account.   
 For Strevens’s account to apply to the Ptolemy example, it has to be a case such 
that the partial probability will equal the posterior probability.  I will suppose this to be 
true.15  After ceding this point to Strevens, I’ll examine the Ptolemy case.16  h will consist 
                                                 
15 Strevens presents 3 criteria to be fulfilled in order for this to occur.  
 
 (1)  P(e|h) = P(e| ~(ha)) 
 
 (2)  There is no real change in the central hypothesis’s probability due to factors other 
than the falsification of ha: that is, that δc – the change in probability due to information 
contained in the evidence that is irrelevant to the falsification of ha – is close to zero. δc is 
from P+(h) = P(h) + δqd + δc  (Strevens 520, 521, 531), where P+(h) is the posterior 
probability of h, P(h) is the prior probability of h, δqd  is the change in probability of h due 
to the falsification of ha, and δc is the change in probability of h because of information 
that is irrelevant to the falsification of ha – that is, the additional information carried by e.  
This last part is Strevens’s major modification, which he believes allows him to properly 
assess the posterior probabilities in situations where information irrelevant to the 
falsification of ha will still impact (potentially greatly) the posterior probability of a 
given h. (Strevens 521) 
 See, e.g., Strevens’ Newstein example, where you are very confident of a certain 
scientist’s abilities.  This scientist claims that h is true and, additionally, that e will be 
observed. (Strevens 521)  Then, if either one of these statements is found to be true, your 
expectation that the other will be true will rise dramatically. (Strevens 521)  In this way, 
information irrelevant to the falsification of some ha will impact the posterior probability 
of that h.   
 
(3) P(e|hb) = P(e|~(ha)) 
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in Ptolemy’s eight historical commitments: 1) the movement of the heavens is spherical; 
2) the heavens themselves are spherical; 3) heavenly objects are spherical; 4) the Earth is 
spherical; 5) the Earth is the center of the heavens; 6) the fixed stars are so far away from 
the Earth that the Earth is like a point to them; 7) the Earth does not, itself, move in any 
way; 8) there are 2 motions to the heavens. (Ptolemy 7)  a will consist in the other 
auxiliaries to which Ptolemy is committed.  These will include hypotheses needed to test 
Ptolemy’s theory and will include the claim that the heavenly bodies move in perfect 
circles concentric to the Earth.  The disconfirming evidence, e, will be the observations 
of the sun that seem to show the sun moving in unequal distances in equal times as 
observed from the Earth.   
 ha does seem to be falsified by e.  It does not, in fact, appear that heavenly bodies 
move in perfectly circular orbits centered at the Earth. (Strevens 533)  However, there is 
                                                                                                                                                 
where b represents other possible alternative auxiliaries.  
 
  I need to grant these conditions because, otherwise, P(e|h~a) will not equal 
P(e|~(ha)) and Strevens’s account would not apply. These conditions relate back to the 
discussion in footnote 10.  As I stated, Strevens thinks that situations where a hypothesis 
introduction can be ad hoc and either glorious or desperate are situations where the partial 
posterior probability is (approximately) equal to the posterior probability.  These are 
situations where information from the evidence that does not falsify ha also does not 
cause a change in probability.  These conditions are the ones that Strevens claims a 
hypothesis introduction must pass in order for the partial to be (approximately) equal to 
the actual posterior probability.   Otherwise, we would be dealing with situations such as 
the Newstein example mentioned earlier in this footnote. 
 
16 A critic might argue that the Ptolemy case does not, in fact, fulfill these three 
conditions.  As these conditions need to be fulfilled in order for a charge of ad hocness to 
be able to be appropriate, so much the worse for Strevens’s account.  If this case fails to 
meet the criteria, then the cases I discuss in section VI will also fail, as their structures are 
identical to the structure of the Ptolemy case.  The critic might argue that there is no 
strong intuition concerning the ad hocness of the Ptolemy case and, therefore, that it is 
failing to meet the criteria is not a problem for Strevens.  The other two cases failing to 
meet the criteria would definitely be a problem for the critic’s argument, however, as 
these two are very clear intuitive examples of ad hocness.   
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an alternative a’ to a such that ha’ is consistent with e.  The alternative a’ will include, 
perhaps, the hypothesis that our eyes see apparently uncircular orbits because the 
heavenly bodies travel on perfectly circular orbits whose centers are not located at the 
center of the Earth.  Then, by adding some additional specifications to a’ – how these 
orbits are constructed or where their centers are located, Ptolemy’s theory can be 
“rescued from falsification”. (Strevens 533)  The additional information might come from 
either the eccentric hypothesis or the epicyclic hypothesis. 
 As Strevens appeals to a traditional definition of ad hocness, the alternative a’ 
will be considered ad hoc if it were added solely to rescue Ptolemy’s theory from the 
disconfirming evidence. (Strevens 533)  How should we determine whether Ptolemy 
decided to modify his theory to include eccentrics in order to rescue his theory from e?  
Not being able to ask, we must look at what he wrote concerning the eccentric hypothesis 
and the epicyclic hypothesis.  As quoted previously, Ptolemy states: “the cause of this 
irregular appearance can be accounted for by as many as two primary simple hypotheses 
[the eccentric and the epicyclic].” (Ptolemy 87)  That he presents the eccentric and the 
epicyclic hypotheses as ways to account for the disconfirming evidence suggests that 
Ptolemy might have added either of these hypotheses to his theory in order to save his 
theory from the disconfirming evidence of the sun’s path in the heavens.  This, of course, 
is not proof that Ptolemy was thinking in this way but, at least, these words make it seem 
plausible that Ptolemy was picking out a hypothesis in order to rescue his theory from the 
evidence.  So, on Strevens’s account, it would appear that the eccentric hypothesis 
brought in by Ptolemy was ad hoc. 
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 Note the differences between Strevens’s account’s treatment of the eccentric 
hypothesis’s addition and my discussion of the Ptolemy case in chapter 1, section IV.  On 
Strevens’s treatment, the fact that there were two different, interchangeable hypotheses, 
either of which could have been used to modify Ptolemy’s theory, does not impinge on 
whether or not the chosen hypothesis was ad hoc.  This is because the ad hocness of a 
hypothesis arises in the motivations for moving to a’ from a.  Additionally, like Howson 
and Urbach, Strevens does not claim that being ad hoc ought always to be a source of 
criticism.   
 I have not yet completed Strevens’s account’s treatment of the Ptolemy case.  It 
has been determined, fairly easily, that Ptolemy’s a’, which included the eccentric 
hypothesis, was ad hoc.  What still must be determined is whether the event of changing 
to ha’ from ha was a glorious or desperate rescue. 
 In a glorious rescue, the probability of the modified set of auxiliary hypotheses, 
including the new hypothesis, is increased.  Thus, glorious rescues seem to be justified 
events, according to Strevens.  Desperate rescues, on the other hand, seem to detract from 
the legitimacy of the central theory, as the probability of the central hypothesis goes 
down because of the conditionalizing on new evidence, yet the scientist does not respond 
appropriately. (Strevens 534)  Instead of questioning the central hypothesis, the scientist 
holds on to it, replacing the auxiliary instead.  It seems, according to Strevens, that the 
prior probability of the central theory will greatly influence whether a certain case is a 
case of a desperate or glorious rescue, as evidenced by the quotations and discussion in 
the previous section.  It now needs to be determined whether or not Ptolemy’s theory was 
well regarded and, so, whether its prior probability was high.   
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 Examining Strevens’s treatment of Newtonian theory in the face of the 
perturbations of Uranus will shed light on this issue.  The probability of h – Newton’s 
theory of gravitation17 - was very high at the time that the perturbations of Uranus caused 
Adams and Leverrier to independently postulate the existence of an additional planet, 
Neptune.  One of the reasons that the probability of Newtonian gravitation was so high, it 
seems, is because there weren’t any other plausible rivals to Newtonian gravitation theory 
that explained the evidence. (Strevens 535)  So, the high prior probability of Newtonian 
gravitation, compounded by the lack of plausible rivals, makes the modification of 
Newtonian theory to include the existence of another planet a glorious rescue.   
 And similarly, so, with the Ptolemy case.  Ptolemy’s theory was, arguably, 
without any real rivals.  And, in the Newtonian case, it was important that there were no 
plausible rivals: this helped elevate the prior probability of Newtonian gravitation.  The 
prior probability of Ptolemaic astronomy would also likely be very high, as it had no real 
rivals and had been much more successful than its predecessors such as Aristotelian 
astronomy.  As Ptolemaic astronomy’s prior probability may be considered quite high, 
the probability of a would have suffered greatly.  Its alternatives that made e, in 
conjunction with h, more probable would have then seen an increase in probability.  The 
eccentric hypothesis was created to solve the problem of the sun’s anomaly, so its 
probability will rise.  The combined ha’ will then have a high posterior probability. Thus, 
I would argue, Ptolemy’s modification could be seen as a glorious rescue.  Yet, our 
intuitions seem to tell us that the Ptolemy case is a clear case of a bad act: a hypothesis 
                                                 
17 Strevens is not entirely clear as to whether he means Newtonian theory in general or 
Newtonian theory of gravitation.  However, I do not think that the choice matters much 
for the discussion at hand.   
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acceptance that shouldn’t have occurred at the time that it did.  This result, while not 
damning for Strevens, is still one that ought to cause some concern for Strevens.  A good 
account of ad hocness should either account for our intuitions in the clearer cases of ad 
hocness or should give us a compelling reason as to why the counter-intuitive result 
should obtain.  Strevens’s account does not do the first and, I will argue, does not do the 
second.  This is because the elements of his theory that Strevens touts as beneficial – the 
Bayesianism and the glorious and desperate rescues – are not as felicitous as he thinks 
they are.  This should become clear in what follows. 
 Next, I will apply Howson and Urbach’s account to the Ptolemy case, with the 
same variables consisting in the same propositions. So, a’ will represent the eccentric 
hypothesis, e’ will represent the anomalous orbit of the sun.  b represents any relevant 
background information.  In my actual calculations, I will be dropping this variable, as it 
does not affect them. 
 That the introduction of the eccentric hypothesis is considered ad hoc should 
come as no surprise, as both Howson and Urbach and Strevens use the same criterion for 
determining ad hocness.  The second step is to determine whether this ad hoc 
introduction is acceptable or not, and then whether the theory, in combination with this 
hypothesis, credibly accounts for the disconfirming evidence. (Howson Urbach 158)  The 
eccentric hypothesis is acceptable if the probability of the eccentric hypothesis given the 
evidence and other relevant information is greater than .5.  This probability is equal to the 
likelihood of the hypothesis multiplied by the prior probability of the hypothesis, all 
divided by the probability of the data. (Howson Urbach 26, 110)  Or, in equation form: 
 P(a’|e’) = (P(e’ |a’) P(a’)) / P(e’) 
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As previous astronomical theories, such as Aristotle’s, held that all heavenly bodies had 
perfectly circular orbits centered at Earth and Ptolemaic theory, prior to modification, 
held the same, P(a’) would have been quite small and P(e’) even smaller. Suppose P(a’) = 
.1; P(e’) = .09; P(e’ |a’) =.6 , where P(e’ |a’) = (P(e’ & a’)) / P(a’).  Then, P(a’|e’) = .667 
and the introduction of the eccentric hypothesis will be acceptable, on Howson and 
Urbach’s account.  These numbers are not implausible, although a change in the prior 
probabilities on the right hand side of the equation will lead us to different posterior 
probabilities of the eccentric and, given enough number manipulation, might cause the 
introduction of the eccentric hypothesis to be rendered unacceptable. 
 As with Strevens’s account, labeling the eccentric hypothesis an acceptable ad 
hoc hypothesis introduction is something that should cause concern for Howson and 
Urbach, for similar reasons as I gave for Strevens.  Notice, too, that Howson and 
Urbach’s verdict on the epicyclic hypothesis will likely be very similar to the verdict for 
the eccentric hypothesis, and the same for Strevens.  Also, given that a hypothesis is ad 
hoc, whether this hypothesis introduction is good or bad is independent of there being 
two hypotheses, either of which could have been used to modify Ptolemy’s theory.  This 
is because the ad hocness of a hypothesis arises in the motivations for moving to a’ from 
a. 
 
VI.  The Bayesians versus the Lab-Break In Case and the Philosopher’s Ptolemy Case 
 
 For both Strevens’s and Howson and Urbach’s accounts, introducing the eccentric 
hypothesis turned out to be ‘good’ ad hoc – that is, for Strevens, it is a glorious rescue 
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and for Howson and Urbach, it is an acceptable introduction.  I noted that these results, 
while not damning for either account, are still results that ought to cause some concern 
for both Strevens and Howson and Urbach.  A good account of ad hocness should either 
account for our intuitions in the clearer cases of ad hocness or should give us a 
compelling reason as to why the counter-intuitive result should obtain.  I will run both 
accounts through two examples, both with similar structures to that of the Ptolemy case, 
in order to make these results look even worse for both of these accounts.  Here’s the 
first: 
 Break-in case: Brady accepts the theory that mercury, under standard atmospheric 
pressure, boils at 357° C. Brady tests this theory (in conjunction with certain 
auxiliary hypotheses) by heating mercury and having his lab assistant record the 
temperature at which it boils in a notebook. The next day, Brady checks the book 
and finds that the temperature written down is 359° C.  In the face of this 
disconfirming evidence, Brady rejects the auxiliary hypothesis that the temperature 
written in the book is the one that the assistant wrote down the previous day and 
accepts the hypothesis that someone broke into his lab and changed the temperature 
in the notebook.   
 
 Notice the similarity in structure to the Ptolemy case.  Both Strevens and Howson 
and Urbach will count the introduction of the temperature-changing hypothesis as ad hoc, 
as it is introduced solely to save the theory that mercury boils at a certain temperature 
from the disconfirming evidence of the temperature written down by his lab assistant in 
the notebook.  Both Strevens and Howson and Urbach counted the introduction of the 
eccentric hypothesis as ad hoc for a similar reason.  Additionally, the fact that there were 
two different, interchangeable hypotheses, either of which could have been used to 
modify Ptolemy’s theory, makes no difference to Strevens and Howson and Urbach’s 
treatment of it; similarly in the lab break-in case, although in its case there are more than 
two different, interchangeable hypotheses. His assistant could have accidentally written 
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the temperature wrong, for example.  Or, the room might not have been at standard 
atmospheric pressure.  Or, the substance being tested might not have really been mercury. 
 To determine whether the temperature-changing hypothesis is a glorious or a 
desperate rescue is to determine whether the prior probability of the mercury-temperature 
theory was high.  One of the reasons for it to be high would be the lack of other plausible 
rivals to it that explained the (previous) evidence.  Suppose Brady has run this 
experiment many times and has previously obtained the results that mercury, under 
standard atmospheric conditions, boiled at 357° C.  This information would cause the 
prior probability of the mercury-boiling theory to be high.  It will also be quite high 
because there don’t seem to be any other plausible rivals to this theory that explain the 
evidence.  So, the high prior probability of the mercury-boiling theory, compounded by 
the lack of plausible rivals, makes the modification of the mercury-boiling theory to 
include the temperature-changing hypothesis a glorious rescue.  Again, this is a 
problematic result for Strevens’s account.   
 Next is to determine the outcome for Howson and Urbach’s account.  To 
determine whether a hypothesis introduction is acceptable or not is to determining 
whether the probability of the new hypothesis, given the evidence and relevant 
background information, is greater than .5.  Again, using  
 P(a’|e’) = (P(e’|a’) P(a’)) / P(e’) 
where P(a’) = .05; P(e’) = .04; P(e’|a’) = .75 (both the evidence and the temperature – 
changing hypothesis being initially very improbable), the posterior probability may be 
calculated 
 (.05 • .75) / .04 = .9375 
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 The posterior probability of the temperature-changing hypothesis comes out to be about 
.94 and, so, will be an example of an acceptable hypothesis introduction.18  In a case with 
an analogous structure to the Ptolemy case, and where our intuitions even more strongly 
indicate that this hypothesis introduction is suspect, Howson and Urbach’s account deems 
this introduction acceptable.  This seems problematic for their account. 
 The second example is the philosopher’s Ptolemy case, which I introduced in 
chapter 1, section X.  This example is very similar to the original Ptolemy case, with the 
exception that the structure is then repeated several times. 
 The initial calculations for both Strevens and Howson and Urbach in the 
philosopher’s Ptolemy case will be the same as in the original Ptolemy case, as again 
either an eccentric or an epicyclic hypothesis will be introduced in order to save the 
theory from disconfirming evidence.  So, the first modification will be a glorious rescue 
or an acceptable introduction.  And, both theories ignore the fact that there are other, 
interchangeable hypotheses that might have been introduced.  What I will need to 
determine is whether the additional modifications come out differently than the first.    
 In a glorious rescue, the prior probability of h was very high and, so, the 
probability of h will decrease very little when ha is falsified.  Discarding a and adding a’, 
whose probability will greatly increase as a result of e, will cause the scientist to have 
                                                 
18   Again, as in the Ptolemy case, one might argue with my initial probabilities.  
However, it does seem likely that the prior probabilities of both the temperature-changing 
hypothesis and the evidence in the notebook would be very small.  I will discuss a related 
problem in section X of this chapter, when I discuss the differences that prior 
probabilities make.  It seems like the priors make too much of a difference in determining 
the acceptability or unacceptability of a certain hypothesis introduction, given that there 
seems to be a plausible variation in these values, when assigned, depending on what is 
perceived as the ‘fair betting odds’ on them.   
 
 72
accepted a hypothesis where the probability of ha’ is equal, or almost equal, to the 
probability of ha before e came to light.  After the first modification, the probability of 
Ptolemaic astronomy will still be very high (for the above reason and also because there 
are no plausible alternatives to it).  So, it seems, the next modification will also be a 
glorious rescue, and the next.  As the probability of h may decrease a bit after each piece 
of new evidence arises that disconfirms ha (where a is whatever set of auxiliaries or 
auxiliary that ends up being replaced with a’ when the rescue occurs), it is certainly 
possible that, after some number of iterations, the rescue will no longer be considered 
glorious.  How much iteration this would need is not clear.  Why would it be, though, that 
one particular modification would be a desperate move when other, identical 
modifications were not?  And, just as with the first modification, the desperateness or 
gloriousness of each successive modification will be invariant on whether there are other, 
interchangeable hypotheses that might be used to modify the theory.    
 An analogous assessment will occur on Howson and Urbach’s account.  Where 
the difference might lie would be on the number of iterations that it would take for the 
given hypothesis introduction to be unacceptable: it would seem that this point would 
come more quickly for Howson and Urbach than for Strevens.  However, Howson and 
Urbach’s account will be equally invariant on whether there are other, interchangeable 
hypotheses that one might introduce.   
 The lab break-in case and the philosopher’s Ptolemy case, as they are structurally 
similar to the original Ptolemy case, serve to underscore the fact that both Strevens and 
Howson and Urbach’s accounts evaluate these types of cases as positive ad hoc 
introductions, which seems to get these cases wrong. Even more importantly, why 
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Strevens and Howson and Urbach’s accounts get the cases wrong is because of these 
accounts’ insensitivity to cases where there is only one possible hypothesis that will 
reconcile the theory with the disconfirming evidence, as opposed to cases where there are 
multiple alternatives. I will proceed by highlighting other problems for both Howson and 
Urbach and Strevens’s accounts of ad hocness.   
 
VII. A Divergence in Terminology from Both Howson and Urbach and Strevens and a 
Gesture to a Later Objection 
 
 The Bayesian accounts I have discussed all share a version of the standard 
definition of ad hocness.  They claim that a hypothesis is ad hoc when the hypothesis is 
introduced for the reason that this hypothesis can rescue the central thesis from 
disconfirming evidence.  As a result of their reliance on this definition of ad hocness, two 
points arise for these Bayesians.  Firstly, these Bayesians do not believe that to be ad hoc 
is either acceptable or unacceptable.  Ad hocness is merely a psychological characteristic 
on the Bayesians’ accounts.  This is in contrast to Hempel (as well as Leplin, Sober and 
myself), who believes that ad hocness has a normative significance.  On Strevens’s 
account, normativity does not enter the picture until he further separates the types of ad 
hoc hypotheses into glorious rescues and desperate rescues.  Similarly on Howson and 
Urbach’s account, when separating acceptable and unacceptable hypotheses.   
 Which brings me to the second point that this definition of ad hocness raises.  Ad 
hocness is a psychological characteristic on the Bayesians’ accounts because this 
definition commits us to claiming that the ad hocness of a hypothesis depends on the 
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psychology of the scientists introducing the hypothesis.  It is ad hoc only if the scientists 
had certain motivations for introducing it. 
 In fact, this might be a slightly misleading way to put this point, as the 
psychological characterization of ad hocness might seem to rest solely on the fact that 
Howson and Urbach, and Strevens, use this particular definition of ad hocness.  It is true 
that the particular way in which this characterization of ad hocness is psychological in 
nature is a result of this definition.  However, the Bayesian accounts I’ve considered, no 
matter their definition of ad hocness, will make ad hocness be a psychological, and not a 
normative, characteristic.  This is because the possibility for normative claims arises in 
these accounts only at certain points when updating one’s beliefs using Bayesian 
conditionalization.  The first point normative claims can be made is when the prior 
probabilities are determined.   These priors will either constitute ‘fair odds’, or not.  
Then, normative claims can be made as to whether you update your beliefs according to 
Bayes’s theorem.  Suppose you update your beliefs due to some piece of evidence and 
there are two possible hypotheses you can accept.  One has a much higher posterior 
probability, given the evidence, than the other.  Then, a Bayesian might say that you were 
unjustified in choosing the one with the lower posterior probability.  There are no other 
points at which normative claims can be made. Determinations of ad hocness are not 
made at either of the normative points, so they cannot be normative claims.  A similar 
point may be made for any Bayesian treatment of ad hocness that has a similar structure 
to the accounts that I’ve considered.   
 One might think that, in fact, the psychology of the scientists is very important to 
whether or not a hypothesis is ad hoc.  After all, if the scientist does not think that the 
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hypothesis will add anything else to the theory – additional predictions, e.g. – then it 
seems less likely that the hypothesis is a good one, or that the hypothesis is less likely to 
be true – or so the thinking goes.  I address this in chapter 1, section VIII.  It might well 
be that a scientist is more justified in believing in a hypothesis if his motivations are 
exemplary in introducing a certain hypothesis to a given theory in the face of recalcitrant 
evidence and, so, a scientist might be less justified or not justified in believing in a 
hypothesis introduced solely to solve a problem.  However, this is an epistemological 
point, whereas determining whether something is ad hoc is a methodological issue.  In 
issues of methodology, the rule or guidelines created to deal with these issues do not tell 
the scientists what motivations to have.  Therefore, the motivations of the scientists ought 
to be irrelevant in determining ad hocness.   
 I will return to the Bayesian normative account of ad hocness in the next section. 
 
VIII. Ad Hocness Ought Not Be the Umbrella Term for Two Distinct Phenomena 
 
 Strevens’s account of ad hocness includes two different types of ad hoc 
hypotheses – the ones that are a part of a glorious rescue and those that are a part of a 
desperate rescue.  Howson and Urbach’s account of ad hocness also includes two 
different types of ad hoc hypotheses – the acceptable and the unacceptable.  And it looks 
like any similar Bayesian account of ad hocness will also include two different types of 
ad hoc hypotheses, whatever their labels.  I will use Strevens’s account as the illustration 
for the problem found in so doing, but the critique will apply to all of these Bayesian 
accounts of ad hocness.   
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 The problem in so doing is twofold.  The first problem is that ad hocness is used 
as a pejorative in science and in (most of) philosophy.  The Bayesians will have to give a 
good reason as to why the glorious rescues are actually ad hoc moves at all.  Strevens, for 
example, differentiates between the introduction of good ad hoc hypotheses and bad ad 
hoc hypotheses – that is, the types of ad hoc hypotheses that are justified and those that 
are not.  This is the distinction identified in the distinction between glorious and 
desperate rescues.  However, this sort of heterogeneity of ad hocness runs strongly 
counter to how scientists use the term ‘ad hoc’.  Having part of one’s theory labeled ‘ad 
hoc’ is considered a detriment to the theory, not a form of approbation.  Something that 
philosophers of science must be sensitive to is to how terms are actually used in science.  
If we are to differ markedly in our use of terminology, we must give a good reason for so 
doing.  I do not think that Strevens has done this.  I will argue this point more both in the 
second, related problem in this section and also in the criticism found in the next section. 
 The second, related, problem is that, on occasions where certain types of acts can 
be clearly distinguished, and there is a reason to so distinguish them, it is a mistake to 
place such acts under the same umbrella term.  For example, Strevens’s label ‘glorious 
rescue’ in the Uranus perturbation case seem to be another way of labeling an instance 
where it was rationally permissible (maybe even encouraged) for scientists to postulate 
the existence of another planet to account for these perturbations.  To label some act a 
desperate rescue seems to be another way of labeling an instance where it was not 
rationally permissible for scientists to postulate such a hypothesis.  To label the former as 
a good ad hoc move and the latter as a bad one seems to unnecessarily complicate the 
issue.   
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 In sections VII-X of Chapter 1, I discuss instances where there does not seem to 
be any principled way to make a distinction between two types of hypotheses or two 
types of acts.  In contrast, there seems, here, to be a major and clear distinction between a 
move that is rationally permissible to make and one that is not rationally permissible to 
make.  Why not respect this distinction, and the way in which scientists use the term ‘ad 
hoc’, and label the rationally impermissible moves ‘ad hoc’ and the rationally permissible 
moves as good scientific methodology?   
 After all, an important part of scientific methodology is to modify one’s theories 
in the light of disconfirming evidence.  To do otherwise would be either to throw over a 
theory the instant disconfirming evidence arose, no matter the theory’s virtues, or to 
maintain theories that will be empirically inadequate.  These modifications are being 
made because of disconfirming evidence, which seems to point to the possibility of their 
being ad hoc.  To label indiscriminately all (or most) of these types of theory 
modifications as ad hoc is either to misrepresent what is going on or to render the term 
‘ad hoc’ rather meaningless.19  It will become meaningless if it embodies too many 
actions, especially if the actions that it embodies are very heterogeneous, or if the term 
                                                 
19 In “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”, Jarrett Leplin puts this point quite well: 
 “If in fact ‘ad hoc’ is used in science to mark a particular methodological liability, 
if it has the univocity I have claimed in making this liability a necessary condition of its 
application, then a neutral epistemic analysis, which must distinguish as many senses of 
‘ad hoc’ as there are forms of empirical deficiency, radically underestimates the scientific 
importance of the concept. […] In so far as ‘ad hoc’ is subjected to distinctions of sense, 
there is a natural inclination, exhibited by many along the slippery path to Holton, to 
attribute such differences to differences in usage whose only legitimate significance is 
biographical.  In this situation, if it can be shown that a common judgment was made in 
even a small number of importantly different cases by use of the concept, then univocity 
should be presumed pending evidence to the contrary.  The distinguishing of sense so 
popular from ordinary language philosophy is a valuable tool only if not exploited ad hoc 
to convert philosophical problems into historical ones.” (Leplin 1982 240-241) 
 
 78
goes too far afield from scientific practice.  If the term is meaningless, why use it at all?  I 
don’t find any of these consequences acceptable.   
  
IX.  Too Much Depends on Prior Probabilities 
 
 With Fitelson and Waterman, I claim that Strevens’s conception of desperate and 
glorious rescues ends up hinging almost exclusively on the prior probabilities of h, which 
does not seem right, for several reasons.  Fitelson and Waterman, in “Bayesian 
Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens”, criticize 
Strevens’s solution to the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem: a solution that I do not discuss in 
the body of this chapter20, as the distinction that Strevens makes does not affect the nature 
of ad hoc hypotheses, according to him.  However, a brief digression into Strevens’s 
solution and Fitelson and Waterman’s critique of it will show how an assumption that 
Strevens makes in the solution to the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem will bleed into his 
criteria for desperate and glorious rescues. 
 Fitelson and Waterman claim that Strevens makes a critical oversimplification 
when characterizing the problem, which causes other problems for Strevens’s theory.  
According to them, Strevens claims that: 
  e is equivalent to ~(h & a) (Fitelson and Waterman 294) 
where e is the disconfirming evidence, h is the central hypothesis and a is the set of 
auxiliary hypotheses.  Fitelson and Waterman’s issue with this simplification is that the 
simplification says that e consists of no more than the fact that h and a both aren’t true. 
                                                 
20 Although I do discuss the essentials of it in footnotes 10 and 15 of this chapter. 
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(Fitelson and Waterman 294)  As a result of this, they argue, Strevens’s later claim that 
the relationship between the confirmation of h given e and the confirmation of a given e 
will depend on both the prior probabilities of h and a, as well as conditional probabilities 
such as the probability of a given h and h given a, is a false one. (Fitelson and Waterman 
295)  In fact, they claim, the simplification of the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem makes the 
comparison of the confirmation of h given e and the confirmation of a given e just a 
comparison between the prior probabilities of h and a.21 This makes the disconfirming 
evidence irrelevant to the relationship between these two confirmations. (Fitelson and 
Waterman 295)  And, as Fitelson and Waterman state: “[i]t seems clear to us that, in the 
original Q-D problem, the mere relationship between the priors of H and A should not by 
itself determine the relative support that E provides for H vs. A.” (Fitelson and Waterman 
295)  They continue the critique by saying: 
    We take Quine and Duhem to be asking the following question: In cases 
where H & A entails ~E, can the evidence E differentially confirm H vs. A – 
a posteriori – and, if so, how?  This is not a question about the relative a 
priori plausibilities of H vs. A but rater a question about the a posteriori 
confirmational power of E to discriminate between H and A when H & A 
entails ~E. (Fitelson and Waterman 296) 
 
In other words, Strevens’s solution of the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem misses its mark.  
It misses its mark because it relies solely on the prior probabilities of H and A to 
determine which ought to be thrown aside or modified given a certain piece of 
disconfirming evidence.   
 That Strevens’s account doesn’t adequately solve the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
problem is an issue for Strevens in a couple of ways.  The first issue is that other attempts 
                                                 
21 Strevens himself seems to be hinting at something like this in the two excerpts quoted 
in section IV of this chapter. (Strevens 535, 535-536) 
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to define ad hocness – such as Hempel’s – fall into the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem and, 
thus, are not good definitions of ad hocness for the reasons stated in chapter 1, section IX.  
Therefore, it does not appear that Strevens can try to get out of the problem via any of the 
pathways that the other, failed, attempts take.22 23  
 The other way that Fitelson and Waterman’s critique is problematic for Strevens 
occurs as a result of Strevens’s distinction between glorious and desperate rescues.  If the 
confirmation of h given e and the confirmation of a given e are based merely on the prior 
probabilities of both h and a, then whether a rescue is glorious or desperate will also be 
based on these prior probabilities.  This is a problem because it would seem that, given a 
relatively well-established theory without serious rivals, any rescue of it would be a 
glorious – and, therefore, justified or, at least, permissible – one.  This is not a happy 
outcome, for it seems perfectly plausible to think that there could be cases (such as the 
Ptolemy case) where, because of disconfirming evidence, the introduction of a hypothesis 
into a well-established theory without any serious rivals ought to be desperate, 
unjustified.  However, this sort of outcome looks very improbable, given the dependence 
of Strevens’s account on the prior probabilities of h and a.  Alternatively, it would seem 
that a newly presented theory, introducing a hypothesis because of disconfirming 
                                                 
22   Fitelson and Waterman claim that the likelihood-measure l is a better Bayesian 
measure of confirmation and Bayesian accounts using l can better deal with the Quine-
Duhem-Ayer problem.  I will not evaluate these claims here.   
 
Fitelson, Branden and Waterman, Andrew.  “Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and 
the Quine-Duhem Problem.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
forthcoming. 
 
23  Strevens has published a response to Fitelson and Waterman.  However, this response 
concentrates on another part of their critique of his paper and does not really address the 
issue raised, above.  Fitelson and Waterman note this as well, in a response to Strevens’s 
response. (Fitelson and Waterman, forthcoming)  
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evidence, would almost always be committing a desperate rescue.  This, too, seems an 
unfortunate consequence. 
 To have ad hocness reduce to whether or not a hypothesis is being introduced into 
a well-established theory or a non-well-established theory because of disconfirming 
evidence creates two negative consequences.  Firstly, that there are good and bad ad hoc 
acts does not map on to scientists’ use of ad hoc.  Secondly, as ad hocness is equivalent to 
the prior probabilities of theories, the vice of ad hocness just refers to the modifications, 
due to disconfirming evidence, to a theory with a low prior probability and the virtue of 
ad hocness refers to the relevant modification to a theory with a high prior probability. 
This is to place the emphasis, and to move the label ‘ad hoc’, on the theories themselves, 
without taking into account the particular hypothesis being accepted.  Yet, this is 
precisely where the emphasis, and the label ‘ad hoc’, should be placed.  And, Fitelson 
and Waterman have pointed to the same problem of emphasis in Strevens’s attempt at a 
solution to the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem.   
 
IX.  The Problem of Prior Probabilities for the Possible a’ s 
 
 As evidenced by the previous section, the designation of a glorious, versus 
desperate, rescue is determined almost exclusively by the prior probability of the theory 
being modified due to disconfirming evidence.  However, there is another determiner for 
that designation.  In a glorious rescue, the probability of the modified set of auxiliary 
hypothesis, including the new hypothesis, is increased (usually dramatically).  In order 
for such an increase to occur, the prior probability of a’ (before the advent of the 
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evidence) must be rather low.  This is because there will not be an appreciable increase in 
the probability of the modified hypothesis if its prior probability were already high.24  In 
looking at the original Ptolemy case, an interesting problem will arise concerning the 
prior probability of a’. 
 In the original Ptolemy case, there were two different hypotheses from which to 
modify the auxiliaries: the eccentric and the epicyclic.  Whichever one will get the 
biggest boost in probability seems to be the hypothesis that ought to be adopted as a’.  
The Bayesian will claim that the a’ chosen should have the highest boost in probability so 
that h + a, given the evidence and relevant information, will have the highest posterior 
probability.  So, it looks like whichever of the eccentric and the epicyclic gets chosen 
ought to be on the basis of its prior probability.  This way of deciding which hypothesis 
to use seems to miss the point again.  It is not going to be a good thing to choose a 
hypothesis on the basis of it having a low prior probability before the advent of e.  Not 
only does this seem wrong-headed, it also doesn’t get to the point of the problem.  There 
is a problem here because Ptolemy has two, empirically equivalent hypotheses from 
which to choose and no criteria upon which to make the decision.  Yet, he makes the 
decision anyway.  That one has a lower prior probability than the other is not giving him 
sufficient criteria to decide.25   
                                                 
24   A similar situation is found in Howson and Urbach’s criteria for acceptable and 
unacceptable hypotheses and acceptable and unacceptable modified theories.   
 
25   Strevens might claim, here, that this case cannot be decided using his version of 
Bayesianism because he relies on the partial posterior being equal to the true posterior 
probability in order to get around the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem.  His claim is that, in 
most (interesting) cases, his three criteria will be fulfilled and the partial posterior will be 
equal to the true posterior probability, which information, he claims, can be used to 
determine ad hocness and glorious versus desperate rescues. (Strevens 529-531, 533)  
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 In order to highlight the importance of this problem, I will redescribe the original 
Ptolemy case.  Suppose the three following scenarios: (1) the eccentric hypothesis is 
introduced and it is the only alternative to a; (2) the epicyclic hypothesis is introduced 
and it is the only alternative to a; (3) either the epicyclic or the eccentric hypothesis is 
introduced and they are both alternatives to a.  If the prior probability of Ptolemy’s eight 
commitments is (much) greater than the prior probability of the a that is discarded, all 
three of these scenarios will be examples of glorious rescues.  So, whichever rescue will 
be glorious in these conditions, despite the fact that two scenarios provide only one 
alternative to a, while the third provides more than one. 26 
 
X.  Conclusion 
 
 Due to their requirements that ad hocness be merely psychological in character, 
and due to the problems faced by these theories as a result of their insensitivity to the 
available number of possible modifications, both Strevens’s and Howson and Urbach’s 
Bayesianism fail to give an adequate account of ad hocness.  Strevens’s account, in 
particular, fails to give an account of ad hocness where a well-established theory could be 
                                                                                                                                                 
The reason why this might not be a case where the partial posterior equals the true 
posterior probability would be that it fulfills condition three of the conditions that make 
these two values unequal. (Strevens 531)  I am not entirely clear on what types of 
situations Strevens is trying to depict in this condition.  I cannot say more than it seems 
possible that the Ptolemy scenario might not qualify.  So much the worse for Strevens’s 
account.   
 
26 In fact, I could run this same sort of argument for the other two examples discussed in 
section VI.  That I can do this strengthens my claim.  I have left out the treatment of the 
lab break-in case and the philosopher’s Ptolemy case because of length considerations.  
However, their outcomes are the same as the original Ptolemy case when run through this 
argument.   
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modified in such a way that it was a desperate rescue and vice versa for not-well-
established theories.  So, we will have to turn elsewhere to find an acceptable account of 
ad hocness.   
 
 
  
 
Chapter Three 
Jarrett Leplin’s Account of Ad Hocness: The Closest to Being Successful 
 
 
I.  Jarrett Leplin’s Criteria of Ad Hocness 
 
 Jarrett Leplin’s view, as formulated in “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis” 
and revised in “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”, is closer to my own view in 
certain ways than is Strevens’s.  Leplin’s definition of ad hocness, for instance, is a 
methodological rather than an epistemic one.1 (Leplin 1982 236)  Leplin and I both think 
that the appeal to the psychology or biography of scientists is not the appropriate way to 
understand what makes something ad hoc.  Leplin also considers ad hocness always to be 
a vice, as I do.  As well, he and I both think that there is and ought to be a distinction 
between something being false or improbable and it being ad hoc. (Leplin 1982 236) 
However, I think that his criteria fail, ultimately, to properly characterize the nature of ad 
hocness.  After discussing Leplin’s view, I will demonstrate how his criteria do fail.  
In “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis”, Leplin states his account of ad 
hocness.  He thinks, in this paper, that he has found individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for ad hocness.  (Leplin 1975 333)  As Leplin states it: 
                                                 
1 Our conceptions of what is methodologically suspect in ad hoc acts are quite different, 
however.   
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An hypothesis H introduced into a theory T in response to an 
experimental result E is ad hoc if and only if: 
(I) E is anomalous for T but not for T as supplemented 
by H. 
(2) E is evidence for H but 
(a) No available experimental results other than E 
support H, 
(b) H has no application to the domain of T apart 
from E, 
(c) H has no independent theoretical support. 
(3) There are sufficient grounds neither for holding that 
H is true nor for holding that H is false. 
(4) H is consistent with accepted theory and with the 
essential propositions of T. 
(5) There are problems other than E confronting T 
which there is good reason to hold are connected 
with E in the following respects: 
(a) these problems together with E indicate that T is 
non – fundamental, 
(b) none of these problems including E can be 
satisfactorily solved unless this non-
fundamentality is removed, 
(c) a satisfactory solution to any of these problems 
including E must contribute to the solution of 
the others. (Leplin 1975 336-337) 
 
 Leplin seems to emphasize different elements of his theory of ad hocness in the 1982 
paper than he does in the 1975 paper.  After detailing the criteria, I will discuss both 
characterizations of Leplin’s view, in order that I present the most charitable reading.   
I will concentrate my discussion on the more contested conditions: conditions 
such as (4), although not completely uncontroversial2, are the sorts of conditions that 
                                                 
2 I suppose there might be a case where H is consistent with much of the propositions of 
T but not consistent with other parts of accepted theory.  Or, perhaps H is not consistent 
with an essential proposition of T.  In the second case, it would seem as if a scientist that 
introduced that sort of hypothesis is either mistakenly doing so or is radically changing 
the theory itself – moving to a new theory.  Thus, the second case would not be 
problematic because the move would not be ad hoc but, rather, either wrong or a radical 
departure.  In the first case, as long as the hypothesis were consistent with the essential 
propositions of T, it seems plausible that its introduction could be a candidate for ad 
hocness.   
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pretty much all theories of ad hocness share.  If the hypothesis weren’t at all consistent 
with the essential propositions of T, it would seem silly or false to introduce this 
hypothesis into a theory that you wish to maintain: it would not, however, be the sort of 
act that could be labeled ‘ad hoc’.  (1) is another non- contested condition.  If there were 
no disconfirming evidence, there would be no need for a hypothesis introduction.3  If the 
hypothesis didn’t then fix the problem, the hypothesis would have even more serious 
issues than being ad hoc.  The other criteria, however, are more controversial.4    
 
II.  The 3rd and 5th Criteria  
 
 In the 3rd criterion, Leplin claims that a hypothesis is ad hoc only if there is not 
enough evidence either way to hold that the hypothesis is true or false. (Leplin 1975 321)   
Once the hypothesis is introduced, it is possible that more evidence will come to light that 
will either give the scientists reason to believe that H is true, or evidence that will give 
the scientists reason to believe that H is false.  Leplin thinks that this is an important 
criterion for a couple of reasons.  Firstly, it looks like he wishes to distinguish ad hocness 
from, say, a clearly false hypothesis or a clearly true hypothesis.  Leplin thinks that there 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3  I will use the term ‘introduction’ throughout my discussion of Leplin’s view, as this is 
the term that he uses.  I have stated, in Chapter 1, section XI, why I think that it is the act 
of accepting a hypothesis, rather than introducing it, that can qualify as ad hoc.   
  
4  I will not discuss the 2nd criterion, although it is not as clearly uncontroversial as, say, 
the 1st.  A dogged critic of the criterion of additional test implications would attack 2 (b) 
for seeming to imply that a requirement for ad hocness is that the hypothesis reconciles E 
with the theory and that’s it.   I discuss possible interpretations of this part of the criterion 
in section IV, when discussing the Ptolemy case.  The criticisms of the interpretations just 
mentioned are found in Chapter 1, sections VII and VIII.   
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are ways that the introduction of a hypothesis can be bad besides it being ad hoc: 
introducing a false hypothesis, for example, would be bad but not ad hoc.5  Secondly, 
Leplin thinks that it is a positive aspect of his view that he can distinguish two types of ad 
hocness: the ad hocness of a hypothesis and the ad hocness of the introduction of the 
hypothesis.  A hypothesis, on his view, can be ad hoc initially, and then not ad hoc after 
more evidence has been brought to light that dictates that the hypothesis ought to be held 
either true or false. (Leplin 1975 321)  In other words, the hypothesis will be initially ad 
hoc because its introduction was ad hoc but shed that label after more confirmation or 
disconfirmation has arisen for it.  The introduction of this hypothesis, however, will 
always be labeled as ad hoc, even if/when the hypothesis itself is no longer considered to 
be ad hoc.  I will take issues with this criterion when I critique Leplin’s view.   
 Skipping Leplin’s 4th criterion, I will discuss his 5th criterion in more detail.  This 
criterion deals with the concepts of completeness and fundamentality, which Leplin 
wishes to differentiate.  He thinks that a theory could be both incomplete and non-
fundamental: however, he wants to claim that these two concepts do not always go hand 
in hand.  A theory may manifest both types of problems.  However, any given problem 
                                                 
5   So, on Leplin’s account, introducing a patently false hypothesis due to disconfirming 
evidence will not constitute an ad hoc act, as it will not fulfill the 3rd criterion.  
Introducing a clearly true hypothesis due to disconfirming evidence will also not 
constitute an ad hoc act for the same reason.  The charge of ad hocness can be appropriate 
only where the scientists do not know whether the hypothesis is true or false.  This is an 
interesting consequence of his account.  There might be times when a hypothesis that is 
known to be false is introduced into a theory as a result of disconfirming evidence where 
its introduction seems clearly ad hoc or clearly not ad hoc, and similarly with a 
hypothesis that is known to be true.  It is not entirely clear to me why a hypothesis, 
known to be true, can’t be introduced ad hocly and similarly for a hypothesis known to be 
false, although I don’t have any strong convictions concerning this point.  I discuss the 
separation between the different virtues and vices (between ad hocness and truth or 
falsity, e.g.) in Chapter 5, section XIII.  I will reserve judgment, here, on this part of 
criterion 3.   
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will be a problem either of completeness or of fundamentality.6  So, what does Leplin 
mean by these terms?   
Firstly, I will discuss Leplin’s concept of incompleteness.   He claims that a 
problem P is a “‘problem of completeness’ for [theory] T if it shows that T is 
incomplete.” (Leplin 1975 325) A theory that is complete is one that adequately 
addresses the phenomena in a given domain7: T will be incomplete if there is a problem 
that arises for T, which will be some phenomenon in the relevant domain either not 
addressed by T or seemingly in conflict with some part of T. This problem will be one 
that can be resolved by adding some other hypothesis to T, whereby the hypothesis 
addresses the additional or previously discrepant phenomenon.  The addition of this 
hypothesis then causes the theory to be complete.  An important characteristic of a 
problem of completeness is that such a problem will not compromise the integrity of T: 
its solution will be consistent with, at least, the ‘essential propositions’ of T, where the 
essential propositions are those that, if modified or discarded, would cause the scientific 
community to consider the thus-modified T a new, different theory.  (Leplin 1975 325)  
 A problem of non-fundamentality, on the other hand, is one where a problem 
arises, the solution of which is inconsistent with either all of or parts of a given theory. 
(Leplin 1975 325)  Unlike a problem of completeness, the solution to a problem of 
fundamentality requires abandoning either all or part of the essential propositions of the 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Leplin’s discussion of the Lorentz theory.  Leplin 1975 321-323. 
 
7 Leplin thinks that completeness is domain-sensitive: a theory about something in 
geology, for example, ought not be considered somehow deficient for failing to address 
something that occurs in, for example, animal husbandry. (Leplin 1975 325)  This seems 
to be a reasonable stipulation.  Otherwise, very few – if any – theories would be 
complete.   
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theory faced with the problem. This is in contrast to a problem of completeness, whose 
solution will not require discarding any of the essential propositions.   
Although Leplin wishes to distinguish these two types of problems, it is not the 
case that all problems are definitively considered problems of completeness or problems 
of fundamentality.  The division of problems into one category or the other will be 
subjective: whether some (if not all) problems are those of completeness or of 
fundamentality will depend on how the given scientist views the problem. Leplin does 
not explicitly state the reasons that a problem ends up getting categorized one way rather 
than another: however, it seems that whether the given scientist will see the problem as 
that of completeness or of fundamentality will depend on the scientist’s degree of belief 
in the theory under attack.  If the scientist’s degree of belief is fairly high, it is likely that 
the problem will be characterized as one of incompleteness.  If it is lower, it is likely that 
the problem will be characterized as one of fundamentality.  These correlations come 
about because to treat a problem as one of completeness, the scientist will look for a 
solution to the inconsistency that is consistent with the (essential propositions of the) 
theory under attack – not something that a scientist skeptical of a theory would be likely 
to do – while to treat a problem as one of fundamentality is to come up with a solution for 
the inconsistency that requires the rejection of all or parts of the theory under attack – not 
something that a scientist with a high degree of belief in a theory would be likely to do. 
In other words, a scientist with a high degree of belief in his theory would be much more 
likely to search for a solution to the problem that allows him to maintain the essential 
propositions of his theory.  A scientist with a low degree of belief in his theory, on the 
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other hand, will be much more willing to entertain solutions that necessitate discarding 
some or all of these essential propositions.8   
 It might seem that, nevertheless, there will be definite cases of completeness 
problems and definite cases of fundamentality problems, where the degree of belief of the 
scientists involved would not dictate what sort of problems they are.  After all, one might 
argue, there are certainly going to be cases where the solutions clearly will be logically 
inconsistent with the theory under attack, while other cases’ solutions will necessitate 
only a minor addition.   However, I do not think that all cases will be as clear-cut as those 
and Leplin seems to agree with me.  He notes that “the judgment that a theory is logically 
inconsistent is generally problematic.” (Leplin 1975 326)  What he seems to be intending, 
here, is that, faced with a charge of logical inconsistency in a given theory, a supporter of 
this theory can always claim that the theory merely looks inconsistent because the theory 
is not yet complete.   Once the theory gets expanded more, the claim goes, it will be 
demonstrated that what looked like a logical inconsistency is, in fact, not.  One of the 
examples given by Leplin is that of Stokes’s theory of aberration, which evaded charges 
of logical inconsistency by having additional hypotheses added to it and thereby making 
its account of ether coherent. (Leplin 1975 326)  Other examples of this sort of 
phenomena are early 20th century theories of light, which seemed to claim that light was 
                                                 
8   As a result, it seems likely that problems for less-well-established theories will be 
much more likely to be treated as problems of non-fundamentality, while problems for 
well-established theories will be much more likely to be treated as problems of 
completeness.  This is not altogether felicitous, as I will discuss in my last objection in 
this chapter.  In the previous chapter, I criticized Strevens because creating a ‘glorious 
rescue’ or a ‘desperate rescue’ depended almost exclusively on the high or low prior 
probability of the theory facing the problem.  A problem being one of completeness or of 
non-fundamentality would seem to depend on something similar.   
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at once composed of particles and of waves: these two claims seem logically inconsistent 
but the addition of certain hypotheses reconcile them.      
 Similarly, there do not seem to be many definitive cases of problems of 
completeness.  (This point is one upon which Leplin cannot agree with me, as will be 
indicated in the next paragraph.)  It might well end up that a seeming problem of 
completeness cannot actually be solved without casting aside some essential proposition 
of the original theory – or, at least, so it seems at that stage of scientific inquiry.  And the 
difference between problems of completeness and problems of fundamentality does not 
seem to be how large the problem is: there could well be large problems that arise for a 
particular theory – for example, quantum mechanics’s seeming incompatibility with 
relativity – that are treated (at least initially) as problems of completeness and vice versa 
for problems of fundamentality.  The fact that labeling a problem one of completeness or 
of fundamentality seems to rest on scientists’ degrees of belief in a particular theory 
under attack is a problem for Leplin, which I will discuss in greater detail in section XI.  
 Leplin wants to distinguish problems of completeness from problems of 
fundamentality because he thinks that a criterion for being an ad hoc hypothesis is that it 
is introduced because the author of the hypothesis believes she is trying to solve a 
problem of completeness, while the problem is really one of fundamentality.  Thus, the 
introduced hypothesis is inadequate as a solution to the problem. (Leplin 1975 326, 329-
332)   So, it is important to Leplin that we can distinguish between problems of 
completeness and problems of fundamentality: otherwise, he could not make this 
distinction a part of the criteria for being an ad hoc hypothesis.  That it is part of the 
criteria for being ad hoc is explicit.  5(a) states that the fact that there is some problem for 
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which scientists are trying to find a solution, together with other problems faced by the 
theory, “indicate[s] that T is non-fundamental”. (Leplin 1975 337) Leplin thinks that the 
existence of other, related, problems seems to indicate that the theory is non-fundamental 
because these problems are related to each other and with the specific problem that the 
scientist is addressing at the moment.  It might seem, in this sort of case, that a solution 
for the problem currently being addressed will be inadequate if it does not also address 
the related problems.   
This idea, I take it, is what motivates 5(c): that the solution of the problem the 
scientists are trying to resolve, if adequate, will have to also help solve the other (related) 
problems that the theory is facing.  It is not immediately clear what Leplin means by 
‘helps to solve’: it could mean either that the specific solution for the problem that the 
scientist is currently working on will be used as an actual part of the solution to the other 
problems, or it could mean that the solution of the current problem will help inspire 
solutions for the other problems with a similar solution structure.  From the example that 
Leplin uses to illustrate 5(c), it looks like he means the latter.  In this example, Leplin 
describes how Einstein used the analogy of thermodynamics and its use of statistical 
averages when dealing with gases in order to solve a similar problem in radiation. (Leplin 
1975 332)  Clearly, the problem in radiation could not be solved by the exact same 
solution that solved the problem for gases.  However, the solution for gases in 
thermodynamics inspired the solution for the problem in radiation.  The solutions are 
similarly structured and, thus, analogous in a certain sense.  I will discuss a problem for 
this part of the criteria later, using the Ptolemy example.  In order to be as charitable as 
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possible to Leplin, I will outline the consequences for both interpretations of 5(c) in that 
discussion. 
5(b), too, supposes that the problem facing the scientists and some other set of 
problems also facing the theory must be related, since it claims that part of being an ad 
hoc hypothesis is an attempt to solve a problem that, along with other (related) problems 
the theory is facing, cannot be solved without changing the theory somehow.  An 
adequate solution for the problem  - one that solved this problem and helped solve the 
related problems - would be inconsistent with some or all of the essential propositions of 
the theory. (Leplin 1975 337)  
In his 1975 paper, Leplin claims that the five conditions discussed above are 
independently necessary and jointly sufficient for labeling a hypothesis (or a hypothesis 
introduction) ‘ad hoc’. (Leplin 1975 332-333) Scientists that introduce ad hoc hypotheses 
are being too restrained in their treatment of the problem with the given theory: they 
think it is merely a problem of completeness when it is really a more fundamental issue.  
In so doing, they are placing a band-aid on a gut shot.  Leplin says just this, albeit with a 
different emphasis, in “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses”:  
The key claim is then that H [a given hypothesis] is ad hoc relative 
to T and e [a given theory and a given piece of contraindicating evidence] 
only if there are problems for T other than e which there is reason to 
require that a solution to e solve or help to solve as well.  The judgment 
that H is ad hoc is the judgment that these further problems require major 
modification of T, whereas the point of the modification effected by H is 
to preserve T essentially intact.  An ad hoc H is simply too conservative a 
response to a problem that ought to occasion far reaching reevaluation of 
T’s principal assumptions.  Rather than solve the problem posed by e, H 
evades the real issue which e’s connection with other outstanding 
problems raises. (Leplin 1982 237) 
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So, when scientists don’t go far enough in solving certain problems, the 
hypotheses introduced to solve the problems are ad hoc.   
  
III. The Puzzle of What ‘Satisfactory Solution’ Means in Leplin’s 5th Criterion 
 
 There is a question as to how to read Leplin’s 5th criterion. This question arises in 
the interpretation of the phrase, ‘satisfactory solution’.  According to Leplin, one of the 
criteria that a hypothesis must fulfill in order for it to be considered ad hoc is that it must 
address only one problem in a set of problems that the scientist has ‘good reason to 
believe’ are connected, while a satisfactory hypothesis would introduce a solution to one 
of these connected problems which would help to solve the other connected problems.   
 Consider three different readings of this phrase, ‘satisfactory solution’. One way 
to read it would be ‘true solution’.  What would this reading signify?  It looks like, if we 
read the phrase to mean ‘true solution’, then a charge of ad hocness will never be 
appropriate.  This is because the hypothesis being tested for ad hocness, which must solve 
only one problem in order to fulfill the first part of the 5th criterion, is being contrasted 
with the satisfactory solution that contributes to more than one solution. If ‘satisfactory 
solution’ signifies ‘true solution’, any true solution will contribute to more than one 
solution.  The hypothesis being tested for ad hocness will not do so, as per the first part of 
the fifth criterion.  So, (we are justified in believing) the hypothesis being tested for ad 
hocness is false.  In fact, reading ‘satisfactory solution’ in this manner implies that all ad 
hoc hypotheses will be false.  And Leplin very much wishes to distinguish false 
hypotheses from ad hoc ones: he considers these two different vices. 
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  This reading seems even worse upon returning to the 3rd criterion.  The 3rd 
criterion states that we cannot have sufficient grounds for holding the hypothesis being 
tested as either true or false.  And, given that the hypothesis being tested fulfills the 5th 
criterion, as per our discussion, the hypothesis being tested will be false if we read 
‘satisfactory solution’ as ‘true solution’.  Of course, that the hypothesis fills the 5th 
criterion and, therefore, is false, does not mean that we know that the 5th criterion has 
been satisfied.  However, in cases where we have sufficient grounds to know that the 5th 
criterion is satisfied, we will have sufficient grounds for holding the hypothesis as false.  
Therefore, on this reading of ‘satisfactory solution’, no hypothesis that we have sufficient 
grounds to know that it fulfills the 5th criterion will fulfill the 3rd criterion.  So, we won’t 
have sufficient grounds for holding any hypothesis to be ad hoc. Additionally, Leplin 
does not use the phrase in the context of truth or justification.  
 The second way that we could read ‘satisfactory solution’ is to read it as meaning 
‘methodologically satisfactory’.  Then, any methodologically satisfactory solution would 
contribute to the solutions of the other, related, problems.  For a solution to be 
methodologically adequate, it must be constructed appropriately.  So, for example, a 
methodologically adequate solution to the trajectory of the orbit of a given planet might 
be one where the correct mathematical computations were applied to the data compiled 
by multiple observations of the location of this planet in the sky.9   I will respond to 
                                                 
9 A solution being methodologically adequate is, of course, a separate issue from a 
solution being epistemologically adequate.  Being adequate according to the former 
reading of the phrase ‘satisfactory solution’ does not necessitate a solution’s being 
adequate according to the latter reading. 
 97
Leplin’s 5th criterion, using the methodologically satisfactory solution reading, in section 
IX. 
 The third reading of ‘satisfactory solution’ is to read it as meaning 
‘epistemologically satisfactory’.  Thus, any epistemologically satisfactory solution would 
contribute to the solutions of the other, related, problems.  For a solution to be 
epistemically satisfactory, the scientist must be justified in believing the solution.  When 
he is justified in believing the solution, he is justified in believing it is true.  At first 
glance, it might seem as if this reading of ‘satisfactory solution’ will have the same 
problem as the first reading.  After all, both of these readings involve some discussion of 
what is true.  However, at second glance, this reading does not have the same problem as 
the first reading.  This is because the first reading is equating ‘satisfactory solution’ with 
‘true solution’, while this reading is equating ‘satisfactory solution’ with ‘the solution we 
are justified in believing (to be true)’.  So, on this reading, for any satisfactory solution, 
the given scientist will be justified in believing it is true.  And any such solution will 
contribute to the solutions of the other, related, problems.  And the hypothesis being 
tested, in contrast, applies to only one problem and does not contribute to the solutions of 
the other problems.  Therefore, the scientist is not justified in believing that the 
hypothesis being tested for ad hocness is true.  However, the fact that the scientist is not 
justified in believing that the hypothesis is true is not the same as the scientist being 
justified in believing that the hypothesis is false.  There is not the same dichotomy as in 
the first reading, where the tested hypothesis must be false because it is being contrasted 
with something that must be true.  So, the hypothesis being tested could, on this third 
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reading of ‘satisfactory solution’, fulfill both the 3rd and 5th criteria, unlike the first 
reading. I will respond to this reading of ‘satisfactory solution’ in section X. 
 
IV.  A Further Puzzle Concerning What Constitutes as Contributing to a Solution 
  
 There seems to be two different ways in which we might claim that some 
hypothesis contributes to a solution to other, related problems.   According to the first 
reading, to contribute to a solution to other problems, the solution laid out by the 
hypothesis in question must inspire a solution for the other problems, enabling them to be 
solved by the construction of a solution similar in structure to the solution of the initial 
problem.  For example, my solution to the problem of creating a line drawing from a set 
of particular dots – connecting them with straight lines - would enable me to create a line 
drawing from other sets of particular dots.  The solutions to these problems are similar in 
structure, even though the particular lines and the order they are connected might not be 
the same.   
 The second reading is more stringent.  According to this reading, the solution laid 
out by the hypothesis in question must actually appear in the solutions to other, related 
problems.  Suppose my solution to some problem is to postulate the existence of an 
eccentric, as in Ptolemaic theory.  In order for this solution to contribute to a solution of 
other related problems, some solution of these problems must incorporate an eccentric in 
addition to whatever other modifications need to be made in order to solve these 
problems.   
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 There is another way in which we could, but ought not, interpret ‘contribute to a 
solution’.  This would be to claim that the given solution must either just be the solution 
for the other, related, problems or that it will be found, in its entirety and with exactly the 
same parameters, in the solutions to the other problems.  The last part of this is different 
than the second, acceptable, interpretation because the second interpretation just requires 
that, e.g., an eccentric is part of the solution for the other, related, problems, while this 
interpretation would require the specific eccentric found in the solution to the sun’s 
anomaly to be a part of the solutions to the other problems.  This interpretation is 
unacceptable because it is clear from his Einstein example that Leplin cannot intend what 
this interpretation requires.   As Leplin states,  
 [T]hese problems [inconsistencies in the Lorenz view] led Einstein to 
despair of a constructive approach to radiation and to pursue instead the 
analogy suggested by thermodynamics of the entropy of radiation with that of 
a gas.  The functional form of the expression for the entropy decrement of a 
gas corresponding to a contraction of its container results from the 
assumption that the gas is an aggregate of independent, identical elements – 
elements that can be treated statistically.  This led Einstein to consider an 
analogous structure for radiation. [italics mine] (Leplin 1975 332) 
 
The problem for which a solution had been proposed was how to calculate the entropy 
decrement of a gas corresponding to a contraction of its container.  The solution was to 
treat the gas as an aggregate of elements that could be treated statistically.  Einstein then 
uses this solution to help solve the problem of getting an adequate theory of radiation.  
Notice that he considered an analogous structure.  Einstein certainly did not use the exact 
same structure that was used for the gas entropy problem.  And Leplin presents both of 
these solutions as satisfactory solutions: that is, these are problems where this is a good 
reason to believe they are connected and either of these solutions would contribute to the 
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solution of the other.  Therefore, the final way of reading ‘contribute to a solution’ cannot 
be what Leplin intends. 
Now for the application of Leplin’s account to Ptolemy.  As outlined, Ptolemy’s 
eccentric hypothesis will be ad hoc according to Leplin if and only if it fulfills the 5 
criteria outlined above.  I will now proceed to determine whether Ptolemy’s theory does, 
in fact, fulfill these conditions in the case of the orbit of the Sun.  
 
V.  Leplin’s Account of Ad Hocness as Applied to the Ptolemy Example 
 
Ptolemy’s astronomical theory, as previously stated, consists in 8 main theoretical 
commitments and auxiliary hypotheses: 1) the movement of the heavens is spherical; 2) 
the heavens themselves are spherical; 3) heavenly objects are spherical; 4) the Earth is 
spherical; 5) the Earth is the center of the heavens; 6) the fixed stars are so far away from 
the Earth that the Earth is like a point to them; 7) the Earth does not, itself, move in any 
way; 8) there are 2 motions to the heavens. (Ptolemy 7)  Leplin’s first criterion for ad 
hocness is that a hypothesis must be introduced to Ptolemy’s theory in response to an 
experimental result where the experimental result is contraindicated by his theory.  When 
looking at the data compiled from observations of the Sun’s orbit, Ptolemy discovers10 
that, in fact, it does not seem that the Sun is moving in a perfect circular orbit, concentric 
to the Earth. (Ptolemy 86)  This evidence is anomalous for Ptolemy’s theory, consisting 
of his 8 original theoretical commitments and auxiliary hypotheses, as his theory would 
                                                 
10 Again, I am not trying to make a historical claim, here.  If, in fact, there was some 
other timeline of discovery, or if Ptolemy already knew full well that there were 
anomalies of the Sun’s orbit is irrelevant to this discussion.  It is enough for my purposes 
to suppose that it happened in the above manner.   
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have the Sun describing equal arcs in equal times around the Earth and the evidence is 
indicating that this does not, in fact, occur. Ptolemy introduces the eccentric hypothesis to 
solve the problem that arises as a result of this evidence. (Ptolemy 93)  With the addition 
of the eccentric hypothesis to his theory, Ptolemy can now claim that, in fact, the sun 
really does move on a perfectly circular orbit, describing equal arcs in equal times.  It is 
just that it appears otherwise to us because the movement, while perfectly circular, is 
around a perfect circle whose center is not located at the Earth.  Thus, it appears that 
Leplin’s first criterion of ad hocness is satisfied. 
Now, for the second criterion.  Since the added hypothesis fulfilled the 1st 
criterion, we know that the evidence will be support for the hypothesis.  Leplin claims, in 
addition, that the new evidence needs to be the only support that the hypothesis has; that 
the hypothesis “has no application to the domain of T [the theory] apart from E [the 
evidence]”; that nothing else – prior theoretical commitments, e.g. – would provide 
independent theoretical support of the hypothesis. (Leplin 1975 337)  Does Ptolemy’s 
theory fulfill the 2nd criterion?   
This will depend on how we are to understand the 2nd part of this criterion.  It 
seems to say that the introduced hypothesis will not do anything other than solve the one 
particular problem that the hypothesis is supposed to fix for the theory.11  If this is the 
case, then the addition of the eccentric hypothesis to Ptolemy’s theory will not fulfill this 
part of the criterion: the eccentric hypothesis will have an application within Ptolemy’s 
                                                 
11 If, in fact, this is what Leplin means by this part of the criterion, there will be an 
additional problem for his theory.  It would seem that almost no hypothesis would fulfill 
this criterion because almost all hypotheses will have some sort of additional implications 
for the theory to which they are introduced.   
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theory besides making unproblematic the anomaly of the sun’s orbit.  That is, the 
hypothesis will impact future problems for the theory, in that other eccentric hypotheses 
will be postulated, later.12  There are other indications that Leplin does not mean quite 
this, but just that the hypothesis cannot fix any problem that is currently a problem for the 
theory.  One such indication is that “contributions to previous accomplishments are 
precluded as well, although preclusion of applicability to outstanding problems is the 
main point of this provision.” (Leplin 1975 318) From this quote, Leplin’s emphasis 
seems to be that an ad hoc hypothesis cannot be helpful in solving any past or current 
problems.    
If Leplin means just that (1) the hypothesis does not contribute to solving current 
outstanding problems and (2) there doesn’t seem to be much in the way of additional 
testable contributions to the theory, then it looks like Ptolemy’s eccentric hypothesis 
passes the 2nd criterion for ad hocness.  Certainly, there doesn’t seem to be any still viable 
theories whose commitments are such that they constitute a good reason to accept the 
eccentric hypothesis.  Aristotle’s astronomy13 might lend support to the eccentric 
hypothesis, inasmuch as its commitment to the heavenly bodies moving along spheres 
would seem to support the requirement that planets travel in perfect circular orbits.  
However, Aristotle’s astronomy, if accepted, does not seem to do much more than bolster 
some of Ptolemy’s original theoretical commitments.  Additionally, the theory lending 
                                                 
12 I take it that this issue is one that is related to the issue of what Leplin means by a 
hypothesis contributing to the solution of other, related problems in his 5th criterion.   
 
13 See, e.g., Aristotle.  On the Heavens.  Encyclopaedia Britannica Great Books: Aristotle 
I.  J.L. Stocks, trans.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. 359-405 
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support to the hypothesis, according to this criterion, must be a still viable theory.  
Aristotle’s theory was not still viable at the time of Ptolemy. 
Now that Ptolemy’s eccentric hypothesis has passed Leplin’s first two criteria for 
qualifying as an ad hoc hypothesis, let us turn to his third condition of tentativeness. 
(Leplin 1975 321)  According to this criterion, there ought to be no sufficient evidence 
that the hypothesis is either true or false.  Ptolemy’s eccentric hypothesis fulfills this 
qualification easily.  Ptolemy himself spends a great amount of time demonstrating, via 
mathematical proofs, that the eccentric hypothesis and the epicycle hypothesis are 
empirically equivalent, given certain constraints. (Ptolemy 87, e.g.)  Given that there is 
another, empirically equivalent hypothesis that would also explain why the sun’s 
anomaly is not really a problem for Ptolemy, there does not seem to be sufficient grounds 
for holding that the eccentric hypothesis is true.  Alternatively, given Ptolemy’s own 
commitments to the perfect circularity of planetary motion and the geocentricity of the 
heavenly sphere, as well as the fact that these eccentrics are empirically adequate for 
explaining the sun’s anomaly14, there does not seem to be sufficient grounds for holding 
the eccentric hypothesis to be false.    
Next, I will determine if Ptolemy’s eccentric hypothesis is consistent both with 
accepted theory and with the essential propositions of T. (Leplin 1975 327) For the first 
part of this qualification, I will stipulate that the eccentric hypothesis is consistent with 
the theories accepted at the time.  Certainly, the thought that the sun has a perfectly 
                                                 
14  That the eccentrics are not supposed to be visible, tangible entities makes it so that the 
supposed non-observation of the eccentrics not the sort of observation that would give us 
reason to believe the hypothesis to be false.  Their non-observation would not give us 
reason to believe the hypothesis to be true, either: the observation of the heavens given 
eccentrics would be no different than the observation of the heavens given no eccentrics.   
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circular orbit is acceptable according to previous astronomical theories – Plato and 
Aristotle’s, for example.  The main issue would be whether the fact that the perfectly 
circular orbit is not concentric with the Earth would be inconsistent with accepted theory.  
While, again, I will resort to stipulation in claiming that perfectly circular orbits centered 
other than at the Earth are consistent with accepted theory, there seems to be some 
backing for this stipulation.  The notions of perfectly circular orbits and perfectly regular 
motions of the heavenly bodies were fairly ingrained in astronomy at this time.  Heavenly 
bodies were thought to have to travel in perfect circles because of their uniform 
constitution.  Their uniform constitution, however, does not necessitate their traveling in 
these perfect circles concentric to the Earth.  In other words, it seems more important that 
the heavenly bodies be moving in perfectly circular orbits – equal times for equal 
distances – than having their orbits have the Earth as their centers. 
So, the eccentric hypothesis is consistent with accepted theory.  Now we must 
find out if it is consistent with the essential propositions of Ptolemaic theory.  To do this, 
it is necessary to be reminded as to what constitutes the essential propositions of a given 
theory.  Leplin thinks that the scientific community determines which properties are the 
essential ones of a theory.  The essential ones are those properties, the abandoning of 
which would cause the scientific community to claim that the given theory has also been 
abandoned – even if other parts of the theory are maintained.  We can’t know for sure 
what the scientific community at the time of Ptolemy would determine are the essential 
properties of Ptolemaic theory.  However, what seems to be considered the essential 
properties of Ptolemaic theory now are its geocentricity and its requirement that heavenly 
bodies describe equal distances in equal times around circular orbits.  If these are the 
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essential properties of Ptolemaic theory, it looks like the eccentric hypothesis is 
consistent with them.  And it seems quite likely that these are essential properties of 
Ptolemaic theory.  If he were to reject either geocentricity or the perfect circular 
movement, the theory seems to become another type of theory altogether.15  Rejecting the 
requirement that the orbits have the Earth as their center does not impact these 
requirements. 
Finally, Ptolemy’s eccentric hypothesis needs to fulfill the conditions found in the 
5th criterion, in order for it to be considered ad hoc.  So, there need to be other problems 
that ‘there is good reason to believe’ are connected to the problem that the 
contraindicating evidence raises and that are inconsistent with some essential proposition 
of Ptolemaic theory.  Additionally, these other problems cannot be solved16 by the 
hypothesis, even though a satisfactory solution to one of them ought to help in getting a 
satisfactory solution to all of them. (Leplin 1975 331)   
Concerning the first qualification, it is clear that there are other problems that 
seem connected to the anomaly of the sun’s orbit.  Those problems would be the anomaly 
of the moon’s orbit and the anomaly of the orbits of the other planets.  And, as such, 
these problems and the sun’s anomaly indicate that there is something within the essential 
propositions of Ptolemy’s theory that is inconsistent with the evidence. Ptolemy 
addresses the problem of the Sun’s anomaly by eliminating a non-essential proposition: 
that the heavenly bodies have perfectly circular orbits concentric to the Earth.  5(a) and 
                                                 
15 That is to say, if Ptolemy rejects geocentricity, his theory would appear to transform 
into something like that of Copernicus.  If he were to reject that heavenly bodies describe 
equal distances in equal times around circular orbits, his theory would appear to 
transform into some type of Kepler-like astronomical theory.   
 
16 Or, the hypothesis cannot aid in the solution of these other problems.   
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5(b) indicate that this was the wrong proposition to eliminate.  Ptolemy was being too 
conservative in his solution to the sun’s anomaly.  Rather, in order to solve all of the 
related problems, Ptolemy would have to take a more radical approach and eliminate an 
essential proposition of his theory - likely, the proposition that the Earth is the center of 
the heavenly sphere and/or that the Earth does not move in the heavenly sphere.  Thus, it 
appears that the Ptolemy example fulfills 5(a) and 5(b).  
 The problem arises in fulfilling condition 5(c).  5(c) requires that the solution of 
the current problem (in this case, the anomaly of the sun’s orbit) will contribute to the 
solutions to the other problems (the other anomalous orbits). Now, Leplin claims in the 
2nd criterion that the hypothesis in question will have no other application to the theory 
than in solving the problem that arises with the given contraindicating evidence.  If the 
hypothesis in question assisted in solving other problems, it would not fulfill the 2nd 
criterion.  So, it seems clear Leplin thinks that a hypothesis that fulfills the 2nd criterion 
will not be a satisfactory solution to the problem it is supposed to solve.  Thus, here, 
Leplin is contrasting an ad hoc hypothesis to a satisfactory one that would contribute to 
the solution of other, similar problems.  So, an ad hoc hypothesis cannot make such 
contributions.  Yet, in the eccentric hypothesis case, this hypothesis does contribute to the 
solutions of the other problems – either way we construe what it means to ‘contribute’ to 
a solution.  This is because the other orbital anomalies can be solved, at least in part, by 
postulating some kind or kinds of eccentrics. 
 Suppose we claim that to contribute to a solution is to inspire a solution for the 
other problems, enabling the others to be solved by the construction of a solution 
structurally similar to the solution of the initial problem.  Ptolemy postulates the 
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existence of an eccentric for the moon and for other planets in order to help solve the 
anomalies present in their orbits.  It is true that not all of the planets’, nor the moon’s, 
anomalies are completely solved by the postulation of a specific eccentric but a complete 
solution is not necessary, according to Leplin’s condition.  It is enough that the solution 
structure of the eccentric hypothesis for the anomaly of the sun can be used in these other 
cases to create a similar (partial) solution structure.  And the eccentric hypothesis does 
this.  Thus, the eccentric hypothesis fails the condition set out in 5(c), according to one 
interpretation of 5(c). 
 According to the other possible interpretation of 5(c), the eccentric hypothesis 
also fails the condition set out in it.  The second, more stringent, interpretation requires 
that the satisfactory solution to any of these related problems must actually appear in the 
solutions to the other related problems. As it is harder, on this interpretation, for a 
solution to contribute to a solution for the other problems, it ought to be easier, on this 
interpretation, for a hypothesis to fail to contribute and, therefore, fulfill this part of the 
5th criterion for ad hocness.  Postulating an eccentric orbit solves the solution to the 
anomaly of the Sun.  Looking at the solutions to the other anomalies, it is clear that, as 
part of their solutions, each contains a postulation of an eccentric orbit.  Thus, even on 
the more stringent interpretation of 5(c), the eccentric hypothesis fails the last 
requirement for an ad hoc hypothesis. 
 Leplin’s criteria are supposed to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient. 
(Leplin 1975 332-333)  The eccentric hypothesis does not fulfill all of the criteria.  
Therefore, according to Leplin’s criteria for ad hocness, the eccentric hypothesis is not an 
ad hoc hypothesis.  This, I claim, is a conclusion that is quite counterintuitive and tells 
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against Leplin’s theory of ad hocness.  Ptolemy’s way of dealing with the anomalies of 
the heavenly bodies is seen almost universally as bad and bad because it is ad hoc in 
some way.  Leplin will have to explain why we should think that Ptolemy’s account is 
not ad hoc, despite what most people believe about it.   
 
VI.  Leplin’s Account as Applied to the Philosopher’s Ptolemy Case 
 
 Some might argue that the case of the sun’s anomaly is not the sort of case to 
which they would point when identifying a canonical case of ad hocness.  In response to 
these critics, I will also apply Leplin’s account to the philosopher’s Ptolemy case, which 
is arguable a more canonical case of ad hocness.  Leplin’s treatment of the philosopher’s 
Ptolemy case17 will be very similar in layout to the sun’s anomaly case, as the 
philosopher’s Ptolemy case just specifies that the manner in which scientists solved 
problem of the sun’s anomaly will be repeated for other anomalies.  Therefore, each 
iteration of solutions will fulfill the first four criteria, in the same manner as the solution 
to the sun’s anomaly did.  And each iteration will have the same problem with the 5th 
criterion as did the sun’s anomaly: in fact, the problem is even more apparent in this 
version of Ptolemy because, as several related problems were solved similarly, it would 
seem more likely that the current solution of the particular anomaly that is being 
examined will contribute to a solution to other related anomalies – in either sense of the 
                                                 
17 The summary of which is in Chapter 1, section X. 
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phrase ‘contributes to a solution’.18  Applying Leplin’s account, then, to the philosopher’s 
Ptolemy case will result in the same counter-intuitive outcome as the sun’s anomaly case.   
 Ending up with a counter-intuitive outcome, although serious, is not a devastating 
problem for a theory.  Thus, my critique of Leplin’s theory does not end with the 
observation that it produces a very counter-intuitive outcome both Ptolemaic cases.  
Rather, I have additional fuel to add to the fire, in the form of 5 objections to Leplin’s 
account.   
 A note is in order before I turn to detailing my criticisms of Leplin’s theory.  I 
want to emphasize again the sorts of things that Leplin’s theory gets right.  Firstly, his 
discussion of the criterion of direct testability for acceptable solutions to problems 
addresses the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem without falling afoul of it.19   Additionally, 
Leplin rightly discusses the problem of ad hocness as a methodological, rather than an 
epistemic, problem.  The trend in the literature has been to treat the problem as an 
epistemic one: Strevens’s account is an example of this.  This seems to be both misguided 
                                                 
18  A proponent of, e.g., the repeated modifications account of ad hocness might object to 
my treatment of the philosopher’s Ptolemy case.  She might say that it is the repetition 
that makes this case a canonical example of ad hocness, and this repetition is how it 
importantly differs from the sun’s anomaly case.  However, Leplin’s account of ad 
hocness is insensitive to these repetitions: it must evaluate each repetition individually, 
not as a set.  So, this repeated modifications proponent might have a reason to object to 
Leplin’s account and, therefore, Leplin’s account’s treatment of the philosopher’s 
Ptolemy case.  But, she does not thereby have a reason to object to my assessment of 
Leplin’s account as applied to this case.  My reasons for rejecting the repeated 
modifications account of ad hocness are found in Chapter 1, section X. 
 
19 This is in contrast to views such as the independent testability view, which Leplin 
rightly dismisses as irrelevant.  This is also in contrast to views such as that of Strevens’s 
Bayesianism, which Fitelson and Waterman claim does not solve the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
problem, contra to what Strevens asserts.  And Strevens himself notes that Howson and 
Urbach’s Bayesianism fails to address this problem.  Therefore, it is a positive that 
Leplin’s theory does get around the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem.  My account will get 
around this problem as well.    
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and problematic, as epistemic accounts will either fall into the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
problem or fail to address it altogether.  My account is, therefore, like Leplin’s in that it is 
a methodological account of ad hocness.   
 Finally, I think that Leplin’s account is, so far, the account of ad hocness that has 
come closest to the heart of the matter.  This being said, there are still points where I have 
strong disagreements with his account.  Thus, the next subject to be addressed is my 
criticism of Leplin’s account. 
 
VII.  The Failure to Account for What Makes Ad Hocness a Vice 
 
  Leplin’s account fails to account for what is really problematic with ad hoc 
hypothesis introductions or acceptances.  The very fact that there were two empirically 
equivalent hypotheses that Ptolemy chose between in the sun’s anomaly case seems to be 
the motivation for calling the adoption of the eccentric hypothesis ‘ad hoc’ and, therefore, 
not rationally acceptable.20 Yet, according to Leplin, the introduction of the eccentric 
hypothesis is not ad hoc.   
The fact that Leplin’s view does not consider the eccentric hypothesis ad hoc is 
not enough to claim that Leplin thinks, contra my view, that no methodological error has 
occurred in the acceptance of the eccentric hypothesis: the eccentric hypothesis might 
have other vices and, so, ought not be accepted.  In this manner, Leplin might agree that 
the addition of the eccentric hypothesis was not a satisfactory solution to the problem of 
the sun’s anomalous orbit, but would maintain that my critique is not effective because 
                                                 
20 This is precisely why I claim that this case is a case where an ad hoc hypothesis 
acceptance has occurred, in chapter 5.   
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there are many other ways in which the addition of a hypothesis might be unsatisfactory 
other than it being ad hoc.  Thus, we would not be in disagreement that the addition of the 
eccentric hypothesis is unacceptable.  We would just be in disagreement as to how it is 
unacceptable.   
I argue that, in fact, Leplin and I do disagree as to whether the addition of the 
eccentric hypothesis is rationally acceptable or not.  In order to demonstrate this, I must 
introduce an additional criterion for the addition of hypotheses introduced by Leplin in 
his 1982 paper.  This criterion – direct testability – determines whether or not the addition 
of a certain hypothesis in the face of recalcitrant evidence, ought to be considered a real 
solution to the problem that had arisen for the theory due to this evidence.  Leplin 
discusses the criteria for ad hocness in conjunction with the criterion of direct testability, 
in part, to address the traditional view of ad hocness that characterizes a hypothesis as ad 
hoc if it is not independently testable.  
According to Leplin, the hypothesis that there is a trans-Uranian planet, 
introduced in order to explain the perturbations of Uranus, and the hypothesis that there is 
a intra-Mercurial planet, (Leplin 1982 236) introduced in order to explain the precession 
problems of Mercury, were both considered fairly poor hypotheses because no such 
planets had been observed and these planets ought to be observable in principle. (Leplin 
1982 243) This point is one that the received view latches onto.  Hypotheses are ad hoc, 
according to this view, if what the hypotheses postulate is observable in practice but has 
not yet been observed.21 (Leplin 1982 243)  Both the postulated trans-Uranian planet and 
                                                 
21 As Leplin clearly points out, this version of the received view of ad hocness is a 
modification of Karl Popper’s version of ad hocness, where hypotheses are ad hoc if they 
are unfalsifiable – that is, if they are not testable, even in principle.  The reason why the 
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the postulated intra-Mercurial planet were observable in practice and had not yet been 
observed when the hypotheses were put forth as solutions to problems in Newtonian 
gravitation.  Bode’s law, a law that predicted the distance of planets from each other and 
had predicted that a trans-Uranian planet would be too far away to see at the time that the 
trans-Uranian hypothesis was being discussed, had been discredited and, so, there was no 
reason why a trans-Uranian planet ought not be observed.  Solar intervention – that is, the 
planet being permanently occluded by the sun, was ruled out in the case of the intra-
Mercurial planet, so this planet, too, ought to be observable. (Leplin 1982 243)  Leplin 
agrees in part with this assessment but thinks that the criterion is misleading, as it does 
not mirror what actually counts in scientific practice when assessing auxiliary 
hypotheses.  As Leplin points out, the fact that we haven’t detected free quarks is not a 
liability to a hypothesis that postulates the existence of quarks because quarks aren’t ever 
going to be free. (Leplin 1982 243)  Thus, Leplin modifies the received view, changing 
the criterion from ‘observable in practice’ to ‘directly testable’.  As he says: 
The general principle appears to be that so long as some better 
form of evidence than that which supports an hypothesis is theoretically 
possible, the hypothesis is not credited with solving an outstanding 
problem, although it may be worthy of investigation in its own right.  
Conversely, if it can be shown that the available evidence is of the best 
sort possible, the hypothesis may come to constitute a solution despite the 
fact that this evidence is of a sort that would otherwise be insufficient.  It 
is this principle which distinguishes direct from indirect testability.  A test 
may be considered direct if no better test is theoretically possible, 
regardless of how indirect it may appear epistemologically. (Leplin 1982 
244) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
move was made to a stronger version of testability is, as he points out, because almost 
any hypothesis can be made testable in principle.  No(or almost no) hypothesis or theory 
can be tested in isolation – we always test a hypothesis/theory in conjunction with its 
auxiliaries – so the ‘tweaking’ of auxiliaries will make almost any hypothesis/theory 
testable in principle.  (Leplin 1982 243) 
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Thus, the fact that both the trans-Uranian planet and the intra-Mercurial planet 
were, in principle, observable and neither had been observed, the hypotheses supporting 
their existence fail the direct testability criterion.  Notice that neither of these hypotheses 
is considered ad hoc, according to Leplin.  In this manner, Leplin’s direct testability 
criterion separates from the received view because his criterion is pointing out another 
way in which a hypothesis can fail to be a (good) solution to a certain problem facing a 
theory besides it being ad hoc.   
So, the distinction that Leplin wishes to emphasize is the distinction between 
direct and indirect tests for the existence of phenomena.  He is clearly using ‘directness’ 
differently than it is commonly used.  While a direct test, in common terms, would be 
something like placing one’s hand on an apple and looking at an apple to make sure that 
there is an apple on the table, Leplin’s use of ‘direct testability’ is such that, if there were 
no better test available, examining the radiation emitted from the apple might qualify as a 
direct test of the apple’s being on the table.22  On Leplin’s account, for example, the 
Michelson-Morley experiment was considered, at certain points, a direct test of the 
Lorentz contraction hypothesis because it was thought that there was no other way to test 
contraction other than by way of the interferometer. (Leplin 1982 245)  So, in order to be 
considered a (good) solution to a problem, it looks like the hypothesis must be directly 
testable in the way in which Leplin uses the phrase.  
The discussion of direct testability, while not speaking directly to the subject of ad 
hocness, is important for my reply to the argument that Leplin and I agree on the 
                                                 
22 I wish to stress ‘if no better test were available’ because, in correspondence, Leplin has 
said that he wishes ‘theoretically possible’ to mean possible within the current theories 
and commitments of the time and not to mean ever possible.  Thus, to the Greeks, it was 
not theoretically possible to fly to Mars.  Now, it is theoretically possible to fly there.   
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unacceptability of the addition of the eccentric hypothesis.  If the eccentric hypothesis 
passes the direct testability criterion it ought to be considered a good solution to the 
problem of the sun’s anomaly facing Ptolemaic theory, according to Leplin.  If it is a 
good solution, then there will not be anything else wrong with the addition of this 
hypothesis to Ptolemaic theory.  Therefore, I can claim that Leplin and I come to two 
different conclusions in this case: not only does Leplin’s view not show that the addition 
of the eccentric hypothesis is bad because that move is ad hoc, it also can’t claim that the 
hypothesis was bad for other reasons.  What is left, then, is to determine whether or not 
the eccentric hypothesis passes the direct testability criterion.   
To do this, it needs to be determined whether there was some better form of 
evidence theoretically possible in the case of the eccentric hypothesis.  If there is no 
other, better, test possible, then the eccentric hypothesis will be directly testable and, 
therefore, a good solution to the problem facing Ptolemaic theory.  Did Ptolemy have any 
other way of determining how the sun’s orbit was anomalous except through observations 
made from the Earth?  In Ptolemy’s time, it was not theoretically possible to travel into 
space to observe the sun’s movements.  And, the eccentric itself is not supposed to be 
observable.  Therefore, it does not look as if there is any better form of evidence possible.  
According to Leplin, then, the eccentric hypothesis must be a good solution to the 
problem of the sun’s anomaly.  Therefore, according to Leplin, there isn’t anything else 
wrong with the addition of this hypothesis to Ptolemaic theory.  And the claim that Leplin 
and I do not differ on whether the addition of the eccentric hypothesis is unacceptable 
cannot hold: this claim relies on there being something else wrong with the eccentric 
hypothesis besides it being ad hoc. On Leplin’s view, the eccentric hypothesis is not 
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considered ad hoc and it fulfills the direct testability criterion.23  Therefore, not only is 
the hypothesis not ad hoc, it is also to be considered a solution to the problem of the 
anomaly of the sun’s orbit.  Yet, if a solution at all, it does not seem rationally 
permissible to consider this solution of the anomaly as a good solution.  This solution 
fails to give a reason why it is that the addition of the eccentric hypothesis is a solution to 
the problem facing Ptolemaic theory and the addition of the epicyclic hypothesis is not.  
At the very least, the addition of the eccentric hypothesis ought to be demonstrated a 
better solution than the addition of the epicyclic for the addition of the eccentric to be 
considered a good solution.  Leplin’s account of ad hocness does not give us this 
demonstration, yet, on Leplin’s account, the addition of the eccentric hypothesis ought to 
be considered a good solution to the problem facing Ptolemaic theory 
 
VIII. Leplin’s Third Criterion is Misleading 
 
  Leplin’s 3rd criterion is, at best, misleading.  The 3rd criterion states that, to be ad 
hoc, a hypothesis must have no compelling evidence for or against it being held true.  
Leplin considers this criterion an especial good-making characteristic of his theory 
because it gives us two different conceptions of ad hocness, depending on how we 
                                                 
23 The eccentric hypothesis is being supported by the observed anomaly of the sun’s 
orbit.  At the time, there would have been no other way possible to support this 
hypothesis: certainly, there were no telescopes nor were there ways to go to the sun, for 
example.  Nothing of this sort was theoretically achievable.  As Leplin states, “the 
relevant principle is that an auxiliary hypothesis enables a theory to solve an outstanding 
problem only if no better form of evidence than that currently supporting the hypothesis 
is theoretically achievable.” (Leplin 1982 245) 
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approach this criterion, and that the conception that he advocates is very specific on what 
is deemed as ad hoc.  As Leplin says: 
 On this formulation an ad hoc hypothesis need not remain so.  
Alternatively, we could say that an ad hoc hypothesis is one for which 
there are no such grounds when it is introduced.  Both options have 
support in normal usage.  It is said that the contraction hypothesis ‘was 
[introduced] ad hoc’ and also that it ‘is [an example of] an ad hoc 
hypothesis’.  An advantage of my choice is specificity. [Brackets Leplin’s] 
(Leplin 1975 321) 
 
 Thus, Leplin wishes to claim that a hypothesis can be ad hoc but, later, become non-ad 
hoc.  I believe that this is a misleading way of talking about ad hocness.   It is misleading 
because the hypothesis is not being examined in the same context when it is introduced 
and when there is additional evidence for holding that it is true.  When it is introduced, it 
is part of the periphery of the theory.  It is not part of the core of the theory.  If it were ad 
hoc, it ought not to have been accepted into the theory.  Suppose it did get accepted.  
Then, as one’s theoretical commitments develop and more evidence comes to light, this 
hypothesis becomes more established and, potentially, becomes part of the core of the 
theory.  At that time, the hypothesis is no longer the type of thing to be considered ad hoc 
because it is established and its role in the theory is no longer in question.  It is thus 
misleading to claim that the hypothesis is no longer ad hoc after it becomes established 
within the theory because a well-established hypothesis is not the sort of thing that can be 
ad hoc or not ad hoc.  It is only when we are considering whether to accept the hypothesis 
or not can we deem this acceptance as ad hoc or not ad hoc.   And it remains a fact that 
the hypothesis being considered ought not to have been accepted when it was, even 
though this hypothesis’s acceptance would not have been considered ad hoc if the 
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hypothesis had been accepted into the theory at the later time, when there was sufficient 
grounds for holding that the hypothesis is true.   
That is, the account of ad hocness is a methodological one.  What it is supposed to 
label is the introduction/acceptance of hypotheses given specific empirical problems.  So, 
we don’t need to examine a hypothesis for ad hocness after it has been 
introduced/accepted into the theory, unless we are examining this hypothesis’s previous 
introduction or acceptance, in order to determine whether that move was rationally 
permissible or not. Leplin’s 3rd criterion confuses the issue by allowing for a hypothesis 
to be ad hoc and then, later, be deemed not ad hoc.  Part of the way in which the 3rd 
criterion confuses the issue and is misleading lies in the equivocation in what qualifies to 
be labeled ‘ad hoc’ between a hypothesis and as the introduction of that hypothesis.24    
 
IX. Scientists Can’t Get Advice from the 5th Criterion 
 
  As the 5th criterion is an empirical one, it seems that it might not always be 
possible to see the connection between problems for which the ad hoc hypothesis does 
not contribute to the solutions.  Yet, Leplin believes that his 5 criteria are a 
methodological account of ad hocness.  Therefore, they ought to be advice-giving, telling 
scientists how to proceed in certain situations.  But, if scientists cannot tell how certain 
problems are connected, this account will not give useable advice on how to proceed. 
 
                                                 
24 See my discussion of what qualifies to be ad hoc in chapter 1, section XI for my 
discussion of why that which qualifies ought not to be a hypothesis introduction itself 
but, rather, hypothesis acceptance.   
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 Leplin could intend his criteria for ad hocness to be doing one of two things: 
either these criteria are meant to be retrospective, evaluating some event that has already 
occurred, or these criteria are meant to be advice-giving, telling scientists how to proceed 
in certain situations.  As Leplin has stated that his account is a methodological one, it 
seems more natural to interpret his criteria as being intended to do the latter.  Therefore, 
Leplin’s account must give useable advice on how scientists should proceed if these 
scientists wish to maintain a given theory in the face of recalcitrant evidence.  And 
Leplin’s account will not do so because of the externalist, empirical nature of the 5th 
criterion.  
 This objection speaks directly to the introduction and the 3rd part of the 5th 
criterion.  The introduction makes, as part of the criteria for ad hocness, the condition that 
“there are problems other than E confronting T which there is good reason to believe are 
connected with E in the following respects”. (Leplin 1975 331)  The third part of this 
criterion makes it a condition of ad hocness that “a satisfactory solution to any of these 
interconnected problems will contribute to the solution of the others.” (Leplin 1975 331) 
These conditions consist in the empirical claims that there are connections between 
problems facing a theory and that the ad hoc hypothesis, unlike a satisfactory solution to 
one of these problems, addresses only one problem and doesn’t address or aid in the 
solution of the others.   
 It might seem, from a certain reading of these conditions, that Leplin just wants to 
include connections between problems that are (fairly) easy to see.  After all, Leplin does 
state that there ought to be a good reason to believe that the problems are connected in 
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certain specific ways.  Yet, Leplin cannot mean this by his criteria of connectedness 
because of what he says in the following excerpt: 
It is to be emphasized, however, that the respects in which, 
according to this condition, the problems confronting T are connected do 
not require that the connection be readily apparent.  H may be charged 
with ‘ad hocness’ despite an apparent unrelatedness of the problems 
confronting T or of E with other problems thought to be related 
independently.  A charge of ‘ad hocness’ may reflect the belief that such 
unrelatedness is superficial, masking important relationships at a deeper 
level.  The charge might then be controversial, its vindication requiring 
that further research bear out the alleged connection. In this way the 
concept of ‘ad hocness’ can be used to direct attention to neglected or 
unnoticed relationships, thus opening new lines of research. (Leplin 1975 
331) 
 
From these sentences, it is clear that Leplin doesn’t just think that the relatedness of the 
problems ought to be fairly apparent.  In fact, he states explicitly that these problems, 
instead of seeming related, might actually seem completely distinct from each other.  The 
key, here, is that Leplin seems to be claiming that the criterion is talking about problems 
that are actually related: notice, at the end of this quote, that he mentions empirical 
research to solved the question of whether certain problems are related or not.  Thus, this 
relatedness is an empirical distinction and there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not 
certain problems are related.  If the problems are actually related in the relevant ways 
and, yet, these connections are not available to the scientist modifying a given theory in 
the fact of disconfirming evidence, then Leplin’s criterion cannot be giving useful advice 
to this scientist.   
Scientists can only use the advice if they can tell how the problems are connected.  
And, in order to determine how and whether certain problems are actually connected, the 
scientists must know whether satisfactory solutions will help solve these other problems.  
But, the scientists will not know what the acceptable solutions are, yet.  So, Leplin’s 5th 
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criterion does not seem to give scientists any useable advice on how to proceed if they 
wish to maintain a given theory in the face of disconfirming evidence.   
The example that Leplin gives for actually related hypotheses – Einstein seeing 
problems in radiation as related to problems in the thermodynamics of gases - is a good 
example of a time where Leplin’s criterion would seem especially unhelpful in 
determining whether or not certain problems ought to be solved in similar manners. 
(Leplin 1975 331-332) Einstein didn’t think that any successful theory of radiation was 
possible given the accepted views, which included the Lorentz theory.  Seeing a 
connection between how the problem of determining the reduction in entropy of a gas 
given the contraction of its container and the problem of the entropy of radiation, Einstein 
used a structure analogous to the structure used in solving the gas problem for his 
solution of the radiation problem.  In both solutions, the thing whose entropy is being 
measured is considered “an aggregate of independent, identical elements” (Leplin 1975 
332) which can then be treated in a statistical manner.  Thus, light came to be understood, 
according to Einstein, as quanta, which helps to show that the Lorentz theory is non-
fundamental, according to Leplin. (Leplin 1987 332)  How in the world were scientists to 
recognize the similarities between a problem in the thermodynamics of gases – where 
they were dealing with swarms of molecules – and a problem in the theory of radiation – 
where, at the time, light was considered a type of wave, where there are no swarms of 
molecules and, in fact, there are no massed bodies at all?  The scientists examining these 
two problems would have had to have already known that acceptable solutions to one of 
these problems would have to help solve the other.  Yet, they certainly didn’t know that 
the acceptable solutions were, as evidenced by the fact that it took Einstein to realize that 
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these problems were connected, and the way in which they were connected.  This 
example, among others, ought to convince the reader that Leplin’s 5th criterion causes 
Leplin’s account of ad hocness to fail to give useable advice for those scientists that are 
attempting to avoid ad hoc moves.   
Of course, this objection only applies to certain of the cases where scientists are 
trying to solve a problem for their theories.  There might well be other cases where 
scientists can tell that the problems are connected.  This does not mean, however, that 
Leplin’s view is adequate for these cases.  The last two objections will speak to other 
reasons why Leplin’s criteria for ad hocness are inadequate and, ultimately, undesirable. 
Notice, as well, that I have outlined the two ways of reading ‘acceptable solution’ 
in 5(c) of Leplin’s criteria in section III of this chapter.  The current objection is treating 
‘acceptable’ as a methodological claim and responds to this reading of the term.  The 
other way to read ‘acceptable’ is to read it as an epistemological claim.  The next 
objection will respond to this way of reading the phrase.   
. 
X. Why Determining when Problems Ought to Be Solved Together Appeals to the 
Degrees of Belief of Scientists  
 
 
 
 In the last critique, I outlined the sort of relationship between certain problems 
facing a theory that Leplin intends.  The relationship is one that, in principle, the 
scientists ought to see because it is an actual, empirical relationship.  However, in 
practice, how are scientists going to determine whether or not there is an actual 
relationship between certain problems?  It looks like whether or not a hypothesis is 
deemed ‘ad hoc’ will be, in part, a result of the degrees of belief of the scientists in the 
 122
scientific community at the time.  Leplin even suggests something like this when he says 
that: “[a] charge of ‘ad hocness’ may reflect the belief that such unrelatedness [the 
seeming unrelatedness of certain problems] is superficial, masking important 
relationships at a deeper level.” (Leplin 1975 331)  So, given that scientists might not, in 
reality, always know about the existence of an actual relatedness between certain 
problems, the introduction or acceptance of a hypothesis being labeled ‘ad hoc’ and, 
therefore, vicious will be determined by whether or not scientists believe that there is 
such an actual relationship. This consequence is bad for Leplin’s theory because the 
psychology of the scientists should not determine whether or not the introduction or 
acceptance of a hypothesis is ad hoc.25  Allowing the degrees of belief of scientists to 
come into the determination will reduce claims of ad hocness to claims about how 
confident scientists are about the theories whose problems these hypotheses are supposed 
to fix.  As Leplin himself points out (Leplin 1975 332), Einstein’s connecting the method 
of determining entropy decrease in gases with entropy decreases in radiation was not 
something that most other scientists would have even considered  - because the other 
scientists considered these phenomena successfully incorporated into theories that were 
in pretty good standing and in which scientists had a pretty high degree of belief.  Yet, 
these same scientists might be much more willing to allow a charge of non-
fundamentality, and to claim that certain problems really are connected, even when they 
don’t initially appear to be, if, for example, the theory to which the hypothesis is being 
introduced is quite new and, thus, there are not high degrees of belief about it.  The 
negative aspects of relying on degrees of belief of individual scientists have been 
                                                 
25   I have discussed this problem in a slightly different context in Chapter 1, section VI. 
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discussed previously, in my discussion of Strevens’s view in chapter 2, section III and 
also in my discussion of Hempel’s view in chapter 1, section VI.26   
 
XI. Completeness Versus Fundamentality and the Degrees of Belief of Scientists 
 
 
 This objection is closely related to the last one, in that it deals with the degrees of 
belief of scientists. Determining whether or not a problem for a theory is one of 
completeness or one of fundamentality is a matter of the degrees of belief of the scientists 
working with this theory.  As I noted previously, there do not seem to be many (if any) 
clear-cut cases of either completeness or fundamentality.  When a problem is considered 
to be one of completeness, its solution is attempted without violating any essential 
propositions of the theory, while for a problem considered to be one of fundamentality, 
its solution is attempted by replacing essential propositions of the theory, where the 
solution is seen as incompatible with some or all of the theory.  Yet, as pointed out 
previously, demonstrating that a hypothesis is inconsistent, combined with other, 
auxiliary hypotheses, with some or all of a given theory is very difficult: a proponent of 
the theory can always claim that the hypothesis only seems inconsistent with the theory 
because the theory is not yet complete.  Once the theory is complete, the proponents 
claim, there will no longer be this seeming inconsistency.  Analogously, it is hard to 
demonstrate that a theory is merely incomplete instead of non-fundamental.  Thus, 
considering a problem for a theory a problem of completeness or a problem of 
                                                 
26   I also talk about this problem in regards to Leplin’s account of ad hocness in footnote 
8 of this chapter. 
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fundamentality will be a result of the problem–solver’s degree of belief in the theory for 
which the problem arises.27  Treating it as a problem of fundamentality would be a result 
of having a high degree of belief in the theory.  An example of this, as discussed above, 
would be scientists’ degrees of belief in the prevailing electromagnetic and gas theories 
around the time of Einstein: these were quite high and, so, the scientists considered the 
problem of quantifying the entropy of radiation as one of completeness.  Einstein, on the 
other hand, did not have as high a degree of belief in these theories28 and, so, treated the 
problem as one of fundamentality.  This is a problem, as stated in the previous critique 
and also in my critique of Strevens’s account, because the degrees of belief of the truth or 
empirical adequacy29 of a theory will depend, in part, on how established the theory 
facing the problem is.   So, problems facing theories that are relatively new and for which 
scientists don’t have high degrees of belief will likely be treated as problems of 
fundamentality while problems facing theories that are well-established and for which 
scientists do have high degrees of belief will likely be treated as problems of 
completeness.  This manner of determining which of the two sorts of problems a theory 
might have seems quite problematic, as evidenced by the Newtonian theory example 
                                                 
27 This is also related to the discussion in footnote 8 of this chapter. 
 
28 Leplin does not talk about degrees of belief.  However, he does note that Einstein did 
not think that the accepted theories could adequately explain radiation. (Leplin 1975 332)  
Since Einstein didn’t think that these theories solved a problem that was within their 
purview to solve, it would seem that Einstein likely had severe misgivings as to whether 
these theories were true or empirically adequate.   
 
29 Neither truth nor empirical adequacy is doing any real work, here.  Insert your favorite 
term here and the argument still holds.   
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brought up by Strevens.30 (Strevens 535)   In this example, it would be unlikely for the 
hypothesis of a trans-Uranium planet to be considered ad hoc (or at least, not ad hoc in a 
bad way on Strevens’s view) because Newtonian theory was well established and there 
were no other viable competing theories at the time.  Thus, there was a very high degree 
of belief in Newtonian theory.  This example is a problem, not because the trans-Uranium 
planet hypothesis should be considered ad hoc (I myself don’t think it is and my 
methodological account of ad hocness determines that it is not)31, but, instead, because 
the evaluation is based almost solely on the fact that Newtonian theory was well 
established and didn’t really have any competitors.  This seems wrong because it looks 
like a well-established theory still has quite a few opportunities to ad hocly introduce or 
accept a hypothesis and shouldn’t be exempt from the censure that this introduction or 
acceptance ought to produce just because it is well established.  Alternatively, a new 
theory ought to be able to introduce/accept a hypothesis without it (almost) automatically 
being seen as potentially ad hoc, because the degree of belief in the theory is lower than 
that of a well-established theory.  Plus, appealing to the psychology of the scientists 
doesn’t fit well with the claim that ad hocness is a methodological – and not an 
epistemological – problem.   My discussion of Hempel’s account of ad hocness in chapter 
1, section VII, discusses the methodological versus epistemological distinction in more 
detail.  
                                                 
30  Strevens, himself, did not think that the Newtonian example was problematic.  
However, in critiquing Strevens’s view, I demonstrated how the Newtonian example was 
problematic for a view that included scientists’ degrees of belief.   
 
31   See chapter 5, section V for my discussion of this. 
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 Thus, for the reasons outlined above, Leplin’s theory of ad hocness ultimately 
fails.  I will turn now to Sober’s account32 of ad hocness. 
 
                                                 
32 I am calling it Sober’s account for sake of brevity. In the two papers that I will be 
discussing, Sober teams up with two different people – Malcolm Forster and Christopher 
Hitchcock – to discuss the view that I will be critiquing.   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Sober, Forster and Hitchcock’s Failure to Properly Account for Ad Hocness 
 
I.  Simplicity and Curve-Fitting  
 
 In this chapter, I will present the account of ad hocness developed by Forster and 
Sober in “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will 
Provide More Accurate Predictions” and Hitchcock and Sober in “Prediction Versus 
Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting” .12  Their account is a part of a larger 
project that attempts to give criteria for determining how to trade off between demands of 
simplicity and demands of precision. 
                                                 
1 As Sober co-authored both of the papers upon which I base my analysis of this account 
of ad hocness, I will often use just Sober’s name to identify the account for ease of 
discussion.   
 
2 I am calling it an account of ad hocness rather loosely, as it is a bit misleading to label it 
as such.  In the Hitchcock and Sober paper, they claim that their theory concerning the 
accommodation of new data and new information eliminates the need for ad hocness to 
exist as a distinct criticism.  Thus, I will be concentrating on Sober and Forster’s paper, 
which actually discusses ad hocness.  There is nothing in the Hitchcock and Sober paper 
that contradicts or changes dramatically the phenomenon called ‘ad hocness’ in the 
Forster and Sober paper.   
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Sober’s curve fitting theory is based, in part, on work done by H. Akaike.3   Sober 
uses Akaike’s work to come up with a methodological rule for determining what theories 
have more predictive power than other theories. (Forster Sober 6-7)  By predictive power, 
Sober means the expected predictive accuracy of a particular theory. (Forster Sober 10)  
The amount of predictive power a given theory has has been important for quite a while 
in philosophical discussions of the qualifications of specific theories, and especially in 
discussions of ad hocness.  The phrase has been used to identify instances where the 
scientist introducing a given hypothesis is doing so just because his current theory, as it 
stands, does not fit with some new piece of evidence.  These ad hocly introduced 
hypotheses will have very little, if any, predictive power because they were introduced to 
patch up one specific problem for a given theory.4  Therefore, the theory with the ad hoc 
modification will not be as virtuous because it will be less predictively powerful, or so 
this argument goes. 
In addition to the lack of predictive power of hypotheses introduced ad hocly, 
there has always been a tension observed between how closely a theory5 fits the data and 
                                                 
3 Akaike, H. “A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification.”  IEEE Transactions 
on Automatic Control, AC-19, (1974), 716-723. 
 
Akaike, H. “One Entropy Maximization Principle.”  Applications of Statistics.  P.R. 
Krishniah, ed. Amsterdam: North Holland. 27-41. 
 
Akaike, H. “Prediction and Entropy.”  A Celebration of Statistics.  A. C. Atkinson and S. 
E. Feinberg, eds.  New York: Springer.  1-24. 
 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the received view, see the discussion of Hempel and 
Popper in chapter 1, Sections V - IX.   
 
5 Sober does not use the term ‘theory’ the same way throughout either paper.  In addition, 
he often uses theory and hypothesis interchangeably.  I will try to copy his terminology, 
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the simplicity of the theory.  Theories that fit the data excellently have often been accused 
of being too complicated, while very simple theories often do not fit the data very well. 
(Forster Sober 5, 6, e.g.)  There is also the worry that closeness in fit to the data is not the 
same as closeness in fit to the truth.  Sober’s way of addressing the tension between fit 
and simplicity is to look at how closeness-of-fit to the data generated works with 
simplicity in order to give us an estimate of a theory’s predictive power, using Akaike’s 
statistical modeling method.    
Akaike’s theorem deals with families of curves and which families fit given data 
sets better.  The families of curves represent models.  A model is a family of hypotheses 
that are all represented mathematically with the same basic equation form – parabolic, for 
example – with different co-efficients. (Sober, Forster 12, fn. 20) Any model will consist 
in a family of curves because models – mathematical formulas - have adjustable 
parameters that can be manipulated to give us different versions of the same equation.6 
(Sober, Forster 3) The phrase, ‘adjustable parameters’, in this context, refers to 
coefficients in a mathematical formula, where the coefficients can be given different 
values.  In the case of Ptolemaic astronomy, for example, these coefficients would 
represent the values for the angular speed of the sun, the size of the radius of the sun’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
where possible.  When I get into more detail with Sober’s account, I will use his term 
‘model’, which is much more precise.  This term will be defined in the next paragraph. 
6 It will often seem, in my discussion of Sober’s view, that it is possible to substitute 
‘theory’ for ‘model’.  The reason that I am going to speak only of models, unless Sober 
specifically says ‘theory’, is both because of a footnote found in the Sober and Forster 
paper and because of the lack of consistency mentioned in footnote 5.   
   In places, such as during the discussion of ad hocness, Sober and Forster seem to 
interchange discussion of models with discussion of theories – implying that these two 
terms denote the same (or at least similar) concept.  Yet, in their footnote 20, Sober and 
Forster define what it is to be a model and what it is to be a hypothesis and then make 
pains to distinguish models and theories – without defining what the term ‘theory’ 
denotes.   
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orbit, etc.  By adjusting the coefficients’ values, we can generate curves that fit the data 
that was actually collected in a given circumstance more or less closely. 
Why not just choose the values of the coefficients that result in the curve that fits 
the data perfectly?  We oughtn’t do this because the data collected will not all be 
accurate.  There will be errors and ‘background noise’ – unrepresentative data – included 
in this data set.  If a particular curve fits the data perfectly, the curve will be unlikely to 
give accurate predictions: it will have factored in all of the errors and noise in the data in 
making those predictions. (Sober, Forster 5-6)  On the other hand, as Sober and Forster 
point out, a model that is maximally simple likely won’t fit the data well enough.  Thus, 
we ought not use a curve that fits the data too well or too poorly as our model: we need to 
find the one that fits the data set just right. The family of curves whose best-fitting 
member fits just right will be the model closest to the true model for the theory. (Sober, 
Forster 6-7)  This curve will best balance closeness-of-fit to the data set and simplicity, 
according to Sober. 
It might seem as if Sober is needlessly adding a step to the argument by starting 
with families of curves.  After all, he eventually wants to match best-fitting individual 
curves with their actual counterparts. Sober’s starting point is necessary, however.  There 
are major problems that arise when trying to determine the simplicity of individual 
curves.7  (Sober, Forster fn. 18)  However, by looking at a family of curves and 
determining the number of adjustable parameters that family of curves has, we avoid this 
problem.  Sober and Forster never refer to the simplicity of an individual curve.  They 
                                                 
7   Sober and Forster refer to Graham Priest’s outline of the problems facing individual 
curves and evaluation of their simplicity in “Gruesome Simplicity”, especially section V.  
Op. cit.   
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always speak of the simplicity of a family of curves, and then the fit of some particular 
curve within the family.   
The two criteria, then, in which Sober and Forster are interested are these: 
(a) Larger families generally contain curves closer to the 
truth than smaller families 
(b) Overfitting: the higher the number of adjustable 
parameters, the more prone the family is to fit to noise 
in the data 
(Sober, Forster 8) 
 
The phrase ‘larger families’, here, refers to ones with more curves found within them: the 
family of parabolas, e.g., is larger than the family of lines because the family of lines is a 
subset of the family of parabolas.  The reason why larger families generally contain 
curves closer to the truth is because the larger families have more parameters and, so, 
more resources that enable them to reduce their average distance from the data.  To 
reduce their average distance from the data is just to reduce their distance from the actual 
model.  (Sober, Forster 8) But, this closeness of fit by itself is not enough, as the closer 
the fit, the more likely it is that noise in the data will bias the fit: that is, there is a 
possibility for the curve to fit the data too closely and, therefore, to be not as close to the 
actual curve as a curve that does not fit the data quite as closely.  Simplicity must also be 
considered.  The combination of closeness of fit and simplicity, Sober claims, will 
provide an unbiased determination as to which family of curves will be closest to the true 
curve.  If this were true, then this view would determine which family of curves would 
have the most predictive success.  As was pointed out earlier, predictive success is a good 
indication that the particular model that gives us this success is close to the true model.  
And, a model without predictive success or little predictive success in comparison with 
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its complexity will likely be overfitting.  I will argue, later, that models that overfit will 
be considered ‘ad hoc’, on Sober’s view.     
 In order to get a precise, epistemically accessible8 calculation of closeness-of-fit 
considerations versus simplicity considerations, Sober and Forster use a modified version 
of Akaike’s theorem.  Here is the modified version: 
Estimated[A(family F)] = (1/N) [log-likelihood(L(F)) – k] (Sober, Forster 10)  
Here, A(family F) stands for the Akaike score of a family of curves.  N stands for the 
number of data points.  The k stands for the number of adjustable parameters the family 
has.  The log-likelihood is being used to measure the distance to the data from the family 
of curves.  It is the log of the likelihood that this data set would have occurred, given the 
best-fitting member of the family of curves being considered.9  The smaller the log-
likelihood, the greater the distance to the data is and vice versa. (Sober, Forster 10)  This 
formulation, Sober and Forster claim, allows the error variance to be treated as one of the 
parameters and, so, the error variance no longer needs to be known to make the 
calculation – unlike with the unmodified version of Akaike’s theorem.     
                                                 
8 It is this modified version, along with two assumptions upon which Akaike’s theorem 
relies, that makes the goodness-of-fit versus simplicity calculation epistemically 
accessible.  The two assumptions to which I am referring are the following: (1) certain 
“mathematically formulated conditions that ensure the ‘asymptotic normality’ of the 
likelihood function” (Sober, Forster 29); (2) there is enough data so that these asymptotic 
normalities will be reached. (Sober, Forster 29)  This last assumption is fairly self-
explanatory.  The first assumption consists (roughly) in mathematical parameters such 
that the error distributions will be normally distributed – that is, that there won’t be some 
extreme shift to the data such that the error distributions vary greatly to one side or the 
other of the mean value. (Sober, Forster 30)   
 
9 See, for example,www.xycoon.com/lsrloglikelihood.htm 
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This theorem allows for the consideration of both the curve fit (with the log-
likelihood) and simplicity (with the k-value).  The higher the log-likelihood, the higher 
the k-value likely will be and vice versa.   The goal is, in comparing two or more families 
of curves, to pick the one with the highest overall Akaike score: that is, the highest 
number after the number of parameters is subtracted from the log likelihood and 
multiplied by the inverse of the number of data points. The one with the highest Akaike 
score will be the hypothesis with the greatest expected predictive accuracy.  Thus, the 
Akaike theorem is a statistical measure of how curves fit the data.  The score the best-
fitting curve from the family of best-fitting curves gets is an unbiased estimate of 
predictive accuracy.   
As the reader can see from looking at the structure of the theorem, a more 
complicated family of curves – one with more parameters – will have to add a significant 
amount of goodness-of-fit in order to be favored over a simpler family of curves.  The 
log-likelihood, being a log function, is not going to go up as quickly as the 
straightforward addition of the number of parameters.  Thus, if a simpler family of curves 
is equivalent – or close to equivalent – in goodness-of-fit to a more complex family of 
curves, the simpler family will be preferred over the more complex family. (Sober, 
Forster 11)   
Another element of the theorem that Sober and Forster highlight is that the 
importance of either simplicity or goodness-of-fit changes, depending on the number of 
data points involved. (Sober, Forster 11)  They claim that, in the case of a large amount 
of data points, goodness-of-fit is much more important than simplicity (number of 
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parameters).  On the other hand, with small amounts of data points, the simplicity will 
become much more important.10  
 
II.  Ad Hocness and Its Correlation with Closeness-of-Fit 
 
Sober and Forster are mainly concerned with how to determine accuracy of 
predictions and how to choose a model that will be the most accurate in predicting new 
data: ad hocness is a more peripheral topic.  They speak, among other things, about 
unified theories and why they are preferable to non-unified theories and of causal 
modeling.  I will not address these issues, here, as they are not within the scope of my 
project.  Instead, I will omit these very interesting discussions and skip directly to Sober 
and Forster’s discussion of ad hocness.  
                                                 
10   Although they are not explicit as to why the number of data points makes a difference 
in the importance of goodness-of-fit or of simplicity, looking at a different formulation of 
Akaike’s result gives some insight into why this might be.  Consider this formulation:  
Estimated(Distance from the truth of family F) = SOS [L(F)] + 2kσ2   (Sober, Forster 9)   
where SOS [L(F)] stands for the sum of squares of the best-fitting curve in family F (the 
sum of squares being the sum of the square of the distance from the true curve for each 
data point, k stands for the number of parameters found in family F, σ2 stands for the 
degree of spread of the errors around the true curve. (Sober, Forster 9)  (I have, here, 
taken out an added constant because Sober and Forster state that this constant is common 
to all families and, so, drops out when comparing families of curves.)  Then, as the 
number of data points increases, the SOS [L(F)] will increase.  If there are a large number 
of data points, the addition of 2kσ2 will not matter much in final calculation.  If there are 
a very small number of data points, however, the addition of 2kσ2 will be a large factor in 
the final calculation for each family being considered.   
    Sober and Forster seem to support this sort of explanation in the following: 
         “Suppose that there is a slight parabolic bend in the data, reflected in the fact that 
the SOS value of L(PAR) [the best-fitting curve of the family of parabolas] is slightly 
lower than the SOS value of L(LIN) [the best-fitting curve of the family of lines].  Recall 
that the absolute value of these quantities depends on the number of data points.” (Sober, 
Forster 11) 
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Like me and like Leplin, Sober and Forster reject the Bayesian idea that ad 
hocness has something to do with the motives of scientists.  They also, like me and like 
Leplin, reject the idea that the historical background – what theories came before it, for 
example – have something to do with ad hocness.  Sober and Forster also think that ad 
hocness is a vice. (Sober, Forster 17)  However, Sober and Forster seem to disagree both 
with me and with Leplin as to what sort of thing can be ad hoc.  In their discussion of 
curve fitting, they have been talking about models, which are families of curves where a 
particular curve represents a particular hypothesis. While Sober and Forster speak only 
briefly about ad hocness, an argument can be made that they seem to attribute ad hocness 
as a vice of theories or research programs, in the spirit of Lakatos.11 (Sober, Forster 17)  I 
will here argue for this interpretation of Sober and Forster.  
Sober and Forster begin by rejecting the hypothetico-deductive conception of 
science because of the Quine-Duhem-Ayer problem.  However, Sober and Forster agree 
with the hypothetico-deductive conclusion12 that there is a difference between acceptable 
revision – as in the case of Leverrier’s postulation of Neptune because of the 
perturbations of Uranus – and, as they put it, “ad hoc evasion”. (Sober, Forster 17)  Their 
example of this sort of ad hoc evasion is a version of the philosopher’s Ptolemy case.  As 
Sober and Forster describe Ptolemaic theory: 
                                                 
11 See, for example: 
 
Lakatos, Imre.  “Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes.”  Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.  Lakatos, Musgrave, eds.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
 
12   This is a fairly uncontroversial conclusion: certainly, I would agree with this and so 
would all of the others whose views I have critiqued.  Where the controversy arises, of 
course, is how the distinction between acceptable revisions and ‘ad hoc evasions’ is 
characterized.  
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The classic example of this [preventing refutation of a theory by 
making adjustments in the auxiliary hypotheses of the theory] is Ptolemaic 
astronomy, where the model may always be amended in the face of 
potential refutation by adding another circle – so much so that the 
expression ‘adding epicycles to epicycles’ has become synonymous with 
‘ad hocness’. (Sober, Forster 17) 
 
So, in the case of Ptolemaic theory, it looks like the theory is ad hoc because the 
additional complexity – the sum of epicycles and eccentrics and equants added to deal 
with the seemingly anomalous orbits of the planets and of the moon – does not add 
enough predictive value or gain in fit with the data13.  Thus, the theory will have a low 
Akaike score because it is gaining a higher degree of fit at the cost of simplicity.   
Just because a theory has a low Akaike score because of high complexity cannot 
mean that this theory is ad hoc. ‘Low’ is a comparative term: something has to be lower 
than something else.  So, it looks like Sober and Forster intend ad hocness to be 
comparative, although they do not discuss explicitly this comparative aspect. Throughout 
the paper, Sober and Forster have been discussing how to use Akaike’s theorem to decide 
between two or more families of curves, in order to decide between two or more models 
of theories for certain data sets.  Similarly, for ad hocness, it looks like a theory has to be 
ad hoc in relation to another theory: some theory’s Akaike score must be (significantly) 
worse than some other theory’s Akaike score.  So, Ptolemaic theory is ad hoc in 
comparison, presumably, with Copernican theory.  And this comparative aspect of ad 
hocness seems supported elsewhere in the text.  When discussing how more unified 
theories tend to get better Akaike scores for their models, Sober and Forster speak 
directly about the comparison between Ptolemaic and Copernican theory: 
                                                 
13   Their claim that the gain in closeness-of-fit, after repeated iterations, is not enough to 
counteract the loss of simplicity is very similar in tone to what Kuhn says in the quote in 
footnote 16 of chapter 1.   
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In Ptolemy’s geocentric astronomy, the relative motion of the earth 
and the sun is independently replicated within the model for each planet, 
thereby unnecessarily adding to the number of adjustable parameters in his 
system.  Copernicus’s major innovation was to decompose the apparent 
motion of the planets into their individual motions around the sun together 
with a common sun-earth component, thereby reducing the number of 
adjustable parameters. […] We present the maximization of estimated 
predictive accuracy as the rationale for accepting the Copernican model over 
its Ptolemaic rival.  For example, if each additional epicycle is characterized 
by 4 adjustable parameters14, then the likelihood of the best basic Ptolemaic 
model, with just twelve circles, would have to be e20 (or more than 485 
million) times the likelihood of its Copernican counterpart with just seven 
circles for the evidence to favour the Ptolemaic proposal.  Yet, these basic 
models had about the same degree of fit with the data known at the time.   
(Sober, Forster 14-15) 
 
In other words, Ptolemaic theory is inferior to Copernican theory because it has a worse 
Akaike score than Copernican theory.  It is not that Ptolemaic theory is a bad theory 
simpliciter.  It has a worse Akaike score than Copernican theory because it overfits the 
data and, as a result, has many more parameters than Copernican theory.  And the Akaike 
theorem is supposed to tell us when overfit occurs – when the added accuracy does not 
make up for the added complexity of a theory’s model – because these sorts of models 
will not be accurate in predicting new data or fitting additional data sets. 
So, when Sober and Forster discuss reasons to reject or view with suspicion 
certain theories in the vocabulary of Lakatos, it appears that they are really letting the 
reader know what it is for a theory to be considered ad hoc.  Lakatos speaks not of 
theories but of research programs: these constitute the ongoing testing of a specific 
scientific theory.  He also speaks of research programs being degenerative, where 
degenerative means that the program no longer has predictive power and so no longer 
                                                 
14 Sober and Forster do not say what these additional parameters are.  I think that they are 
speaking a bit loosely, here, because it is not clear that all epicycles will have 4 adjustable 
parameters. I will discuss what these 4 adjustable parameters might be in section V.   
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makes novel predictions. (Sober, Forster 17)  Sober and Forster adopt this language when 
they say:   
Our proposal is that a research programme is degenerative just in case 
loss in simplicity is not compensated by a sufficient gain in fit with data.  Of 
course, the fit will always improve, but the improvement may not be enough 
to increase the estimated predictive value. (Sober, Forster 17) 
 
While they are using Lakatos’s vocabulary, it seems clear that what Sober and Forster are 
defining, here, is how a theory is determined to be ad hoc.  They label Ptolemaic theory 
as ad hoc and, when identifying it as such, point out the fact that Ptolemaic theory 
underwent a great loss in simplicity that did not greatly improve the fit.  Here, Sober and 
Forster are implying that the Ptolemaic theory’s improvement in fit is not enough to 
increase its overall Akaike score and, thus, its estimated predictive value.15  And they 
have stated, previously, that something that overfits the data is unlikely to have a high 
predictive value because something that overfits will include background noise and 
experimental errors in so closely fitting the data.  So, it looks like there are two ways to 
be a bad model/theory (to have a low estimated predictive value): one is to be very, very 
simple and, as such, underfit the data.  The other is to overfit the data.16  The latter case is 
a case of ad hocness on Sober and Forster’s view, I argue.  And, this vice is a 
comparative one, according to the textual indications of Sober and Forster.   
                                                 
15   Again, they seem to be echoing the sentiments of Kuhn in the quotes cited in chapter 
1, footnote 16. 
 
16 In the 2004 paper, Sober and Hitchcock never identify overfitting as ad hocness but 
they discuss how models can have low expected predictive values.  The two ways in 
which models can have low expected predictive values, according to Sober and 
Hitchcock are that the model either is too simple and underfits, or that it is too complex 
and overfits.  This distinction mirrors the distinction that Sober and Forster make in the 
1994 paper.  It is just that, in the 1994 paper, Sober and Forster seem to make a more 
explicit connection between ad hocness and overfitting.  Thus, it looks like ad hocness 
just is overfitting and nothing more, on their account.  
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 Sober and Forster, thus, seem to claim that the sort of thing that can be ad hoc is a 
theory-data set pair.  Leplin does not agree with this and neither do I.  However, this is 
not an objection that I am going to pursue contra Sober and Forster because I will 
demonstrate that there is a way in which Sober and Forster’s view can be reconciled to 
the idea that it is the introduction or acceptance of a hypothesis that qualifies as possibly 
ad hoc. I will describe this modification of Sober and Forster’s theory next, when I apply 
their view to the Ptolemy example discussed previously. I will, however, critique the 
comparative conception of ad hocness, as I think that this element of Sober and Forster’s 
view of ad hocness is inescapable for them and also undesirable.      
 
 
III.  How to Evaluate Hypothesis Introductions According to Sober’s Account of Ad 
Hocness 
 
Sober wants to discuss the predictive accuracy of models/theories.  In this way, 
my interpretation of what he considers ad hocness to be does not bear directly on the 
previous discussion of ad hocness.  Instead of discussing the possibility of theories as a 
whole being ad hoc – such as the ad hocness of the whole Ptolemaic theory in 
comparison with the whole Copernican theory – I have been discussing the possibility of 
a hypothesis introduction or acceptance being ad hoc.  However, there is no reason to 
think that Sober can’t talk about the predictive accuracy of individual hypotheses.  Nor 
does it seem implausible that he could also talk about whether the introduction or 
acceptance of a certain hypothesis into a theory ought to have happened.  It looks like, 
given recalcitrant evidence, Sober can claim that a hypothesis introduction or acceptance 
ought to be labeled ad hoc if the family of curves that represent the modified model (the 
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model with the inclusion of the new hypothesis) do not achieve as high an Akaike score 
as either the original model or some otherwise modified model that includes a different 
new hypothesis.  Given a set of possible hypotheses, upon adding them individually to 
the original model, there will always be at least one modified model that achieves the best 
Akaike score out of the others, although there might be a set of modified models that all 
achieve equally high Akaike scores.  The models not in this set will likely have less 
predictive power and will have lower total Akaike scores.  Thus, the hypothesis that, 
when combined with the original model, received the highest Akaike score, will be the 
hypothesis that ought to have been chosen, according to Sober. 
 
IV.  Whether, on Sober’s Account, a Model Ought to Be Modified At All 
 
It will be another matter as to whether any hypothesis ought to be added to a 
model given recalcitrant evidence.  Remember, Sober deems the model with the most 
predictive value in comparison with other models to be the one that we ought to use.  
Suppose recalcitrant evidence arises.  Now suppose there are three possibilities: (1) keep 
the model as is, even though its closeness-of-fit will be damaged by the recalcitrant 
evidence; (2) consider the model in combination with a hypothesis that improves the 
closeness-of-fit because it takes into account the recalcitrant data but has a higher 
complexity of, say, 4 or 5 adjustable parameters; (3) consider the model in combination 
with a hypothesis that improves the closeness-of-fit – although not as well as the second 
option – but which has fewer added parameters than the second option.  It could very 
well be the case that the option that has the best Akaike score is option (1), where no 
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hypothesis is introduced.  Then, adopting one of the other two options would be ad hoc.  
However, if the 2nd option’s Akaike score is the highest, that is the option we should 
adopt, and similarly for the 3rd option.  So, there are two different questions that Sober’s 
theory might answer: (1) out of these hypotheses, which one would give me the highest 
predictive accuracy when added to my theory? (2) Out of the possible options, should I 
add another hypothesis to deal with recalcitrant data or should I keep my theory as it was 
before the recalcitrant data appeared?  In other words, we need to compare the proposed 
revisions, in combination with the particular model we are using, to each other.  Then, we 
need to compare whichever modified model has the highest Akaike score to the 
unmodified, original model to see which of those has the highest Akaike score.  If we 
don’t choose the one with the highest overall Akaike score, our model is ad hoc.  
This version of Sober’s criterion of non-ad hocness that I have just outlined will 
be the one that I test in order to see how Sober’s predictive accuracy view deals with the 
specific Ptolemy example that I have been using.  As I stated, this version seems in the 
spirit of Sober and will allow me to compare his conception of ad hocness with the others 
that have been discussed, as this version puts the criterion of non-ad hocness in terms of 
the introduction or acceptance of hypotheses instead of theories as a whole.   
 
V.  Sober Versus Ptolemy 
 
Ptolemy finds that his theory of the movements of the heavenly bodies does not fit 
the data very well.  This is because of the observed anomalies of the sun’s orbit.  So, he 
decides to add an additional hypothesis that will enable his theory to better fit the data.  
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According to Sober and Forster, the best-fitting curve in one family of curves will be 
superior to that of another family of curves, and, thus, will have greater expected 
predictive accuracy, if the best-fitting curve of the first family scores better according to 
the Akaike theorem than that of the second.  The two considerations that are in tension 
with each other will be closeness-of-fit and the number of adjustable parameters for each 
family of curves.  In the case of the eccentric and the epicyclic hypotheses, they are 
empirically equivalent in their closeness-of-fit to the data set of the sun’s positions in the 
sky.  So, the closeness-of-fit consideration will come out the same for the models of both 
the eccentric and the epicyclic hypotheses.  Thus, the important parameter in deciding 
between the two hypotheses will be the complexity of their respective models.   
In the case of the eccentric hypothesis, it looks like the model will have four 
adjustable parameters.  The first two will consist in the distance between the center of the 
Earth and the center of the ecliptic and the angular coordinate locating this center against 
the zodiac.  The final two parameters will be the radius of the eccentric and the angular 
speed of the sun.  Yet, the model of the epicyclic hypothesis looks to have 4 adjustable 
parameters as well: the radius of the orbit that is concentric to the earth, the radius of the 
epicyclic orbit, the angular velocity of the sun, and the angular velocity of the orbit 
around which the epicycle moves.17  Therefore, it looks like the model of the epicyclic 
hypothesis is equal in complexity to the eccentric hypothesis.  Since both their closeness-
of-fits and their number of parameters look to be equivalent, then the models that contain 
                                                 
17 In the case of the sun, this orbit must have the same period as the epicycle and, so, is 
constrained. However, in general, an epicyclic orbit doesn’t need to exhibit the properties 
of the sun’s orbit.  And, in the case of some of the planets, there is an epicyclic orbit that 
is not constrained in this way.  For the sun, the two angular velocities are the same but 
this is a contingent result of the empirical data and is not required by the structure of the 
epicyclic hypothesis.   
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one or the other of these hypotheses ought to get equivalent Akaike scores. Thus, they 
should be equally successful in prediction and either model may be adopted as the best-
fitting one if it is determined that these models have higher Akaike scores than the 
original, unmodified model (Ptolemaic astronomy in its original form).  
Ptolemy himself uses the ideas of simplicity and closeness-of-fit when he decides 
to adopt the eccentric hypothesis.  He notes that both of these hypotheses are empirically 
adequate.  Yet, Ptolemy comes to a different conclusion than does Sober.  According to 
Sober’s calculations, both are equally suitable for adoption. Ptolemy, however, picks the 
eccentric hypothesis, claiming that, though both are empirically adequate, the eccentric 
hypothesis is simpler.  It is possible that Ptolemy means something like metaphysically 
simpler, here.  But, it’s also possible that he means simplicity in terms of number of 
parameters.  Sober’s view is silent on the matter of a theory or hypothesis being simpler 
metaphysically, as his view deals only with simplicity as evaluated by number of 
adjustable parameters.  
Applying Sober’s account, we come to the conclusion that both the eccentric and 
the epicyclic hypothesis are equally acceptable for adoption.  He doesn’t give any 
additional reasons for choosing between the two.  And it might well be that metaphysical 
simplicity is a perfectly valid reason to choose one hypothesis over another.  However, if 
Ptolemy is saying that the eccentric hypothesis is simpler in terms of the number of its 
adjustable parameters, then there is a tension between Ptolemy’s decision and Sober’s 
view.  On Sober’s view, as we saw previously, both hypotheses are equally simple in 
terms of number of parameters and, so, greater simplicity is not a reason to choose one of 
these hypotheses over the other.   
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This tension is not, of course, a definitive reason to condemn Sober’s view.  An 
argument could certainly be made that Ptolemy was concerned with metaphysical 
simplicity: the displacement of the sun’s orbit from being centered at the earth to being 
centered elsewhere might have been less metaphysically onerous than the postulation of 
multiple circles to account for the sun’s movements.  And, even if Ptolemy was talking 
about simplicity in the way that Sober does, Ptolemy could simply be wrong in choosing 
the eccentric over the epicyclic because of a concern for this sort of simplicity.  What 
Sober’s view fails to capture is the seeming arbitrariness of adopting one hypothesis over 
the other, instead of merely using one for its convenience but withholding judgment as to 
whether it ought to be part of the theory as a whole or keeping both hypotheses as live 
options.18   
There is more to consider, though, than the Akaike scores of the two hypotheses 
in comparison with each other.  It is not immediately evident, in the Ptolemaic case, 
whether or not the theory’s overall Akaike score would improve given the adoption of 
one of either the eccentric or the epicyclic hypothesis.  That is, it might be better to 
choose the eccentric over the epicyclic, but it might be better19 to add neither, or to add 
some other hypothesis, to the main theory.  However, not much rides on this: we could 
conceive of a case exactly like the Ptolemy case in the relevant ways, except that the 
                                                 
18 Of course, on other views, simplicity could be an additional virtue in favor of the 
eccentric hypothesis and, thus, Ptolemy might be justified in accepting it over the 
epicyclic hypothesis even though they are empirically equivalent.  The point, here, is that 
Sober cannot make this sort of distinction that others might because, for him, simplicity is 
just the number of parameters and is a part of the calculation for a given model’s Akaike 
score.  Simplicity cannot come in again after the Akaike scores have been calculated.   
 
19 That is, the model with the highest Akaike score might not be one that contains either 
the eccentric or the epicyclic hypothesis.   
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theory’s Akaike score definitely did improve with the adoption of one of these two 
hypotheses.  And, certainly, in the Ptolemy case, it looks plausible that its model’s 
Akaike score will improve, given the addition of one of these hypotheses.  With neither 
of them is there a great deal of additional parameters, in comparison to the number of 
parameters already found in Ptolemaic theory, and both would make the closeness-of-fit 
to the data much better.  On Sober’s view, then, it seems that Ptolemy’s theory is not ad 
hoc in this case: its model’s Akaike score improved with the addition of the eccentric 
hypothesis.  So, Ptolemy did nothing wrong in this case by adopting the eccentric 
hypothesis: the Ptolemaic model’s Akaike score, arguably, would become higher, and 
higher to the same degree, with the addition of either the eccentric or the epicyclic 
hypothesis and, so, Ptolemy was permitted to adopt either of the two.   
I do think that Sober et al attempted an ingenious solution to the curve-fitting 
problem.  It is just that I don’t think that it works completely, and does not work as a 
characterization of ad hocness.  There are two ways in which I will criticize Sober’s view 
of ad hocness.  I will turn to those criticisms next.   
 
VI.  The Problem With Considering Ad Hocness a Comparative Characteristic 
 
 
 
  On Sober’s view, ad hocness is comparative.  This comparative nature is 
problematic because something can’t be ad hoc in absence of other viable options and 
because, in the case of multiple options, (at least) one option is always going to be not ad 
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hoc.  This is because, for a hypothesis20 to be ad hoc, according to Sober’s view, the 
model containing it must have a lower Akaike score than the model(s) containing some 
other hypothesis(es).   The model will have a lower Akaike score because it overfits the 
data and, in doing so, has too many adjustable parameters.  This conception of ad 
hocness, as was noted earlier, is essentially comparative.  As Sober and Forster 
themselves noted, for example, Ptolemaic theory is ad hoc because it has a worse Akaike 
score than Copernican theory, as a result of its extensive number of adjustable 
parameters. (Sober, Forster 14, 17)  This seems adequate for situations where there are 
more than one (viable) hypotheses to compare to each other.  However, what will happen 
in situations where there really is only one (viable) hypothesis?  It looks like, then, that 
this hypothesis cannot be ad hoc because the model containing it has the highest Akaike 
score.  
 Consider the example of the plenists.21  The plenists believed that there could be 
no vacuums in nature – a stronger claim, even, than those who believed that nature 
merely abhorred a vacuum. (Hempel 28-29)  Along came Torricelli and his mercury bath 
experiment.22  In this experiment, Torricelli filled a tube with one closed end and one 
                                                 
20 Sober and Forster talk only about theories being ad hoc, when they explain their view 
of ad hocness, although they mention ad hoc hypotheses in section 6 (the sub family 
problem) when they use the term ‘ad hoc’ in a more traditional manner.  I have already 
demonstrated that Sober and Forster’s view of ad hocness can be applied also to 
hypothesis introduction or acceptance during the discussion of Ptolemaic theory and its 
solution to the sun’s anomalous orbit.  So, in this discussion, I will speak of their view 
being applied equally to theory-data sets and to hypothesis-data sets although Sober and 
Forster do not.   
 
21 Hempel, among others, discusses the plenist example as one that is definitively ad hoc.  
See Philosophy of Natural Science. Op cit.  
 
22   Hempel also discusses this experiment. 
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open end full of mercury.  Keeping the open end covered, he immersed this tube in a pool 
of mercury, open side down.  He then released the seal on the open end of the tube.  
There was no way in which air could have gotten into the tube, because the one open end 
is surrounded by this pool.  Yet, the level of the previously full tube of mercury dropped, 
leaving a seemingly empty space at the closed end of the tube.  In the face of this 
seeming evidence for the existence of a vacuum, the plenists postulated the existence of 
funiculi: invisible strands, rather spring-like in nature, that connect the mercury to the top 
of the tube.  These strands completely fill up the space between the top of the tube and 
the mercury and, so, the seeming vacuum is not an actual one.  Looking only at the 
plenists, it does not appear as if they advanced any other hypotheses to account for the 
disconfirming evidence.  Let us suppose, for our purposes, that the plenists did not 
advance any other viable hypothesis.  Now suppose that the plenist theory’s Akaike score 
went up as a result of adopting this new hypothesis: that is, that the unmodified model’s 
Akaike score was lower than the score of the model containing the funiculus hypothesis.  
Then, neither the funiculus hypothesis itself nor the adoption of this hypothesis would be 
considered ad hoc.  They couldn’t be because there are no other alternatives to the 
funiculus hypothesis to which the model containing this hypothesis can be compared, and 
the Akaike score of the plenists' theory went up when this hypothesis was adopted.  Yet, 
this sort of hypothesis seems to be exactly the sort of hypothesis that we do not want to 
accept as legitimate.  The plenists took option B when, if they wanted to retain their 
theory, option C – the ‘wait and see’ option – was the only appropriate course of action.23  
                                                 
23 When a scientist’s theory is faced with recalcitrant evidence, there are always three 
options that the scientist may take.  (A) throw over their theory; (B) hold on to their 
theory and add a hypothesis that will reconcile it with the evidence; (C) do nothing, 
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In fact, it is this sort of hypothesis that has traditionally been called ad hoc because it 
seems to have been formulated solely to save the theory from recalcitrant evidence.24  
Hempel himself characterizes the adoption of the funiculus hypothesis in these very 
terms.   
 A critic might want to object to my last conclusion.  I was comparing only the 
unmodified plenists' theory with the theory modified by the funiculus hypothesis.  Maybe 
I am comparing the wrong models.  Perhaps the plenists’ model containing the funiculus 
hypothesis is considered ad hoc because it has a lower Akaike score than Torricelli’s 
model that contains the hypothesis that vacuums exist.  This comparison, the critic might 
argue, is the appropriate comparison.  However, there is something wrong with adding 
the funiculus hypothesis, regardless of whether we compare it to Torricelli’s theory or 
not.  And we should be able to see that the addition of the funiculus hypothesis is ad hoc 
without Torricelli’s theory.   
 Consider a different sort of case: suppose, instead of having no rivals, a certain 
theory has several rivals.  Yet, all of these hypotheses are some sort of variation of the 
funiculus hypothesis. Either all of the models that contain one of the hypotheses being 
considered will have the same Akaike score or one (or more) will have a better Akaike 
score than the others.  In the first situation, it looks like it would be acceptable to choose 
                                                                                                                                                 
recognizing that there is a tension or even an inconsistency between the evidence and his 
theory plus the background but deciding to hold off doing anything about it for the time 
being.  I discuss these options in chapter 1, section X. 
 
24 It is true that I am not willing to adopt this formulation of ad hocness because of 
several major problems that it faces.  However, while not adequate for defining ad 
hocness, it is a pretty good intuitive guide for making determinations of ad hocness.  On 
my view, the model containing the funiculus hypothesis would also be considered ad hoc, 
even if there were no other (viable) hypotheses to which it could be compared.   
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any of these hypotheses.  In the second situation, it looks like at least one of the models – 
the one or ones that scored higher than the others – will not be considered to be ad hoc.  
Yet, neither of these analyses seems right for the reason stated above.  All of these 
hypothesis acceptances ought to be considered ad hoc. 
 An example of this sort of situation might be imagined when considering the 
horror vacui proponents after Pascal executed his Puy-de-Dome experiments.25  The 
horror vacui proponents were similar to the plenists in that they believed that nature 
abhorred a vacuum and, so, vacuums did not exist in nature. (Hempel 28-29)  Pascal 
measured the height of a column of mercury in a sealed tube when this measurement was 
taken at sea level and when it was taken, amongst other places, at the top of a mountain.  
He demonstrated that the mercury’s level dropped in relation to the top of the tube when 
measured at the top of a mountain, creating what appeared to be a vacuum.  Pascal also 
demonstrated that, in bad weather, the height of the mercury dropped in comparison with 
the height of the mercury in fair weather.  In response, a horror vacui proponent might 
come up with several different hypotheses that might explain the actions of the mercury 
in these different situations.  One might be that, while Nature does abhor a vacuum, it 
abhors it less on the tops of mountains and in bad weather than at sea level and in fair 
weather.26 27  The second hypothesis might be that there is an invisible and weightless 
                                                 
25 I introduce this example and the Torricelli experiment in chapter 1, section V. 
 
26 This view was famously derided in Pascal’s treatise on air pressure.  I have quoted part 
of Pascal’s rhetorical rant in chapter 1, section V. 
 
27  This hypothesis would be plausible for the horror vacui theorists and not for the 
plenists because, on the former view, nature just abhors a vacuum.  That leaves room to 
say that a vacuum might occasionally exist.  The plenists, on the other hand, were 
committed to the non-existence of vacuums.   
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ether that can permeate glass.  This ether exists in more quantity in bad weather and at the 
tops of mountains.  The third might be something along the lines of the funiculus 
hypothesis adopted by the plenists: there is some sort of invisible and weightless material 
that connects the mercury to the top of the tube.  This material connects it more closely at 
sea level and in good weather than on the tops of mountains and in bad weather.  When 
added to the horror vacui model, any of these hypotheses will raise the model’s Akaike 
score because they do not add many (if any) adjustable parameters and they all greatly 
improve the closeness-of-fit to the data.  Now suppose that the model that includes the 
first hypothesis achieves a better Akaike score.  Then, the acceptance of this hypothesis 
will be rationally permissible, according to Sober.  Or, suppose that all three models that 
contain one of these hypotheses had equal Akaike scores, all of which are higher than the 
original, unmodified model’s score.  In that case, any of the three hypotheses would be 
acceptable to adopt, according to Sober.  And this just does not seem right:  all three of 
these hypotheses seem like the sort of hypothesis that ought not to be adopted in this 
situation.    
 In short, we want to be able to make judgments of ad hocness on one theory or 
hypothesis standing alone.  We also want to be able to claim that all of our possible 
options are ad hoc.  Sober’s view of ad hocness does not permit us to do either of these 
things, because of its essentially comparative nature.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
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 While there are other objections that could be raised against Sober’s view, I have 
outlined only the two strongest.  Both of these are real problems for Sober.  Having 
discussed and discarded several of the most promising accounts of ad hocness, I will now 
turn to my own proposal for defining ad hocness, an account which will sidestep the 
problems that face these other theories and that will also sidestep the Quine-Duhem-Ayer 
problem that faces the traditional account of ad hocness.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
A New Account of Ad Hoc Acts 
 
 
I.  What Can Be Ad Hoc, Revisited 
 
 Having discussed previous definitions of ad hocness and the problems inherent to 
them, I will turn to my positive account of ad hocness.  In order to set up this account, I 
will first indicate the types of acts1 that qualify as potentially ad hoc.   
 A scientist’s theory is always set against a background, which consists in the 
currently accepted scientific theories and assumptions that impact on the theory.2 This 
will be true for all theory modifications.  However, there must be certain conditions 
fulfilled in order for the specific modification to be one that can be labeled ‘ad hoc’.  
Firstly, a theory must face disconfirming evidence.  This is not enough, however, as the 
scientist can act in different ways after disconfirming evidence arises.  Additionally, the 
scientist must decide to accept a new hypothesis into her theory in order to reconcile this 
theory with the disconfirming evidence.  
                                                 
1 I will only discuss ad hocness in terms of ad hoc acts.  As I discussed in chapter 1, part 
XI, the term ‘ad hoc’ is applied only to acts, despite it sometimes appearing to apply to 
hypotheses or theories themselves.   
 
2 There is not a sharp line between the background and the theory itself, which is to be 
expected: the theory’s auxiliaries blend into the background in which the theory is 
situated.   
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 I discussed, in chapter 1, section XI, the difference between the introduction of a 
hypothesis and the acceptance of a hypothesis.  However, it is worthwhile to emphasize 
the distinction here, as I argue that scientists who merely introduce a hypothesis because 
of disconfirming evidence will not be committing an act that qualifies to be judged ad 
hoc.  The introduction of a hypothesis is an act by which that particular limitation or 
explanation comes to be entertained as a potential addition to a theory.   To accept a 
hypothesis is to take an additional step.  A scientist will have to think that the hypothesis 
is true3 in order to accept a given hypothesis.  Without this additional step, there will be 
too many acts considered ad hoc that should not even be in the running for ad hocness.  
For example, we might claim that the introduction of a hypothesis – even one that does 
not make additional predictions, or corroborating evidence for it, or that is not even 
suggested by our theory – is perfectly satisfactory.  We might introduce a hypothesis 
because we think that other hypotheses are not fully satisfactory without thinking that 
what the introduced hypothesis claims is true or empirically useful, or even a good claim.  
We might just need something to enable us to continue investigating the other 
consequences of our theory, for example.4 So, the charge of ad hocness cannot be 
                                                 
3 Or, that the hypothesis is well-supported, or something like that.  
 
4 Here is an example where the hypothesis is being used as a placeholder.  Dr. Georgia 
has a patient, Wendel, whom she thinks has disease R.  Wendel then develops a symptom 
that would seem to contradict Dr. Georgia’s theory that he has R.  Dr. Georgia still wants 
to maintain that Wendel does, indeed, have disease R.  Dr. Georgia could reconcile her 
theory with the disconfirming evidence by supposing some hypothesis B.  Suppose Dr. 
Georgia knows that hypothesis B is false.  However, in previous cases where there has 
been a diagnosis of R and the same type of symptoms arose, it has been helpful to treat 
the patient as if he had R plus B.  Dr. Georgia might well be justified in treating Wendel 
in this manner, while acknowledging that B cannot really be what is going on with 
Wendel: she just doesn’t know at this time why Wendel has R plus the symptoms that he 
does.  And, she would be justified in treating Wendel in this manner because she has an 
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considered for such an act: we are not committing ourselves to anything that ought to be 
judged in the way that ad hoc acts are judged.  In the case of hypothesis acceptances, 
however, we are making a commitment and this commitment can be judged as ad hoc or 
not ad hoc.  
 If none of these conditions is fulfilled, the charge of ad hocness will not be 
appropriate for this action.  There will be other conditions that must be fulfilled, as well.  
I will highlight them as they arise in the discussion.   
 Suppose disconfirming evidence arises for a given theory.  The proponent of this 
theory either directly observes this disconfirming evidence, or reads about it in a journal 
that she hadn’t seen, or hears about it in some other way.  And, the proponent accepts the 
evidence as true.  This is an additional condition that must be fulfilled for the charge of 
ad hocness to be appropriate, as ad hoc acts arise only in cases where the proponent of a 
given theory accepts the disconfirming evidence yet wants to maintain her theory in the 
face of this evidence.  I will defend this claim below in section VI.    
  As it is disconfirming, the evidence is evidence against both her theory and its 
auxiliaries together being true5.  In this type of situation, there are always three choices 
for the scientist: those that I first discussed in chapter 1, section X.  Option A: The 
scientist can discard her theory.  Option B: The scientist can accept a hypothesis that 
                                                                                                                                                 
obligation to treat Wendel and she doesn’t really know what is going on.   Although she 
knows that B is false (or impossible), she has a reason to act in the way that she does: the 
evidence of past mysterious cases of R plus the symptoms where treating for R plus B 
seems to alleviate the patient’s problem.  The Planck’s constant case, in section X, 
contains another illustration of what it means to use a hypothesis as a placeholder. 
 
5  Again, I am using ‘true’ here for ease of discussion.  Substituting ‘empirically 
adequate’, or some other preferred phrase, will not affect the discussion.  I discuss my 
account’s neutrality between empirical adequacy and truth in section XVI of this chapter.    
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makes the evidence no longer disconfirming.  Option C: The scientist can do nothing, 
recognizing that there is a tension, or even an inconsistency, between the evidence and 
her theory plus the background but deciding to hold off doing anything about it for the 
time being.  Our scientist must take option B in order to commit a potentially ad hoc act.  
Otherwise, she would not be fulfilling the second criterion, above.   
 Notice that to discard the theory itself is to take a different option than the option 
taken when a potentially ad hoc act is committed.  This is because just throwing over 
one’s theory, or changing to a new theory, is a different kind of act than ad hocness.  As it 
is a different kind of act, it might well have different criteria that need to be fulfilled in 
order for this kind of act to be done appropriately or inappropriately.6  So, I need to 
distinguish between option A and option B.  This will involve determining what counts as 
moving to a new theory versus what counts as theory modification. 
 In cases where a charge of ad hocness can be appropriate, the scientist must keep 
the core of her theory intact.  Change or modify part of the core of the theory, and she 
will be moving to a new theory.  The core of the scientist’s theory consists in the part of 
the theory that, if eliminated, would cause the scientific community to regard the 
modified theory not as a version of the original but, instead, a new theory.7  And rejecting 
                                                 
6  I discuss a related subject in the reply to one of the objections raised in section VIII of 
this chapter.  
 
7 Jarrett Leplin speaks of this sort of distinction in his 1975 paper, in discussing problems 
of completeness and problems of fundamentality.  The distinction that he makes is 
between ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ propositions of a given theory.  The essential 
propositions constitute the core of a given theory.  I do not wish, here, to concern myself 
with the difference between problems of completeness and problems of fundamentality 
(for the reasons discussed in chapter 3, sections VII and VIII).  However, Leplin’s 
distinction points to the sort of distinction that I would like to make concerning what 
constitutes the core of a given theory.   
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the old theory or moving to a new theory is the kind of act where a charge of ad hocness 
is not appropriate.   
 For example, if a Newtonian theorist dealt with a problem that arose for the 
theory by rejecting absolute simultaneity, it is highly probable that the scientific 
community at the time would not consider the modified theory to be Newtonian theory at 
all.  This modification occurred when relativity theory became accepted.  When we 
discuss relativity theory, we do not claim that it is a new version of Newtonian theory – 
one that no longer contains the notion of absolute simultaneity.  Instead, we claim that 
relativity theory proponents discarded Newtonian theory in favor of the one they 
currently hold.  This is because the commitment of absolute simultaneity is one of the 
core elements of Newtonian theory.   
 It is always possible to take option A, and this act might be permissible or 
impermissible, good or bad.  However, taking option A isn’t an action where a charge of 
ad hocness could be appropriate.  So, examples like the Newtonian one above might be 
evaluated in some other manner but cannot be evaluated for ad hocness.   
 
II.  A Rough Definition of Ad Hoc Acts 
 
 Sometimes it will be appropriate for a scientist to take option B, and sometimes it 
won’t be.  Suppose a scientist holds a particular theory to be true.  She wishes to maintain 
her theory and, so, attempts to reconcile it with the newly arisen disconfirming evidence.  
She can’t continue to maintain all parts of her theory plus auxiliaries: if she did, this 
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conjunction would entail the falsity8 of the disconfirming evidence statement.  However, 
as she is taking option B, she will still maintain the core of her theory, which is consistent 
with this evidence.  She does remove the auxiliary hypotheses that conflict with the 
hypothesis to be accepted, making sure that she has previously removed such auxiliaries 
relevant to the theory (the hypotheses needed in order for the theory to be rendered 
testable) that, in conjunction with the core of the theory, were in conflict with the 
evidence itself.  She will be left with the remaining auxiliary hypotheses and the core of 
her theory.  The set of auxiliaries is consistent with the hypothesis to be accepted and, in 
conjunction with the new evidence, is also consistent with the core of this scientist’s 
theory.  The new evidence, too, is no longer disconfirming for the core of the theory plus 
the auxiliaries.   
 The scientist has committed an ad hoc act if, and only if, the core of her theory, in 
conjunction with the pared-down set of auxiliaries and the (previously) disconfirming 
evidence, does not entail (the high objective probability of) the hypothesis.  In this case, 
the scientist would be choosing option B when she ought to be choosing either option A 
or option C.  In this instance, it was not appropriate for the scientist to take option B.9   
                                                 
8 Or, if not falsity, the theory will entail the probability of the evidence, given the 
accepted theory, is extremely low.  I will be using, for ease of discussion, only the first 
type of example.  However, I think that my account of ad hocness also addresses 
situations where the probability of the evidence given the accepted theory in conjunction 
with its auxiliaries is extremely low but not zero.  See especially section XVII of this 
chapter. 
 
9 So she could have, for example taken option C, and used the hypothesis in conjunction 
with her theory and auxiliaries in order to make predictions, or to investigate some other 
phenomenon.  What she ought not to have done is actually accept the hypothesis into her 
theory. 
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 On the other hand, this act is not ad hoc if, and only if, the core of our scientist’s 
theory, the pared-down auxiliaries and the evidence together entail (the high objective 
probability of) the hypothesis being accepted.   
 When the discussed entailment does not occur, there is a sense of arbitrariness in 
the scientist’s decision to accept the hypothesis that she did.  Why accept this one and not 
some other?  Ad hocness, then, is a type of arbitrary act that seems methodologically 
suspect.  The scientist decides to accept one response to a problem, when the available 
evidence and the scientist’s theoretical commitments do not warrant this choice over 
other possible hypotheses that would also resolve the problem.  And, it is enough that the 
theory, with the appropriate auxiliaries and the evidence, admits of other responses, 
whether our scientist has articulated them or not.10  In these cases, it is appropriate either 
to choose A or C , and not option B. 
 
III. A More Detailed Definition of Ad Hocness 
 
 Now that I have given a rough sketch of my account, I need to describe it more 
formally: 
 Let M be an agent, T be a theory, B be a body of background knowledge, and t be 
a time, such that M accepts both T and B at t.  Let Tc be the core of T and let T include a 
set of auxiliary hypotheses, used in tests of Tc, in addition to Tc itself.  Let E be an 
evidence statement that is recalcitrant for T, given the background B.  Let M accept E.  
Let H be a hypothesis that is inconsistent with some set of auxiliaries in T.  Let X be the 
set of (relevant) auxiliary hypotheses in T that remains after (1) shrinking the set to make 
E be consistent with Tc and the remaining auxiliaries, and (2) then shrinking the set to 
                                                 
10 So, as a result of my view, a person might commit an ad hoc act without realizing it; it 
would be up to the scientific community to figure that out.   
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make H be consistent with Tc and the remaining auxiliaries.11 Let A (= <M, T, B, E, H, 
t>) be the act in which agent M, at time t, encounters the problem to T posed by E, and 
attempts to solve it by accepting the hypothesis H12, while retaining his commitment to 
Tc, B and X. 
 A is not ad hoc iff either {Tc, X, E} entail H, or {Tc, X, E} entail H has a high 
objective probability. 
 If A does not meet all the conditions on it imposed in the above definition, then A 
is neither ad hoc nor non-ad hoc.  That is, “A is not ad hoc” is neither true nor false.   
 A is ad hoc, however, iff {Tc, X, E} do not entail H and {Tc, X, E} do not entail 
that H has a high objective probability.   
  
 When M accepts T and, in T, the core of the theory plus the pared-down 
auxiliaries does not entail H, there is a sense of arbitrariness in M’s decision to accept the 
hypothesis H.  Ad hocness, then, is a kind of arbitrariness that seems methodologically 
suspect.  It involves choosing one response to a problem, at a time when one’s 
commitments and the available evidence do not favor that response over other possible 
responses to the same problem, even if there are no other responses that have been 
thought of by M.  
 One of the elements of my view that I wish to stress is that it is in accord with 
scientific practice because the charge of ad hocness, on my account, carries negative 
connotations.13 While ad hocness is always a vice, it is not an indefeasible vice.  If there 
                                                 
11 See section XVII of this chapter for a more detailed discussion of these requirements. 
 
12  In saying that A is the act made to solve a problem posed by E, notice that I am not 
saying that A is made solely in response to the problem posed by E.  The latter 
formulation is reminiscent of the traditional view of ad hocness, where the psychological 
motivations of the scientists come into play.  Instead, my formulation is just meant to be a 
methodological comment.  This is the public justification for accepting the hypothesis H: 
that is, to solve the problem for T + B caused by E.    
 
13  This is another reason why accepting is the appropriate act, instead of introducing.  
One of the problems raised by identifying the introduction of a hypothesis as something 
that can be ad hoc is that ad hocness can no longer just be a vice.  It might be perfectly 
o.k. to entertain a certain hypothesis in a situation where it would be inappropriate to 
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were virtues of a hypothesis – such as simplicity or explanatory power – there might be 
reasons14 to accept the hypothesis despite its being ad hoc.  Additionally, if, according to 
my view, the acceptance of a hypothesis is not ad hoc, I do not wish to claim that it is 
rationally required to accept this hypothesis: rather, I claim that the acceptance would be 
rationally permissible if there are not other vices to which the acceptance succumbs.15 
 Let me pause to clear up a potential misunderstanding of my account. My account 
might seem to fall prey to the same problem that Leplin’s 5th criterion does.  In this 
criterion, Leplin maintains that an ad hoc hypothesis is a solution for one specific 
problem, where any satisfactory solution of this problem must also provide help in 
solving other, related problems.  This criterion rests on an empirical claim: that there 
                                                                                                                                                 
accept that same hypothesis.  When discussing Strevens’s view, I have already argued as 
to why ad hocness ought only to be a vice, and never a virtue (see chapter 2, section VIII 
and have argued against the artificial union of ‘good’ ad hoc cases and ‘bad’ ad hoc 
cases.  I have also argued related points in chapter 1, section XI.   
    
14 In section XIII of this chapter, when discussing how it might seem that ad hocness 
admits of degrees, I discuss why there might be epistemological or pragmatic reasons to 
accept a hypothesis, despite its being ad hoc to accept it.   
 
15   I wish to stress the last part of this sentence because I do not think that ad hocness is 
the only vice out there.  Suppose, for example, that a certain hypothesis acceptance is not 
ad hoc.  There might still be something wrong with it that would give use a reason to 
think that we ought not accept it into our theory: its known falsity, for example.  I also 
wish to stress that it is the acceptance of a given hypothesis that is the sort of thing that 
can be labeled ad hoc or not ad hoc.  I think that this is true of all of the vices.  So, in the 
case where the hypothesis is known to be false, it might well be rationally permissible to 
use the hypothesis as a placeholder – to act as if the hypothesis were a part of the theory – 
while acknowledging that, ultimately, this hypothesis ought not actually be a part of the 
theory at the given time.  For the acceptance of this hypothesis would not be satisfactory 
at this time.  And this is the same with ad hoc hypothesis acceptance.  An ad hoc 
hypothesis may still be entertained, used, et cetera.  It just ought not be accepted – at 
least, not at that time with that  particular version of the theory and that background.  
Unless, of course, there are other virtues that it has that give a scientist epistemological 
reasons to accept it.  In which case, the hypothesis might be accepted despite its being ad 
hoc.  
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exist certain connections between certain related problems, whether the given scientist 
sees them or not.  I have discussed, in chapter 3, section IX, why the empirical nature of 
this claim is a problem. Basically, the problem is that a scientist might not be in a 
position to know whether something is ad hoc or not, because the scientist might not 
know about the connections between certain related problems.  Therefore, 
methodological advice is not possible in this sort of case.  Yet, on Leplin’s account, that 
is what was being promised. 
  The entailment requirement states that, when the disconfirming evidence plus the 
core of the theory and the relevant auxiliaries entail a given hypothesis, whether the 
scientist is aware of this entailment or not, the acceptance of this hypothesis is not ad 
hoc.  The italicized phrase might seem to be vulnerable to the same objection to which 
Leplin’s criterion 5 is vulnerable.  However, this is not the case.  The entailment 
requirement is not dependant on empirical claims.  Thus, commitment to the entailment 
found in my account does not raise the same problems as found in Leplin’s criterion. For 
this entailment to hold is just for M to be committed to a specific theory relative to 
background B and for the core of the theory plus the pared-down auxiliaries and the 
evidence to have this particular entailment relationship to H.  It is the fact that Leplin’s 
criterion depends on empirical claims that gives rise to the problem for his criterion. 
 In other words, Leplin’s account of ad hocness depends on empirical facts – facts 
that the scientist introducing the hypothesis may have no way of knowing.  My account, 
on the other hand, depends on whether a logical relationship holds, which the scientist 
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may or may not have noticed.  Therefore, there is a disanalogy between Leplin’s 5th 
criterion and my entailment requirement, despite a superficial similarity.16   
 
IV.  Why Arbitrariness is the Vice of Ad Hocness 
 
 Suppose we consider the lab-break-in case introduced in chapter 2, section VI.  In 
this case, Brady accepts the hypothesis that someone has broken into his lab and changed 
the records.  He accepts this hypothesis in order to reconcile his theory concerning the 
boiling point of mercury with the evidence that the temperature written down was 
different from what the theory maintains it should be.  So, Brady takes option B.  Yet, in 
this situation, option B does not seem to be the appropriate option to take: there are other 
ways to reconcile the new evidence with his theory and it is underdetermined which, if 
any, of these ways should be accepted.  His assistant could have accidentally written the 
temperature wrong, for example.  Or, the room might not have been at standard 
atmospheric pressure.  Or, the substance being tested might not have really been mercury.  
So, Brady is jumping to conclusions.  If some other scientist’s situation is appropriately 
like Brady’s, she, too, will pick one hypothesis rather than another, when there are 
insufficient grounds for doing so.  It is arbitrary, a case of jumping to conclusions, to pick 
that specific hypothesis.  It is clear that Brady’s action was inappropriate given the 
                                                 
16   There is an initial criterion in my account that depends on empirical facts.  In order 
for an act to qualify as potentially ad hoc, the scientist committing the act must keep the 
core of her theory intact.  What determines the core of the theory is the consensus of the 
scientific community.  However, this dependence on empirical facts in this criterion is 
not problematic in the way that the dependence on empirical facts is problematic in the 
criterion just discussed.   
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circumstances: Brady did something wrong when he accepted the lab-break-in hypothesis 
in order to reconcile his theory with the disconfirming evidence.   
 The arbitrariness in this sort of situation in accepting one hypothesis over another 
shows why this sort of move is a vice.  Now, I need to show that this vice is ad hocness.  
I now turn back to the traditional view of ad hocness to motivate this claim.  On the 
traditional view, a hypothesis is ad hoc if it is introduced solely to save a theory from 
recalcitrant evidence and has no additional testable implications.17  There seems to be 
something paradoxical going on, here.  On the one hand, it seems right to say that you 
shouldn’t accept a hypothesis just because it saves your theory or just because it has no 
additional test implications.  On the other hand, according to good scientific practice, we 
are supposed to modify our theory to fit the facts.  However, the seeming paradox 
becomes unproblematic when we turn to the intuition underlying the received view: that 
certain types of modifications are unwarranted, and that they are unwarranted because 
there is no real reason to accept this hypothesis rather than another.   
 On my view, an ad hoc acceptance contends with the recalcitrance of the new 
evidence in one particular way, by accepting one particular hypothesis.  However, there 
are other ways to reconcile the new evidence with the given theory and it is 
underdetermined which, if any, of these ways to reconcile the new evidence with the 
given theory should be accepted.  So my view is in keeping with what underlies the 
traditional view of ad hocness: the idea that to do something ad hoc is to do something 
arbitrarily.  It does so while avoiding the traps that the traditional view does not: so, for 
example, my view does not involve independent testability and does not require 
                                                 
17 This formulation should sound familiar from my discussion of Hempel in chapter 1, 
section V.   
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knowledge of the psychology of individual scientists in order to determine whether a 
hypothesis acceptance is ad hoc.18   
 
V.   Examples of Non-Ad Hoc Acts 
 
 Here are two examples that are in contrast to the lab example.  Both of these are 
examples of non-ad hoc acts.  Here’s the first: 
Neptune case: Observations of Uranus made by the mid-1800’s seemed to conflict 
with the predictions of Newton’s laws of motion and gravity. Adams and Leverrier 
modified auxiliaries to accommodate the observations, predicting Neptune’s 
existence.   
 
This is an example of a non-ad hoc hypothesis acceptance because the core of Newtonian 
theory plus the pared-down auxiliaries and the perturbations of Uranus does entail the 
Neptune hypothesis19.  Notice, however, that the acceptance of the Neptune hypothesis is 
the sort of act that can be tested for ad hocness.  There is recalcitrant evidence: Uranus is 
not moving in a regular, elliptical orbit as predicted by Newtonian theory and its 
                                                 
18   I have discussed why these, and related consequences for related views, are problems 
in chapter 1, sections VI-IX. 
 
19 Of course, I am using the name of the planet for ease of discussion.  A theory (although 
not this one) might entail, given such and such evidence coming to light, the hypothesis 
that ‘Saturn must be farther away from the Earth than Venus”, even though, in the 
language of this theory, Saturn is labeled ‘Ares’ and Venus, ‘Aphrodite’.  In fact, the 
theory might not have names for these entities at all.  It is enough that the hypothesis 
would identify these entities in enough detail as to be fairly clear to what phenomena the 
hypothesis applies.  
    Even more than just the name, it is not that the theory plus the relevant auxiliaries and 
the evidence needs to entail the exact shape and size and mineral composition of, e.g., 
Neptune.  It is enough that a body or bodies of a certain mass in a certain location, or a 
specific center of mass are entailed.   
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background.  Adams and Leverrier did wish to maintain Newtonian theory in the face of 
this recalcitrant evidence, while accepting the veracity of this evidence. The auxiliary 
hypothesis being discarded before accepting the Neptune hypothesis is the hypothesis 
that there are only seven planets.  What is being discarded is not part of the core of 
Newtonian theory.  So, this hypothesis acceptance fulfills all the criteria for an act that 
can be considered ad hoc.   
 Adams and Leverrier both independently modified Newtonian theory.  They both 
modified the auxiliary hypothesis that said that there were only seven planets.  In its 
place, both postulated that there was an eighth planet whose gravitational interaction with 
Uranus was such that Uranus’s orbit would be compromised in the way that it actually 
had been.  This hypothesis acceptance was not ad hoc because Newtonian theory plus the 
evidence concerning Uranus’s orbit being eccentric in the specific manner that it was, 
entailed the existence of another planet (or some amalgamation of planets with a center of 
mass located in the same area) with these general characteristics.  The theory was 
committed to this because Newtonian laws of gravitation and of planetary motion entail 
that such a planet must exist if certain eccentricities were to be observed.20 
 Here is a second example, also illustrating an act that, after being evaluated for ad 
hocness, is found to be non-ad hoc: 
Vulcan case: Observations of Mercury made by the mid-1800’s seemed to conflict 
with the predictions of Newton’s laws of motion and gravity.  Leverrier and others 
modified auxiliaries to accommodate the observations, predicting the existence of a 
large intra-Mercurial mass sometimes known as Vulcan. 
 
                                                 
20   I will return to this example when discussing two potential problems for my theory, in 
the formulation of X, in sections XX and XXI. 
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 The acceptance of the existence of intra-Mercurial matter is an act analogous to 
the acceptance of the Neptune hypothesis.  Newtonian theory and auxiliaries plus the 
evidence concerning Mercury’s eccentric orbital behavior entailed the existence of a 
certain amount of mass in a certain location – in this case, closer to the Sun than 
Mercury.   
 One example might seem to be enough to illustrate what makes a qualifying 
hypothesis acceptance not ad hoc.  I bring up the second example for two reasons.  
Firstly, the Vulcan case highlights ad hocness’s independence from other vices and 
virtues, such as falsity and truth.  Scientists were equally justified in both of these cases 
to postulate a planet or a certain amount of mass existing in a certain location, or mass 
with its center of gravity in a certain location.  The reason why we now acknowledge the 
existence of Neptune and do not acknowledge the existence of Vulcan is because we have 
reason to believe that the intra-Mercurial hypothesis is false and that the Neptune 
hypothesis is true.  Yet, both cases are examples of non-ad hoc hypothesis acceptances.   
 Secondly, in Chapter 1, section X, I critique the idea that repeated modifications 
of a theory of the same kind are the sorts of acts that can be labeled ‘ad hoc’.  Having 
these two examples, where the same theory is modified in a similar manner, and yet 
neither hypothesis acceptance is ad hoc, is another demonstration of why this conception 
of ad hocness does not capture the nature of ad hocness.  Of course, these examples are 
not conclusive evidence against the repeated modifications view.  A repeated 
modifications advocate might recognize the non-ad hocness of both of these 
modifications and still hold her view of ad hocness.  She might just modify her view to 
require more than, e.g., three modifications of this type for the set of modifications to be 
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deemed ad hoc.  Or, she might point out that both the Vulcan modification and the 
Neptune modification could be verified through observations, while the sorts of repeated 
modifications that she deems ad hoc are those that cannot be verified in such a way.21 
However, these examples, taken together, at least make one question the repeated 
modifications view.   
 
VI.  What If The Evidence Itself is Rejected? 
 
  One might claim that there is an additional type of ad hocness: that is, that a 
charge of ad hocness can be appropriate either when the conditions stated in section I of 
this chapter are fulfilled, or when all but the condition requiring the scientist to accept the 
recalcitrant evidence are fulfilled.  The second type of ad hocness, on this view, occurs 
when the scientist rejects the evidence, claiming that the evidence is false, or faulty, or 
something like that, where the scientist has no other evidence for this claim other than the 
tension that will arise for her theory.  Suppose, for example, that Ludmilla is a Newtonian 
and part of her (non-core) commitments includes the hypothesis that there are seven 
planets in the solar system.  Evidence comes to light that one of the planets has an 
anomalous orbit, given Newtonian laws of gravitation and motion, and given the 
hypothesis that there are seven planets in the solar system.  Ludmilla, who wishes to 
remain a Newtonian, dismisses this evidence as specious, without any real evidence to do 
so.  Someone that wants to claim the additional sense of ad hocness detailed above would 
                                                 
21 I discuss both of these possibilities in Chapter 1, section X and discard them as 
unacceptable characterizations of ad hocness.  I am bringing up these considerations, 
here, to acknowledge that the Neptune and Vulcan examples are not a set of decisive 
counter-examples to the repeated modifications view. 
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want to say that Ludmilla’s dismissal of the evidence is ad hoc.  There are four reasons 
why I wish to resist acknowledging this putative type of ad hocness.  Firstly, and most 
importantly, these sorts of cases do not seem to be cases of ad hocness.  There might well 
be something methodologically suspect going on: Ludmilla might be rightly accused of 
being dogmatic, or intellectually dishonest or lazy, but these are problems other than the 
problem of committing an ad hoc act.22 
 Secondly, treating this type of evidence rejection as ad hoc would cause ad 
hocness to sometimes be a virtue.  Suppose theory T is faced with disconfirming 
evidence E.  Charles, a proponent of T, rejects the evidence only because it conflicts with 
T.  Yet, T is really well confirmed.  So, a lot of the evidence for T is evidence against E.  
It might well be the case that Charles’s rejection of E is actually the appropriate move to 
make.  Yet, according to the second version of ad hocness, this rejection would qualify as 
ad hoc.  So, it would have to be the case that certain types of ad hoc acts are 
methodologically justified and, therefore, not always vices.  And, I claim, this is 
problematic.  
 Thirdly, if I were to claim that a charge of ad hocness could be appropriate in 
situations where the scientist rejects the evidence, I will get into one of two problems.  
Suppose I were to read the claim that there is no other evidence for the rejection 
hypothesis to mean that there is no other reason for the scientist to accept the hypothesis 
that the evidence is false or faulty other than it will save her theory from disconfirming 
evidence.  That will import all the psychological concerns that I discussed in Chapter 1.  
This reading would also create two different types of phenomena that could potentially be 
                                                 
22   See, for example, footnote 15 in this chapter.  
  
 169
charged with ad hocness: a psychological problem and a methodological problem. Or, I 
might read the no other evidence claim as stating that there is no evidence in the theory 
plus auxiliaries plus theoretical background for the rejection of the evidence.  However, 
there will likely not be any such evidence because the new evidence is disconfirming for 
the theory plus auxiliaries plus theoretical background.  The only way that there might be 
additional evidence would be if some other theory held by the scientist were already in 
tension with the theory for which the evidence was disconfirming.   
 Fourthly, it seems a virtue of my theory that there is only one vice of ad hocness.  
If I were to add another, it might seem arbitrary to stop at just two kinds.  Why not 
twelve?  And, the more kinds of ad hocness that are characterized, the less it seems that 
there is any such thing as a definitive vice of ad hocness: rather, it would seem as if 
people are just using it as a catchall term.  And I do not think that this is the case.  This 
last point is the least important of the three, as I already think that accepting the evidence 
rejection hypothesis, while sometimes potentially unwarranted, is a different sort of act 
than the sort of act that can be labeled ‘ad hoc’. 
 
VII.  Vagueness is to be Embraced – Or, At Least, to be Accepted 
 
 The fact that my account of ad hocness claims that the core of the theory must still 
be intact upon revision for that revision to qualify as potentially ad hoc might seem to be 
problematic.  After all, you might say, aren’t there going to be cases where it is not clear 
whether the acceptance of a hypothesis in the face of disconfirming evidence eliminates 
part of the core of a given theory?  Or, to use Leplin’s characterization of ‘essential 
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propositions’ in a theory (Leplin 1975 325), might not there be a time when the scientific 
community is split as to whether the modified theory counts as the same as the original?  
In response to worries like this, I agree that there is no clear-cut line between non-
essential and essential, or core and non-core: what constitutes the core and what doesn’t 
can be vague.  However, in many cases, a given element will clearly be part of the core.  
Geocentrism is definitely a part of the core of Ptolemaic astronomy, for example.  And, 
there are many cases where a given element will just as clearly not be a part of the core.  
As the line is vague, there will be times when it is indeterminate whether a proposed 
move qualifies as something that could be ad hoc or whether the move cannot so qualify 
because it is really a move between two different theories.  As vagueness, if it is even a 
problem, is a problem for almost all accounts of everything, I do not see it as a particular 
problem for me.   
 While the previous argument ought to be enough to convince the reader that 
vagueness is not unique to my account, I will take an even stronger line.  There are two 
ways to characterize this vagueness.  That the line between what qualifies as a potentially 
ad hoc act is vague may be compared to whether or not there are similar issues of 
vagueness in other philosophical theories.  Or, the vagueness of my account of ad 
hocness may be compared to the actions being labeled.  In the first case, there is reason to 
accept such vagueness.  In the second, there is reason to embrace it. 
 My view does have an element of vagueness to it, according to the first 
characterization of vagueness.  The line between the core and the non-core parts of a 
theory is vague.  However, many – if not all (philosophical) theories – involve vagueness 
in some manner.  Is an object observable or is it not?  Is this animal definitely part of one 
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family or is it definitely part of some other?  Just because there is vagueness in all of 
these examples does not mean that there is not a real distinction between objects that are 
definitely observable and those that are definitely unobservable, or animals that are 
definitely part of one family and animals that are definitely part of some other.  There 
might be some difficulty, for example, in determining whether a platypus is part of one 
particular family but it is easy to determine whether a cat and a beetle are a part of the 
same family.  And, I claim, there is a real distinction between hypothesis acceptances that 
can be evaluated for ad hocness and those that cannot.  So, this type of vagueness is no 
more a problem for my view than for pretty much any other philosophical view.  
 Let us consider the second characterization of vagueness.  It is true that what 
counts as ad hoc on my view will sometimes be vague.  However, what counts as ad hoc 
is vague.  There is only a vague border between what counts as a modification of an 
existing theory as a response to recalcitrant evidence, and throwing over a theory for a 
new one in the face of recalcitrant evidence.  Yet, potentially ad hoc acts are the 
adoptions of hypotheses to reconcile a theory with recalcitrant evidence.  So, if the 
division between the sorts of acts that can be considered ad hoc and those that cannot is 
vague, so much the better that my view is vague in the same way as what it is 
categorizing.  A vague concept needs a vague analysis.  And, I have done this.  Thus, this 
vagueness is actually a virtue of my account.   
 There is an additional way in which my account is vague, but where this 
vagueness is a virtue for my account.  In footnote 8 of this chapter, I claim that my 
account will also settle situations where the probability of the evidence given the 
accepted theory in conjunction with its auxiliaries is extremely low but not zero.  There 
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will be a vagueness in the statistical threshold for these cases: what counts as close 
enough to zero, what clearly doesn’t count as one of these cases.  This vagueness is a 
virtue for my theory because questions of ad hocness only arise when there is recalcitrant 
evidence.  In cases where, instead of logical inconsistency, there is statistical 
improbability, there will be a vagueness in what counts as statistically improbable.  My 
theory mimics this vagueness.23 
 
 
VIII.  How Can New Theories Ever Come To Fruition Without Committing Ad Hoc Acts? 
 
 I have previously discussed the criterion for acts that can potentially be ad hoc.  
The following two actions fail to meet these criteria.  However, it is worth looking at 
these in more detail, as they are actions that, at first blush, appear to be counter-examples 
to my characterization of ad hocness.  1.  A very general statement is accepted into a 
theory in the face of disconfirming evidence.  It seems impossible that a theory entail 
such a general statement.  Therefore, any time a very general statement is accepted into a 
theory under the right circumstances, this acceptance must be ad hoc.  But, of course, we 
wouldn’t want to label all of these acts as ad hoc.  2.  In the case of new or vague 
theories, all hypothesis acceptances will be labeled ad hoc under my theory.  This is 
because such theories are not committed to much and, therefore, will entail little or 
nothing.  I will describe the objections in a bit more detail and then show why they are 
not really objections to my view at all.   
                                                 
23   I discuss these sorts of cases in more detail in section XVII of this chapter.   
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 Take the first part of the objection.  Either the acceptance of these really general, 
law-like statements requires discarding part of the core of the theory, or it does not.  
Suppose that it does require this.  If so, accepting this general statement is to take option 
A, an act that is not a candidate for ad hocness.  An example: suppose a theory consists in 
two commitments.  1.  All violets are purple.  2.  All violets grow only in Africa.  Then, 
suppose Isaiah accepts the law-like statement, ‘All temperate zones contain a species of 
violet that grows there’.  In order to accept this statement, Isaiah must discard (2) and, 
therefore, Isaiah is really taking option A, as he is throwing over his original theory for a 
new one. 
 If the acceptance of a law-like statement does not require discarding part of the 
core, then it becomes a matter of determining whether or not the proper entailment is 
there.  It is true that we would need a very strong set of postulates on the side of the 
theory plus auxiliaries to entail a general, law-like statement.  However, the theory itself 
contains law-like statements (for example, Newtonian theory contains statements such as 
‘all changes in a body’s inertia will be a result of a force applied to that body’) and law-
like statements are certainly strong enough to entail other law-like statements.  The 
proper entailment won’t always exist.  However, due to the strength of the statements 
already found in the theory, neither will it be the case that the proper entailment never 
occurs or too rarely occurs.   
 Now turn to the second claim. Suppose the theory in question is one in its initial 
stages or one that is very vague in its commitments.  The theory is not committed to 
much and the theory, in conjunction with its auxiliaries, does not predict much at all.  The 
worry is, then, that if a hypothesis is accepted into such a theory, it will be highly 
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unlikely that the theory will entail (the high probability of) this particular hypothesis.  
This is because it will be highly unlikely that the theory entails (the high probability of) 
much of anything. So, all such hypothesis acceptances would be labeled ad hoc on my 
account, according to this claim. 
 There is a fairly straightforward answer to this claim, as well.  Given such a vague 
theory, it is highly unlikely that any evidence that comes to light will be recalcitrant for 
the theory. A charge of ad hocness can appropriate only where a hypothesis is accepted as 
a result of recalcitrant evidence.  In this sort of case, such a hypothesis acceptance is not 
the sort that can be judged to be ad hoc or not.   
 There is another response to this second claim.24  Suppose the theory, while quite 
nebulous, is firmed up enough that the evidence is actually in tension with it and its 
auxiliaries.  If a theory is simplistic or vague enough, the modifications in the face of this 
evidence will not fulfill the criteria for potentially ad hoc acts.  Suppose the theory 
currently has only two main parts.  Now suppose that recalcitrant evidence arises.  This 
evidence will cause a proponent to discard at least one of these two parts.  And, if a 
theory only has two parts, discarding one would seem to radically modify the theory.  
Yet, radically modifying a theory is to really choose option A, while option B is the only 
sort of act that may be ad hoc.  As an example, consider the following theory: 1.  The 
Earth is the center of all the fixed stars and 2.  All of the planets revolve around it.  For 
this vague theory, evidence would need to point to the Earth’s not being the center, or 
that which the planets revolve around, e.g., for it to be considered recalcitrant.  In order to 
                                                 
24   The response to be outlined is similar in nature to the response to the first claim.  The 
main difference is that, in response to the first claim, we did not have to suppose evidence 
recalcitrant for the theory.   
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make the theory coherent in the face of evidence such as this, a proponent must introduce 
the following sort of hypothesis: the Earth revolves around the Sun.  But, the addition of 
this sort of hypothesis radically changes the theory.  No longer is it a geocentric theory: 
now it is a heliocentric one.  And, this sort of radical change is the sort of change that 
amounts to throwing over the first theory for a new, heliocentric theory.  
 
 
IX.  How Does My Account of Ad Hocness Decide the Ptolemaic Example? 
 
 Now that I have addressed the most immediate objections to my account, I will 
apply my test to the Ptolemy case.  In my characterization of Ptolemy’s original view, 
Ptolemaic theory had the eight commitments discussed in Chapter 1, section IV.  These 
commitments included, among other things, the commitment to heavenly bodies’ orbits 
being concentric with the earth and the commitment to heavenly bodies describing 
perfectly circular orbits, where the bodies describe equal arcs in equal times in reference 
to the center of the Earth.  Then, the contraindicating evidence arises that seems to 
indicate that the sun’s orbit is not a perfectly circular one with the orbit’s center located at 
the center of the Earth.   
 The act being evaluated is Ptolemy’s act of accepting the eccentric hypothesis in 
response to the sun’s anomalous orbit.  The agent is Ptolemy and the time t is whatever 
time it was after the appearance of the contraindicating evidence that the eccentric 
hypothesis was accepted.  The background B consists in the remnants of Aristotelian 
astronomy that were still lying about, as well as the then-current views on movement, 
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gravity, vision, etc.  The disconfirming evidence is the observations that the sun’s orbit 
did not appear to be perfectly circular around the Earth: instead of its apparent seasonal 
movement being a regular back and forth, it appeared to speed up and slow down.25  The 
question then arises as to whether the core of Ptolemaic theory, the pared-down 
auxiliaries and the (formerly) recalcitrant evidence together entailed that the sun’s orbit 
must lie on the eccentric postulated by Ptolemy.26 
 In the face of this recalcitrant evidence, Ptolemy could have taken option A – he 
could have discarded his theory – or he could have taken option C – he could have lived 
with the tension between the recalcitrant evidence and his theory.  Instead, it looks like he 
took option B – he accepted a hypothesis into his theory in order to reconcile the theory 
with the recalcitrant evidence.   
 Let us make sure that Ptolemy really did take option B.  So, we need to make sure 
that this hypothesis acceptance fulfilled the initial criteria for ad hocness.  Firstly, there 
must exist disconfirming evidence to the theory.  It seems clear that this criterion is 
fulfilled: the sun’s orbit did not appear to be moving in the manner postulated by 
Ptolemaic theory.  Secondly, Ptolemy must have accepted a new hypothesis into his 
theory.  As discussed in Chapter 1, section IV, there is reason to believe that Ptolemy did 
                                                 
25 For a reminder of the details of the sun’s anomaly, refer back to Chapter 1, section IV. 
 
26 Just like in the discussion of Neptune and Vulcan, I am stating the hypothesis as the 
‘eccentric’ hypothesis for ease of locution.  This characterization of the hypothesis is not 
meant to imply that the theory already needed to have a definition of the term ‘eccentric’, 
for example.  Again, as in the discussion of Neptune and Vulcan, neither is this 
hypothesis intended to be exceedingly (overly) specific.  This characterization of the 
hypothesis is supposed to be shorthand for something like, ‘the sun must be on a perfectly 
circular orbit in relation to the center of the orbit, of a certain general size, whose center 
is not coincident with the center of the Earth.’ 
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do this.  However, let us stipulate that he was so doing.  Thirdly, Ptolemy must have 
accepted the recalcitrant evidence.  Ptolemy did seem to be taking the recalcitrant 
evidence seriously and did take it as a real problem for his astronomical theory.27   
 Additionally, the core of Ptolemaic theory must have remained intact: that is, the 
recalcitrant evidence must not directly threaten the core of his theory.  Part of Ptolemaic 
theory was that the sun and the other heavenly bodies revolved around the earth on a 
perfectly circular orbit.  This appears to be an essential element of Ptolemaic theory: the 
reason that the sun and the other heavenly bodies were supposed to move in perfectly 
circular orbits was because they were made of homogeneous materials and were, thus, 
spherical and moved within the ether, which was also homogeneous and, therefore, 
spherical.  And at least three of Ptolemy’s theoretical commitments involved the perfect 
and homogeneous nature of the fixed stars and the heavenly bodies, to whose 
composition Ptolemy attributed the nature of these bodies’ movements.  However, 
Ptolemaic theory also contained several non-essential hypotheses: one of these, for 
example, explained why the sun and the heavenly bodies similarly appear not to move in 
perfectly circular orbits around the center of the Earth by postulating the ecliptic – the 
angled plane on which these bodies’ orbits are situated.  So, as Ptolemaic theory already 
had non-core components that reconciled the core with some seeming anomalous, non-
circular motion.  Therefore, it appears that the recalcitrant evidence in this case is not a 
direct threat to the core of Ptolemaic theory.   
                                                 
27 Again, for the quotational support and additional details, I refer the reader back to 
Chapter 1, section IV. 
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 Given the core of Ptolemaic theory plus the pared-down auxiliaries and the 
(previously) disconfirming evidence, what (if anything) was entailed?  It looks like 
Ptolemaic theory had, as a consequence, some sort of modificatory hypothesis of the 
following sort: even though the sun really does move in a perfectly circular orbit, it does 
not appear to do so, as a result of some sort of sleight of hand or trick of the eye, or 
difference in plane.28  The next question that arises is whether this is enough of a 
commitment that we might claim that Ptolemy was committed to the following 
hypothesis: the sun must be moving on an eccentric orbit with a given radius whose 
center is at a given position.  Did the core plus auxiliaries and background plus the 
evidence entail this hypothesis?  The answer to this question is ‘no’.  There is a 
difference between one’s theory entailing that something must be going on and entailing 
a specific hypothesis.29  There are other options, here, and it seems arbitrary as to which 
one Ptolemy accepts to reconcile his theory with the sun’s anomaly.  He could posit 
epicycles, or eccentrics, or some combination of both, or some other geometric device 
available to him.   
                                                 
28   Ptolemy himself says:  
           Since the next thing is to explain the apparent irregularity of the sun, it is first 
necessary to assume in general that the motion of the planets in the direction contrary to 
the movement of the heavens are all regular and circular by nature, like the movement of 
the universe in the other direction.  That is, the straight lines, conceived as revolving the 
stars or their circles, cut off in equal times on absolutely all circumferences equal angles 
at the centres of each; and their apparent irregularities result from the positions and 
arrangements of the circles on their spheres through which they produce these 
movements, but no departure from their unchangeableness has really occurred in their 
nature in regard to the supposed disorder of their appearances. (Ptolemy 86) 
 
29   To accept the hypothesis that something must have happened is really the same as 
taking option C – acknowledging that the evidence is a problem for one’s theory and 
living with the tension.  I will discuss this point in more detail in section XI of this 
chapter. 
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 And Ptolemy himself did not think that maintaining both the disconfirming 
evidence and his theory committed him to the eccentric hypothesis.  When a planet 
exhibits only one anomaly, like the sun30: 
 The hypotheses [of epicycles and eccentrics] are interchangeable when, in the 
case of the hypothesis of the epicycle, the ratio of the epicycle’s radius to the radius 
of the circle carrying it is the same as, in the case of the hypothesis of eccentricity, 
the ratio of the line between the centres (that is, between the eye and the centre of 
the eccentric circle) to the eccentric circle’s radius; with the added conditions that 
the star move on the epicycle from the apogee in the direction of the movement of 
the heavens with the same angular velocity as the epicycle moves on the circle 
concentric with the eye in the direction opposite to that of the heavens, and that the 
star move regularly on the eccentric circle with the same angular velocity also and 
in the direction opposite to the movement of the heavens. (Ptolemy 88) 
 
Yet, Ptolemy did accept the eccentric hypothesis.  Therefore, Ptolemy committed an ad 
hoc act, on my account.31   
 
 
  
                                                 
30  See, e.g., Ptolemy 93. 
 
31  One might take issue with the conclusion that Ptolemy’s acceptance of the eccentric 
hypothesis is ad hoc and, so, arbitrary and a vicious act.  After all, there are other vices or 
virtues that a hypothesis acceptance might have.  And, in this case, the eccentric 
hypothesis was simpler, according to Ptolemy, than the epicyclic hypothesis.  So there 
was a reason – simplicity – to choose the eccentric hypothesis over the epicyclic one.  
However, thinking in this manner is to confuse separate issues.   Of course hypothesis 
acceptances can have all sorts of different virtues and vices.  Of course these virtues and 
vices have to be weighed against each other in order to determine an appropriate course 
of action.  However, just because some hypothesis has, say, a certain virtue, that does not 
mean that an already identified vice disappears. To say that would be similar to claiming 
that, since I held the door for you and bought you flowers, I magically was no longer late 
to our date.  You might overlook my lateness because of the politeness and the flowers.  
However, my being polite cannot reverse time so that I actually was not late.   
    That is, there might be reasons to end up accepting a hypothesis despite the acceptance 
being ad hoc.  I wish to stress the ‘despite’ because the acceptance is still ad hoc: the 
hypothesis was not appropriately entailed.  I will discuss hypotheses having other virtues 
and vices when responding to the objection found in section XIII of this chapter. 
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X.  A Final Illustration of the Ways in Which One Can Fail to Commit an Action Where 
the Charge of Ad Hocness Can Be Appropriate 
 
 
 In order to motivate the reader to think about her intuitions concerning ad 
hocness, I introduced the example of Planck’s constant in chapter 1, section II.  I will 
return to it here, as I think that this example helps underscore the differences, discussed 
in the first section of this chapter, between the introduction of a hypothesis and the 
acceptance of one, as well as the difference between discarding a non-core component of 
a theory and discarding a core one.   
Planck’s Constant: At the beginning of the 20th century, scientists were committed 
to either Rayleigh-Jeans statistical-mechanical theory of blackbody radiation or to 
Wien’s thermodynamical theory, or to some combination of both.  There arose 
disconfirming evidence for both: shorter wavelengths did not produce the infinite 
amount of energy predicted by Rayleigh-Jeans and the observed emissions from 
longer wavelengths were not in accord with Wien’s theory.  In order to reconcile 
theories of blackbody radiation with the disconfirming evidence, Planck postulated 
a constant, which ended up limiting the wavelengths possible. 
 
 Both Rayleigh-Jeans and Wien’s theories contained a presupposition that there 
could be no minimum unit: so, for example, Rayleigh-Jeans theory presupposed that there 
could be no minimum wavelength for the electromagnetic radiation being emitted by a 
body.  And both, as was noted, encountered major disconfirming evidence in one part of 
the spectrum or another.  Planck successfully solved this blackbody problem by 
introducing a constant, h, which enabled him to reconcile what had been postulated about 
electromagnetic energy with the observed data concerning the intensity of the radiation 
emitted by a blackbody at certain wavelengths.  Yet, this constant, in that it limits the 
energy being emitted to discrete amounts proportional to the frequencies, leads to the 
implication that energy itself is quantized and that energy cannot be emitted at every 
possible wavelength but, instead, only at certain wavelengths. 
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 It has been claimed that Planck’s explanation was not considered by Planck 
himself to really be an explanation of the phenomena but, rather, a mathematical formula 
that coincided with the observed phenomena.3233  Suppose this is the case, and that 
Planck did not treat h as anything more than a mathematical ‘fix’ to the blackbody 
problem and, so, did not accept the consequence that electromagnetic energy is 
quantized.  In this case, Planck introduced the hypothesis of h but did not accept it as part 
of his theory of energy. 
 On this reading of the Planck example, Planck didn’t accept the hypothesis when 
he introduced h.  This makes its situation very different from Ptolemy’s because Ptolemy 
accepted the eccentric hypothesis in order to reconcile his theory with the sun’s anomaly.  
Merely introducing some hypothesis, as Planck did, without committing oneself or one’s 
theory to the consequences of that hypothesis, is not the sort of act where the charge of ad 
hocness is appropriate.  He was simply using the hypothesis as a placeholder, so that 
scientists could get accurate results when estimating blackbody radiation at specific 
frequencies – something that was difficult to do, previously. 
 Accepting the hypothesis to reconcile one’s theory with the disconfirming 
evidence is one criterion for ad hocness.  And, according to the reading of the Planck 
                                                 
32  See, e.g., Thomas Kuhn. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas.  Blackbody Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 1894-1912.  Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1978.   
 
33  The way that Planck introduces his constant, h, is quite suggestive of this reading of 
Planck’s actions.  When discussing stationary energy distributions and how to determine 
them, Planck says: “after the stationary energy distribution is thus determined using a 
constant, h, […]” (Planck 82) The reason why this quote is suggestive is because Planck 
speaks of h as a constant, not the constant, and because he speaks of it only as a constant, 
not as the more fundamental number which it has come to be understood. 
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example just discussed, it did not fulfill this criterion.  However, many people have 
thought that Planck did something ad hoc in the Planck example.  In keeping with their 
intuitions, let us suppose that Planck really did accept the h hypothesis in order to 
reconcile blackbody radiation theory with the evidence.  Would this have been a 
hypothesis acceptance where the charge of ad hocness could apply?  In order to answer 
this question, we first need to make sure that this example fulfills the other criteria for ad 
hocness.  There is disconfirming evidence: the actual blackbody radiation curve, that 
peaks at a certain, middle frequency and vanishes to zero on both the very short and the 
very long frequencies.  Neither the Rayeigh-Jeans theory nor Wien’s theory predicted this 
particular curve.  Next, we need to determine what theory Planck held, so that we may 
determine what constitutes the core of the theory.   
 It is not clear as to whether Planck held Wien’s view or Rayleigh-Jeans’s, or both, 
or neither.  However, suppose he was committed to Rayleigh-Jeans, which held that 
blackbody radiation consisted in standing waves.  This would have been held against a 
background that included, among other things, Maxwell’s wave equation.  Part of the 
core of Planck’s theory, then, is that electromagnetic energy is wave-like in nature – 
hence, the standing waves of blackbody radiation.  Is some part of the theory’s core going 
to be discarded, in this example?  Yes.  The modified theory includes the claim that 
electromagnetic energy is quantized.  This replaces the central claim just discussed.  So, 
Planck’s modified theory replaces the previous theory/theories of blackbody radiation.  
So, again, this example fails a criterion for ad hocness.  Discarding a part of the core of a 
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theory is the same as taking option A, whereas the charge of ad hocness can be 
appropriate only when the scientist takes option B.34   
 
 
XI.  The Philosopher’s Myth of Ptolemy and My Account of Ad Hocness 
 
 I have been speaking throughout this work about Ptolemy.  There is one important 
Ptolemaic example that I need to address, as it is the sort of example used by the repeated 
modifications proponents.  In fact, I introduce the philosopher’s Ptolemy case in chapter 
1, section X as an example amenable, at first blush, to the repeated modifications 
account. 
 A further examination of this case demonstrates not only that my test for ad 
hocness will be in accord with intuitions concerning ad hocness, but also that this 
example, properly fleshed out, shares a feature found in my account with the lab-break-in 
case introduced in chapter 2, section VI: that the acceptance of a given hypothesis is 
arbitrary, so that scientists are jumping the gun in accepting it. 
 There are two ways of reading the Ptolemy case, as the case is underspecified.  
Either each additional epicycle is entailed given the core of the theory, the (previously) 
disconfirming evidence and the pared-down auxiliaries, or they are not.  When this case 
is gestured towards as a canonical case of ad hocness, I argue that it is the latter case they 
are implying.  This is because there is a difference between unwisely being dogmatic 
                                                 
34   The example would not have turned out differently had Wien’s, or a combination of 
Wien and Rayleigh-Jeans’s, theory been held.  In order to claim that energy is quantized, 
a central claim for each of these possibilities must be discarded.   
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about one’s theory and committing an ad hoc move, as in the second case. A scientist 
may hold onto a theory when it seems clear that that theory has been seriously 
disconfirmed, or has become too unwieldy to use, or is likely to be false, or does not deal 
with evidence as well as some other theory, and, in so doing, non-ad hocly continue to 
modify her theory in the face of disconfirming evidence.  In cases such as these, the 
scientist is not at fault for her theory modifications (barring other vices), while potentially 
being at fault for holding onto her theory.    I argue that, if we are to examine the two 
possibilities in detail – the first, where the hypotheses are entailed and the second where 
they are not – we will want to call the latter ad hoc and the former not.   
 Let us examine the case where each additional epicycle is entailed.  According to 
the Ptolemaic system, Mercury is located on an epicycle, which is itself orbiting on an 
equant – the center of motion that is not the center of the planet’s orbit – where its 
rotation is counter to that of the epicycle’s upon which Mercury moves.35  Now suppose 
that, at its apogee, Mercury is found to be further away from the Earth than this model 
predicts.  Correspondingly, it is closer to the Earth at its perigee than the model predicts.  
And when it is between the apogee and perigee, Mercury appears to be moving back and 
forth in the sky more than it would given its one epicycle and its equant.  This evidence is 
disconfirming for Ptolemaic theory, as the actual planetary positions are different than 
those postulated by the theory. 
                                                 
35   The epicycle and equant are needed to explain the two anomalies found in Mercury’s 
movements, that seem to prevent it from following a perfectly circular orbit: 1.  The 
elongation and shortening of the angle between the sun and the planet; 2.  The unequal 
time that the planet appears to take to move through the different parts of the zodiac. 
(Ptolemy 291) 
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 Given that all heavenly bodies must move along circular orbits, and given that 
Mercury is correspondingly nearer and farther away than it ought to be, it looks like the 
core of Ptolemaic theory, in conjunction with its auxiliaries and this new evidence, entails 
an additional epicycle: one that orbits around the previous epicycle in the opposite 
direction and that has a certain diameter.  Therefore, Ptolemy’s proponent, in adopting 
the additional epicycle, did not commit an ad hoc act. 
 Ptolemy’s proponent then makes more observations of Mercury’s movements.  
He notices that the addition of the new epicycle seems to make the model fit the data 
much better.  However, he now has a better telescope and realizes that there are now 
some additional anomalous data points.  Mercury appears to have, in places, too much or 
too little retrograde motion.36  Also, Mercury is not quite in the same plane at its apogee 
than at its perigee.  These differences are all quite small but are real differences in 
Mercury’s actual motion from its predicted motion through the heavens.  Ptolemy’s 
proponent still wants to save Ptolemaic theory from this disconfirming evidence.  The 
core of the theory, in conjunction with the auxiliaries and the newly found evidence, 
entails a very small additional epicycle, traveling in the same direction as the first, upon 
which Mercury orbits.  According to my account, this epicycle addition was not ad hoc, 
nor was the previous.  And suppose that this scenario unfolds however many more times 
that you might wish it to.  Upon reflection, what do we think about this account?  We 
might think that Ptolemy’s proponent ought to change to a new theory, as this theory 
seems quite complicated to use for prediction.  We might think that Ptolemy’s proponent 
                                                 
36 That is, it does not appear to be far enough in one direction between the apogee and the 
perigee at certain points, and at others, it appears to be too far in one direction than it 
should be. 
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is being overly dogmatic in his insistence on maintaining this theory – like we might 
think overly dogmatic the person who refuses to recognize evidence just because it 
disconfirms her theory.  However, given the commitment to Ptolemaic theory and given 
the evidence, I claim that these hypothesis acceptances would not be seen as ad hoc, nor 
does my view so label them.   
 In the second way of filling out the Ptolemaic example, there is no entailment, nor 
the entailment of a high probability for each additional epicycle.  As opposed to the case 
above, suppose the movements were such that there were no unique solutions to each of 
the anomalies discovered in Mercury’s orbit.  That is, the core of Ptolemaic theory, in 
conjunction with its auxiliaries and the new evidence, did not entail even the high 
objective probability of one particular hypothesis because there was more than one way 
to add epicycles, or other geometric apparati.  Now suppose that Ptolemy’s proponent 
still insists on accepting some set of additional epicycle hypotheses in order to explain the 
anomalous evidence.  In this case, the proponent adding these epicycles is jumping to 
conclusions.  There is no reason to accept these additional epicycles.  And, on my 
account, these hypothesis acceptances would be considered ad hoc.  I argue, too, that we 
would agree that these acceptances are, in fact, ad hoc.   
 Notice that my account does not need to have multiple examples of these 
epicycles in order to label one acceptance of one epicycle as ‘ad hoc’.  This seems more 
in accord with our intuitions: doesn’t it seem like something is wrong in this case before 
we add some (large) number of epicycles?  Again, there is a distinction to be made 
between keeping a bad theory while accepting what the theory entails (as in the first 
reading) and making ad hoc moves (as in the second).   
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 What do the second reading of the Ptolemy example and the lab-break-in example 
have in common?  They are both clear examples of ad hoc hypothesis acceptances.  And 
they are both cases where the scientists involved jumped to conclusions.  This is to be 
contrasted with the Neptune case, or the Vulcan case, or the first reading of the 
philosopher’s Ptolemy case, where scientists did not jump to conclusions because the 
hypotheses acceptances were not arbitrary.  The fact that the scientists jumped to 
conclusions in the cases that we consider ad hoc is the reason for that judgment and also 
support for my view that ad hocness just is the vice of arbitrariness or jumping to 
conclusions.   
 
XII.  ‘Something Must Have Happened’, or, Engineering Our Savior Hypothesis to Get 
Around the Entailment Requirement 
 
 
 In order to motivate this objection, let us turn back to Brady and the lab break-in.  
This seems a clear example of an ad hoc hypothesis acceptance.  Yet, maybe Brady’s 
mistake was in accepting such a specific hypothesis.  What if, instead, Brady had 
accepted the hypothesis that ‘something must have happened’, or the hypothesis that 
there was some sort of unspecified action that caused the temperature written in the note 
book not to be 357°C?  Wouldn’t the core of the theory, the auxiliaries and the 
temperature evidence entail this sort of hypothesis?  Suppose a charge of ad hocness can 
be appropriate for the acceptance of the ‘something must have happened’ hypothesis. It 
looks like Brady will circumvent my standards by accepting a hypothesis of this type, 
when it looks like Brady is still doing something wrong in accepting such a hypothesis. 
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 To address this objection, we need to contrast this scenario with what Brady did 
actually do, which was to accept the hypothesis that someone broke into his lab and 
changed the information.  In the latter case, Brady is accepting the hypothesis that 
someone broke into the lab in order to explain the anomalous evidence.  In the former, 
there is a conspicuous failure to explain anything at all.  Brady, in accepting the 
hypothesis that ‘something must have happened’, is really just accepting that he does not 
know what happened: that is, he is taking option C.  Brady knows that the temperature 
evidence is disconfirming for his theory but his theory, given its state at the time and the 
state of its background evidence, does not have the resources to resolve the issue.  He is 
accepting that there is a problem for his theory but is living with the tension for the time 
being.  Taking option C might be a problem in and of itself; however, deciding not to fix 
anything is not to do something ad hoc.  It is to decide not to act at all, or to decide not to 
act for the time being.37 
 
XIII.  But Doesn’t Ad Hocness Admit of Degrees? 
 
 I have already discussed, in section VII, why vagueness is not an issue for my 
account: there will be, for example, gray areas of whether a charge of ad hocness can be 
appropriate and there will also be areas where it is clear whether or not such a charge 
could be appropriate. However, there is a related objection that goes as follows.  Suppose 
issues of vagueness are tabled.  Still, there seem to be degrees of ad hocness that my 
                                                 
37   In Chapter 1, section XI, I show that ad hocness is defined in terms of an action: a 
commitment of some illicit move.  For this reason, it would seem additionally strange to 
think of the non-action described above is a case where ad hocness could be considered.  
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account doesn’t address.  On my account, hypothesis acceptances are either ad hoc or 
they are not.  Yet, the objection continues, this dichotomy does not capture the notion of 
ad hocness because there are some putative hypothesis acceptances that seem to be more 
ad hoc than others.38  So, for example, the hypothesis that the substance wasn’t really 
mercury, or that Brady’s assistant wrote the temperature down wrong, or the hypothesis 
that the lab was not at standard atmospheric pressure, might seem a lot more likely than 
the break-in hypothesis, or the hypothesis that Brady’s evil nemesis changed the datum.  
On my account, if any of these hypotheses were to be accepted into the mercury-boiling-
temperature theory, the act would be ad hoc.  However, according to the objection, it 
seems natural to think that accepting either of the last two hypotheses ought to count as 
more ad hoc than accepting one of the first two.   
 It is true that my account does not admit of degrees in the way that the objection 
seems to desire.  However, the reason that certain hypotheses seem to be more far-fetched 
than others is not a result of them being more ad hoc, and to think otherwise is to be not 
careful enough in distinguishing between potential problems.  As I discuss in chapter 1, 
the label ‘ad hoc’ denotes a failure in procedure.  The scientist, in accepting an ad hoc 
hypothesis, is committing a procedural error.  One either commits a procedural error or 
one doesn’t.  So, a hypothesis acceptance is either ad hoc or it is not.  However, in 
                                                 
38   The thought that certain hypothesis acceptances seem to be much more ad hoc than 
others is related to the following worry.  I claim that ad hocness equates with 
arbitrariness: why accept this hypothesis when there are other (equally as) likely 
hypotheses that would reconcile the theory with the evidence.  Yet, not all potential 
hypotheses seem equally as likely – or, even, almost as likely.  And, therefore, there 
might well be a good reason to accept a hypothesis that seems much less ad hoc than its 
competitor, which, as it seems especially ad hoc, is not really a competitor at all.  The 
answer to the worry just stated should be found in my discussion of the worry that ad 
hocness ought to admit of degrees.   
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individual cases, there may be epistemological or pragmatic reasons for certain 
hypotheses to seem more or less likely.  That is to say, a scientist might have a higher 
subjective degree of belief in one hypothesis over another, while recognizing that both 
would be ad hoc to accept. There are many vices and virtues, of which ad hocness is only 
one vice.  After being judged for ad hocness, a hypothesis acceptance can be found guilty 
of some other vice, or of some virtue.  And the presence of these other vices and virtues 
are the cause of the scientist’s greater or lesser subjective degrees of belief in certain 
hypotheses.   
 In the Ptolemy-sun’s anomaly example, I note that it could have been rationally 
permissible for Ptolemy to accept the eccentric hypothesis – despite the ad hocness of this 
act – if the simplicity of this hypothesis outweighed its ad hocness.  If this were the case, 
and the eccentric hypothesis really was much easier to work with, the simplicity makes it 
a pragmatically better candidate to accept than the epicyclic hypothesis: the two are no 
longer equal in their candidacy (according to pragmatic concerns) for reconciling 
Ptolemaic theory with the evidence.  Now, suppose that we have an analogous situation 
to the eccentric-epicyclic case, with one major exception: there is no added virtue for one 
of the candidates.  Instead, suppose we know the eccentric hypothesis to be false.  A 
similar situation arises: to accept either hypothesis would be to commit an ad hoc act, 
because neither hypothesis is entailed by the theory and the evidence.  However, the 
hypotheses are no longer equal candidates epistemologically because the eccentric 
hypothesis has the additional vice of being false.  This combination of virtues and vices 
in addition to ad hocness or non-ad hocness is what causes the inequality of hypothesis 
acceptances to arise.  What is important to note, however, is that it is not through degrees 
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of ad hocness that the inequality arises: rather, it is through the addition of virtues or 
vices to some of the candidate hypotheses.   
 This sort of answer might seem strange.  After all, wasn’t the greater simplicity of 
the eccentric hypothesis an additional reason for Ptolemy to prefer it to the epicyclic 
hypothesis?  And so, perhaps, it is no longer really arbitrary to pick the eccentric over the 
epicyclic.  If it is no longer arbitrary, how can my account still label its acceptance as ad 
hoc?  In response to the question, ‘why accept this one and not that one?’, one might 
respond, ‘because this one is simpler’.   
 However, this thinking misinterprets my view.  There is no difference, 
methodologically, in accepting one hypothesis over another if the core of the theory, the 
pared-down auxiliaries and the evidence entails neither.  Either one will be entailed or 
none will be.  The fact that the eccentric hypothesis might be simpler does not speak to its 
being entailed or not.  If a hypothesis is not entailed, then it is arbitrary to pick that one 
over another that is also not entailed.  To accept one is to commit a procedural mistake: it 
is always a procedural mistake, in the relevant circumstances, to accept a non-entailed 
hypothesis such as the eccentric. 
 It is only in particular circumstances, as described in the Ptolemy-sun’s anomaly 
example described above, that it might end up being rationally permissible to accept a 
hypothesis – despite its being ad hoc on my account. A given hypothesis with a certain 
additional virtue in a certain circumstance might boost the scientist’s degree of belief in 
that hypothesis such that it might be permissible to accept that hypothesis over others.  
Even in cases where the scientist does not accept a hypothesis but, instead, uses it as a 
place-holder, the presence of these additional virtues and vices will make certain 
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candidates seem more or less appropriate for the job – even though the acceptance of any 
of them would be ad hoc.  A good example of this sort of circumstance is the Planck case.  
When I discussed the Planck case in section X, I entertained the idea that Planck might 
have merely introduced the constant h into his blackbody radiation theory.  In this case, 
he would have been using the hypothesis as a placeholder, so that he and other scientists 
could get accurate results when estimating blackbody radiation at specific frequencies. 
Previously, it was very difficult to get such accurate results at all frequencies.  And, this 
additional ease and accuracy was a very good reason for Planck to use such a constant as 
a placeholder.  
 In sum, accepting a hypothesis in the appropriate situation where this hypothesis 
is not entailed in the appropriate way is analogous to not following the proper procedures 
when flying a plane off a runway.  One either follows the proper procedures or one 
doesn’t.  This sort of methodological point does not admit of degrees. Where the seeming 
degrees of acceptability come in is in examining whether a given hypothesis has some 
additional virtue or vice that, for that specific circumstance, might give the scientist some 
epistemological or pragmatic reason for embracing that hypothesis, even though 
accepting said hypothesis would be an ad hoc act because the scientist would not be 
following the proper procedures in so doing.   
 
XIV.  An Objection Concerning the Use of Objective Probability 
 
 So far, the cases discussed where the charge of ad hocness could be appropriate 
have either ended up being non-ad hoc because the appropriate strict entailment existed, 
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or ad hoc because it didn’t.  I haven’t discussed any cases where the core of the theory, 
the auxiliaries and the evidence entailed the high probability of a hypothesis.  Yet, I have 
allowed that a hypothesis acceptance can be non-ad hoc if its high objective probability is 
appropriately entailed.  I did not allow for this probability to be a subjective one because 
of the worries that arose for subjective probabilities when discussing Strevens in chapter 
2, as well as for the psychology worries that arose when discussing Hempel’s definition 
of ad hocness.  However, it has been notoriously hard to explain what it is to have high 
objective probabilities in a completely deterministic theory and it has been notoriously 
hard to come up with a comprehensive theory of objective probabilities.39   
 I make no claims about whether there might arise a plausible, comprehensive 
theory of these probabilities, although I remain cautiously optimistic.  Even if there were 
no such comprehensive theory, there are still individual cases where theories do entail 
objective probabilities, such as certain interpretations of quantum mechanics that assign 
objective probabilities to events.40  And this sort of objective probability is fairly 
unproblematic. The reason why I allow the entailment of the high objective probability of 
a hypothesis is to allow for the testing for ad hocness in the case of a non-deterministic 
theory.  Take the GRW interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example.  There is, for 
macroscopic systems, a high objective probability of a nearly immediate collapse at any 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Carnap, R. Logical Foundations of Probability.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  1950 
 
40   In addition to collapse theories of quantum mechanics, such as GRW theory, where 
there are objective probabilities assigned to collapses at given times, there are the even 
more unobjectionable objective probabilities found in atomic decay: a given particle’s 
chance of decaying in the span of its half-life is 50%.   
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given time.  The collapses are essentially non-deterministic and, so, can’t be entailed 
simpliciter.  However, their high probability can be.    
 
XV.  A Further Objection Concerning Probabilities 
 
 It might be thought that, in limiting my account to situations where there must be 
either entailment or entailment of a high objective probability, I will mislabel the 
following sorts of cases: those where the core of a deterministic theory, in conjunction 
with the pared-down auxiliaries and the evidence, does not entail the hypothesis being 
considered for acceptance, yet we would want to say that the hypothesis being considered 
is highly likely.  Here is an example of such a case: Dr. Morton has a theory a concerning 
what is wrong with Cary, her geriatric patient. She thinks that Cary has lung cancer.  
Some disconfirming evidence arises for this diagnosis: an analysis of the fluids taken in a 
needle biopsy does not show the appropriate levels of inflammation in the lung.  
However, Dr. Morton still thinks that Cary has lung cancer.  She thinks the hypothesis 
that the needle biopsy happened to have produced a non-representative sample is highly 
likely – perhaps because, with similar diagnoses where similar disconfirming evidence of 
low levels of inflammation has arisen – it has ended up that a non-representative sample 
really was the appropriate modification to the diagnosis of lung cancer.  Dr Morton’s 
determinate theory does not entail the non-representative sample hypothesis because 
there is some chance, although not great, that the anomalous evidence could have been a 
result of the patient having had undiagnosed TB that caused cysts that, when biopsied, 
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would not have a high level of inflammation. But, in 287 previous cases, it has turned out 
that, in cases similar to Cary’s, the biopsy was unrepresentative. 
 Yet the chance that either the biopsy produced a non-representative sample or the 
chance that the patient has had TB without being diagnosed with it is not some objective 
chance.  This is a deterministic theory, and past history is not enough to produce an 
objective chance for this particular situation.  So, the fact that there have been 
unrepresentative samples produced via needle biopsies in similar situations is not enough 
to claim that the theory, in conjunction with the evidence and the auxiliaries, entails even 
the high objective probability of there having been an unrepresentative sample produced.  
So, it seems like accepting this hypothesis would be ad hoc, on my account.  Yet, Dr. 
Morton seems perfectly within her rights to start treating Cary for lung-cancer-with-an-
unrepresentative-biopsy-sample.   
 This situation is not actually a problem for my account.  Cases such as these are 
forced-choice cases.  Dr. Morton has to do something, as she needs to treat her patient.  
Because, in other situations, the sample is often unrepresentative when there are low 
levels of inflammation present in the sample biopsy, Dr. Morton treats her patient as if 
she has lung cancer with an unrepresentative biopsy.  It is a pragmatic choice for 
treatment because an unrepresentative biopsy is, in general, much more common than the 
presence of undiagnosed TB in geriatric female patients.  Notice, however, that Dr. 
Morton is not, on this formulation of the case, accepting that the biopsy sample was 
unrepresentative as part of her theory.  Instead, she is using it as a placeholder until she 
figures out what is really going on – if she ever does.   
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 Suppose Dr. Morton really does accept that the biopsy was unrepresentative.  If 
this is the case, then she has accepted the hypothesis ad hocly.  However, she had to act 
because it is a forced-choice situation, so there are mitigating circumstances and these 
circumstances might be a reason not to impugn her as much for this act – despite the fact 
that she committed an ad hoc act.41   
 
XVI.  Is Neutrality Concerning the Meaning of Acceptance Still Possible? 
 
 The correct choices in cases such as Dr. Morton’s, where there is no entailment, 
are to either not do anything or to use some hypothesis as a placeholder.  I have 
discussed, in section XIII, what might be grounds to introduce a certain hypothesis as 
opposed to some other as a placeholder.  And I distinguish the criteria for accepting a 
hypothesis from the criteria for introducing a hypothesis, in part because I distinguish 
these two types of acts from each other.  However, allowing for placeholders, and 
differentiating them from accepted hypotheses, brings up another putative problem for 
my account.  In order to motivate the objection, let’s look at the reasons that Planck 
might have had for introducing the constant h. The main reason for its introduction 
seemed to be that he thought that it would make reliable predictions.  And, in fact, it 
looks like one of the main reasons to have a placeholder is in order to enable a theory to 
                                                 
41   One might object to this sort of case on the grounds that both the biopsy sample being 
unrepresentative and the undiagnosed TB are both easily checkable.  In order to assuage 
such worries, imagine the not implausible additional complications to the scenario: Dr. 
Morton has a limited amount of money that she can use to run tests and Cary needs 
immediate treatment.  Dr. Morton cannot do an open-chest biopsy because it is too 
expensive and the complicated tests needed to rule out all infections that result in lowered 
white-blood cell production and, therefore, lower levels of inflammation, are too 
expensive and too time-consuming.   
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make predictions in a practical application: that is, in order to make particular predictions 
about particular situations.  A scientist might be justly confident that she will get reliable 
predictions from a placeholder: after all, there were certain criteria that she used in order 
to choose the placeholder that she did.  Planck was justly confident in the predictions that 
arose as a result of using h as a placeholder.  Yet, in these cases, the scientists still 
shouldn’t accept the hypothesis: placeholders are different than an accepted part of the 
theory.   
 So, it looks like using a hypothesis as a placeholder is to claim that the 
placeholder is empirically adequate but not (necessarily) true.  When I discussed the 
difference between introducing a hypothesis and accepting one, in section I, I said that 
the additional step that is taken in accepting a hypothesis is to believe that it is true.  So 
far, this seems to be in accord with the conclusion just stated.  However, in this same 
section, I noted that I was using “true” for ease of discussion, and that I was remaining 
neutral between acceptance being tied to truth and acceptance being tied to empirical 
adequacy.  And this looks to be a problem.  It appears as if I no longer have a nice 
distinction between introducing a hypothesis and accepting one unless I take a side and 
claim that acceptance is just belief in the truth of the hypothesis.  For, suppose I don’t 
take a side and, therefore, acceptance can be tied to empirical adequacy.  Then, the 
constructive empiricist42 might claim that, according to his view, introducing a 
hypothesis or using it as a placeholder is no different than accepting it.  Therefore, any 
                                                 
42 I am using the phrase ‘constructive empiricist’ to identify the followers of van 
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism.  See, for example: 
 
van Fraassen, Bas.  The Scientific Image.  Op cit. 
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placeholder needs to be tested for ad hocness, as it is the sort of act for which a charge of 
ad hocness can be appropriate.  And, in cases where I claim that it is only appropriate to 
use a hypothesis (in the relevant circumstances) as a placeholder, the judgment will 
always be that the scientist has committed an ad hoc act.  Dr. Morton, for example, was 
justified only in treating her patient as if she had lung-cancer-with-an-unrepresentative-
biopsy, because even the high objective probability of the non-representative sample 
hypothesis was not properly entailed.  
 One possibility would be for me to bite the bullet and say that all of these 
(relevantly constructed) cases where someone used a hypothesis as a placeholder are 
cases where, actually, he committed an ad hoc act.  However, this approach would make 
an enormous amount of acts ad hoc that do not seem to be ad hoc according to our 
intuitions and would also make for a strange account of ad hocness.  Entertaining a 
hypothesis for the purposes of a discussion43 might well count as committing an ad hoc 
act on this approach, for example.   
 Another possibility would be for me to cede ground and say that my account is 
actually non-neutral with respect to what acceptance means: really, my account makes 
acceptance mean ‘belief that ___ is true’.  Neither of these options is particularly 
attractive.  I do think that there is a real difference between introducing a hypothesis and 
accepting one, and I do want my account to apply regardless of whether scientific realism 
is being assumed or not.  However, I do have a reply that does not commit me to either of 
these options.  The constructive empiricist is not being true to her own view if she makes 
the argument attributed to her concerning empirical adequacy.  The assumption of 
                                                 
43   Which would be to take the hypothesis even less seriously than using it as a 
placeholder, as there would be no real expectations for this hypothesis. 
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empirical adequacy – the confidence in reliable predictions – that arises in the 
placeholder case is not the sort of empirical adequacy that is the intended contrasted 
between constructive empiricism and realism.  In constructive empiricism, the empirical 
adequacy must be global, in the sense that the hypothesis or theory that is being labeled 
‘empirically adequate’ must give accurate predictions in all relevant cases.  Contrast this 
notion of empirical adequacy with the assumption of empirical adequacy in the case of a 
placeholder.  In the latter situation, all that is needed is the belief that the hypothesis will 
lead to the right empirical predictions for certain applications or situations.  So, for 
example, when Dr. Morton treats Cary as if she has lung-cancer-with-an-
unrepresentative-biopsy, Dr. Morton believes that doing so will give her the appropriate 
treatment for Cary.  Dr. Morton is not, however, committed to believing that the 
hypothesis that the biopsy was unrepresentative is globally empirically adequate.  So, my 
account is able to remain neutral as to the nature of acceptance, despite such objections.44  
However, there arise other potential problems for my theory, including what counts as a 
member of X (the set of appropriately pared-down auxiliaries).   
 
XVII.  A More Detailed Definition of X 
 
 A more detailed definition of X is in order, as the following objections deal 
primarily with attempts to illicitly manufacture X.   In section II, I claim that X is the 
                                                 
44   I am confident that my account can remain neutral in the realist-constructive 
empiricist debate.  However, there might be some version of anti-realism that my account 
won’t support.  If this is the case, I will bite the bullet that my account is neutral only 
with respect to the realist-constructive empiricist debate and, thus, rules out other forms 
of anti-realism.  I do not think that this is a great sacrifice for my account to make, as van 
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is the strongest challenger to the realist position.   
 200
pared down set of relevant auxiliaries left after removing the hypotheses in conflict with 
the evidence itself and then removing those that conflict with the hypothesis to be 
accepted.  As there is a lot of information packed into this sentence, I need to make 
explicit what constitutes X and what ought to be in it.  
 X is a pared-down version of T’s auxiliaries, so I need to say something about 
how I see T.  I am not considering theories as deductively closed sets of propositions.  I 
cannot do so and maintain my theory of ad hocness because there would not be any way 
to determine which hypotheses to remove in order to relieve the tension between the 
theory and the disconfirming evidence.  This is because there are infinitely many ways to 
remove part of a deductively closed set of propositions to make it consistent with a 
proposition (the disconfirming evidence) with which it is inconsistent.    
 Instead, I conceive of the theory as a list of discrete hypotheses accepted by the 
scientist at the time that the disconfirming evidence comes to light.  These hypotheses are 
individuated in some sort of natural manner.  X will be a pared-down list of propositions 
created by starting with T and many hypotheses.   First, Tc will be removed.  Then, those 
hypotheses that are, in conjunction with Tc, in conflict with the evidence itself will be 
removed.  Then, those hypotheses that, in conjunction with Tc, are in conflict with the 
hypothesis to be adopted will be removed.    
 All hypotheses that, in conjunction with the core of the theory, conflict with the 
evidence must be eliminated.  I will be discussing the hypotheses to be eliminated in 
terms of minimal sets of auxiliaries in conflict with the evidence, given the core of the 
theory. Here is what I mean by minimal set of auxiliaries inconsistent with Tc and E.  Let 
Γ = {A1, A2…An} be a set of auxiliaries in T.  Γ is a minimal set inconsistent with Tc + E 
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if and only if Γ is inconsistent with Tc + E and removing some A from Γ will cause the 
set + Tc + E45 to be not inconsistent.46 These minimal sets must be eliminated from X: we 
can’t just pick certain hypotheses to eliminate from these sets and not others.  To do so 
would be arbitrary in just the way that I define ad hocness.  Instead, all such minimal sets 
must be crossed off the list of T’s auxiliaries in order to create X.  For example, suppose 
{~V}, {~B} and {~G} are all minimal sets.  Then, in order to manufacture X, the 
scientist must eliminate ~V, ~B and ~G from X.  
 In footnote 8 of this chapter, I mentioned that my account also handles cases 
where the probability of the evidence given the accepted theory in conjunction with its 
auxiliaries is extremely low but not zero: that is, when the core of the theory, in 
conjunction with its auxiliaries, are not inconsistent with the evidence but very unlikely.  
In these cases, there is an analogous way to eliminate auxiliaries that, in conjunction with 
the core of the theory, are in serious tension with the evidence.  In these cases, the 
minimal sets of auxiliaries that need to be removed in order to construct X would be 
those that, in conjunction with the core of the theory, make the probability of the 
evidence close to zero.  These sets will be minimal in the sense that removing one of the 
auxiliaries in this set will cause the probability of the evidence, given the remaining 
hypotheses in the set and the core of the theory, to dramatically increase.  For example, 
suppose that Maya’s theory is that, when a specific coining machine C is in good working 
order, then the coins that it makes are fair.  Disconfirming evidence arises: a coin made 
by C is flipped 1000 times and comes up heads 999 times.  The auxiliaries that are being 
                                                 
45 By the set + Tc + E, I mean Γ ∪ {Tc, E} 
 
46   Again, T is not deductively closed.  Removing Γ will be a matter of ‘crossing off’ 
hypotheses from the list of hypotheses already affirmed by the theory.   
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considered are the following: 1. This coin was made by C.   2.  C was in good working 
order when the coin was made.  3.  The coin was not later tampered with.  4.  Maya’s 
method of flipping the coin was fair.  Clearly, these auxiliaries in conjunction with the 
core of the theory are not inconsistent with the evidence, as it is possible that a fair coin 
fairly flipped may land heads 999/1000 times.  However, the probability of this evidence, 
given the auxiliaries and the core of the theory, is extremely low.  The minimal set of 
auxiliaries that need to be crossed off in order to form X will be {1,2,3,4}.  Take any of 
these away, and the probability of the evidence, given the rest of these auxiliaries and the 
core of the theory, will greatly rise.  So, all of these auxiliaries will be in a minimal set to 
be crossed off and, therefore, not a part of X.   
 Finally, any hypothesis that, in conjunction with Tc, is in conflict with H must be 
removed.  ~H needs to be removed (if it hasn’t been already), as well as any other set of 
hypotheses that are in conflict with H.  This is to ensure that {Tc, X, E, H} will be 
consistent.  Then, X will be properly constructed.  X just is the pared-down set of 
auxiliaries relevant to T after eliminating those in conflict with the evidence and with the 
hypothesis to be accepted.  I will return to my definition of X in the following objections.    
 
XVIII.  A Potential Problem With X (The Set of Pared-Down Auxiliaries): Smuggling 
Entailment 
 
 Suppose Terry is a scientist who wants to maintain her theory T in the face of 
disconfirming evidence, so she considers accepting a certain hypothesis.  She also wants 
to avoid a charge of ad hocness and, at this time, Tc  + X + E does not entail the 
hypothesis that she wishes to accept.  So, Terry constructs X to include a material 
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conditional, where she believes (or knows) its antecedent to be false.  Terry can construct 
this conditional such that its placement in X will (wrongly) categorize her hypothesis 
acceptance as not ad hoc: she will just make her proposed hypothesis the consequent of 
the conditional.  Since the antecedent is false, the conditional will be true.  Then, since 
this true conditional will be a part of X, and its consequent is just the hypothesis she 
wants to accept, Terry can accept this hypothesis without making an ad hoc move 
because Tc  + X + E will now entail her proposed hypothesis.  And this seems to be a big 
problem for my account because, if X can be constructed in just this manner, no 
hypothesis acceptance need ever be ad hoc.   
 The problem can be characterized as follows: X, as stated previously, is some set 
of those auxiliary hypotheses Terry accepted before learning about the disconfirming 
evidence.  Suppose one of the hypotheses Terry accepted at that time was not-E.  Not-E 
(trivially) entails the material conditional, ‘if E, then H’, because to believe not-E is to 
believe the antecedent of this conditional false, which makes the conditional itself true.  
So, Terry builds this conditional into X.  Then, the evidence comes to light.  After this 
happens, Terry believes E.  The conditional, ‘if E, then H’, is a part of her X.  There now 
has arisen E, so H is entailed by Tc  + X + E.  And H just is the hypothesis that Terry 
wanted to accept in the first place.     
 Think of the lab break-in case as an example.  Suppose Brady builds ‘if the 
temperature that I see written down is not 357°C, then someone broke into the lab and 
changed what was written’ into X in the manner just described.  It then looks like Brady’s 
hypothesis will pass through the ad-hocness filter when he accepts it after discovering 
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that the temperature written in the book was not, in fact, 357°C.  And this is certainly not 
a conclusion that we wish to draw from this example.   
 However, Brady cannot construct X in this manner.  He is not allowed to include 
‘if the temperature that I see written down is not 357°C, then someone broke into the lab 
and changed it’ as a part of X, simply because the conditional is trivially true based on 
what Brady believed before the disconfirming evidence came to light.  Of the auxiliary 
hypotheses that Brady then accepted, every one that (or some combination that), with the 
core of the theory and the background, entails not-E will have to be discarded.  These 
auxiliaries cannot be included in X because X includes only those that do not conflict 
with the disconfirming evidence.  So, ~E needs to be discarded.  But note that E ⊃ H is in 
the set of auxiliaries in the first place only because it was believed that ~E was true and 
this conditional was a trivial consequence of it.  Recall that the auxiliary hypotheses in T 
are not a deductively closed set, but rather a discrete list of hypotheses already accepted 
by the theory.  ~E was not needed to render T testable (as T with the appropriate 
hypotheses will still be testable after E comes to light) and, so, any consequence of E47 
that is in the set of auxiliaries only because ~E was in the set of auxiliaries will also not 
be needed to render T testable.  Therefore, E ⊃ H will not be a part of X.   
 Suppose Terry really does accept the proposed hypothesis, while keeping the core 
of her theory and keeping an illicitly constructed X of the type discussed above.  
Although Terry constructed her X so that she might avoid the charge of ad hocness, she 
has not succeeded in her attempt.  Her hypothesis acceptance is still ad hoc.  For any 
hypothesis acceptance where a charge of ad hocness could be appropriate and where X 
                                                 
47   By ‘consequence of E’, I mean any consequent of a conditional statement where E is 
the antecedent.   
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has been constructed illicitly but, if X had been constructed appropriately, the hypothesis 
would not have been entailed, this hypothesis acceptance is ad hoc.   
 
 
XIX.  Another Sneaky Way to Illicitly Construct X and How X’s Definition Prohibits It 
 
 
 
 
 Without smuggling in the type of illicit material conditionals discussed in section 
XVIII, it still looks as if X can be gerrymandered in such a way that certain hypothesis 
acceptances will come out as non-ad hoc, though they look to be clear examples of ad 
hoc acts. The following example will illustrate the problem clearly.  Suppose Maria holds 
theory T.  Then, disconfirming evidence E arises for T.  Maria comes up with two 
(equally) possible emendations for T: K and H.  T, before being modified, includes ~K 
and ~H.  And, let us suppose that T +E entails the disjunction H or K.  Now, Maria 
decides that she wants to accept H and she doesn’t want to commit an ad hoc act.  So, she 
constructs her X carefully.  The test for ad hocness states that X is the set of relevant 
auxiliaries left in T that remains after first removing all auxiliaries that, in conjunction 
with the core of the theory, are in conflict with the evidence and then removing all 
auxiliaries that are in conflict with the hypothesis being accepted.  Maria gets rid of ~H 
but leaves ~K in X.  X seems to be constructed acceptably because Tc + ~K is not in 
conflict with either the evidence or the hypothesis to be accepted.  But, since ~K is still 
found in X, Tc + X + E entail H.  In accepting H, then, Maria does not appear to be 
committing an ad hoc act.  And, of course, the example would have gone similarly had 
Maria decided to accept K.  Yet, both H and K seemed equally likely solutions when the 
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initial conditions were described: it seems arbitrary, therefore, to accept one and not the 
other.  This outcome does not look good for my account because it looks like, whenever 
an acceptance ought to be labeled ad hoc, it will always be possible to construct X in the 
manner that Maria did above.    
 I will illustrate the case by means of a concrete example.  Suppose Maria’s theory 
is a general theory about how cars work.  Suppose E is the observation that her car won’t 
start.  Suppose that ~H is the hypothesis that her car does not have a bad starter.  Suppose 
that ~K is the hypothesis that her car does not have a dead battery.  If Maria eliminates 
the hypothesis that her car does not have a bad starter, then the core of her theory plus the 
remaining hypothesis that her car does not have a bad battery entails that she must have a 
bad starter.  And the example will run similarly if Maria wants to accept the hypothesis 
that her car has a dead battery. 
 To address this objection, I will return first to the way in which X is supposed to 
be constructed.  When speaking about X non-formally, I state that X contains the 
auxiliary hypotheses remaining that conflict with the hypothesis to be accepted, after the 
auxiliaries relevant to the theory were removed that, in conjunction with the core of the 
theory, were in conflict with the evidence itself.  So, when X is being constructed, the 
hypotheses in conflict with E given Tc must be eliminated. A scientist must eliminate the 
minimal sets of auxiliary hypotheses inconsistent with Tc + E from X.  So, in Maria’s 
case, a minimal set would be {~H, ~K}.  This is because Tc + ~H +~K is inconsistent 
with E, while Tc + ~H is consistent with E and Tc+~K is consistent with E. 
 Maria then needs to eliminate the minimal sets from X, of which {~H, ~K} is one.  
So, neither H nor K will be entailed by Tc + X + E.  In terms of the example, Maria must 
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cross off both the hypothesis that she does not have a bad starter and the hypothesis that 
she does not have a dead battery in her construction of X.  So, her theory plus X plus the 
observation that her car won’t start will not entail either the hypothesis that her car has a 
bad starter or the hypothesis that her car has a dead battery. 
 
XX.  A Potential Problem with The Neptune and Vulcan Examples 
  
 Instead of objecting that my account will allow acceptances to be not-ad hoc 
when they ought to be deemed ad hoc, as in the previous objection, someone might object 
that my account causes far too many hypothesis acceptances to be labeled ad hoc, 
including those that ought not to be.  Take the Neptune case, for example.  In section V, I 
presented this case as one that is a clear example of a non-ad hoc hypothesis acceptance.  
Yet, one might argue, this is actually a case where, on my account, the acceptance of the 
Neptune hypothesis would be ad hoc because the Neptune hypothesis would not be 
entailed.  There might be some conglomeration whose net gravitational pull act on 
Uranus in such a way that Uranus’s orbit contains the observed perturbations.  Therefore, 
the Neptune hypothesis is not entailed.  And, continues the objection, if a case such as 
this is to be labeled ‘ad hoc’ by my account, so much the worse for this account.   
 In footnote 19 of this chapter, I briefly discussed exactly what needs to be entailed 
in order for a hypothesis acceptance in the relevant circumstances to be considered non-
ad hoc.  Certainly, it cannot be the actual planet Neptune that needs to be entailed.  If that 
were the case, almost no hypothesis acceptance would be ad hoc.  There would be way 
too much specificity and detail needed in such a hypothesis.  It is not appropriate, for 
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example, to require the entailment of a planet that has the exact shape and size and 
mineral composition of Neptune in order for the acceptance of Neptune hypothesis to be 
non-ad hoc.  Here, as in other places, an element of vagueness must be embraced.  It is 
enough, for example, that the Neptune case entailed the existence of a body or bodies of 
roughly a certain mass whose center of mass is in a specific location for the acceptance of 
the Neptune hypothesis to be non-ad hoc.   
 What is entailed is that the center of mass be roughly at Neptune’s location.  This 
hypothesis would avoid the objection stated above, where there is some set of planets 
jointly causing Uranus’s perturbations.  While this is a hypothesis that is more vague than 
the Neptune hypothesis, it is certainly very different than, say, the hypothesis ‘something 
is going on’, discussed in section XII of this chapter.  It is pointing to a specific sort of fix 
in order to reconcile Newtonian theory with the recalcitrant evidence of Uranus’s 
perturbations.  And the Neptune hypothesis is a consequence of the center of mass 
hypothesis.  It seems appropriate to allow for some leeway in what version of a 
hypothesis to accept, such as accepting the Neptune hypothesis version instead of the 
(more vague) center of mass version.  Similarly in the Vulcan case, it seems appropriate 
to accept the actual Vulcan hypothesis instead of some other version of it.  And these 
cases are quite different than the Ptolemy-sun’s anomaly case.  In the Ptolemy case, all 
that could possibly be seen to be entailed would be something like the hypothesis that 
there is some set of circles positioned somewhere that cause the sun’s anomaly.  Contrast 
this to the hypothesis that there is a specific center of mass in one specific location.  The 
first seems analogous to ‘something happened’ while the second is actually giving us 
information that would help reconcile Newtonian theory with the anomalous evidence.   
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 In short, there is and ought to be some amount of vagueness allowed in the 
entailed hypothesis.  There are clear cases where whatever might be entailed is no more 
than ‘something happened’, and to take this is to take option C.  And there are clear 
cases, such as the Neptune and Vulcan cases, where what is entailed is much more 
specific than ‘something happened’.  Requiring incredible levels of detail and specificity 
in the entailed hypothesis is not desirable because to do so would be to set the standards 
too high for non-ad hoc hypothesis acceptances.  It is enough that some version of the 
hypothesis being accepted is entailed by the theory and the evidence – even if it is a 
somewhat more general version of that hypothesis.   
 
 
XXI.  A More Nuanced Version of the Neptune Example and the Difference between It 
and Maria’s Case   
 
 
 Here’s another way in which it might seem as if the Neptune example ought to 
come out as ad hoc on my account. One might claim that, in the Neptune case, Tc + X + E 
will entail either the center of mass hypothesis or the hypothesis that a comet has hit 
Uranus in such a way so as to cause its perturbations.  It looks, on the face of it, like the 
Neptune case is just another version of Maria’s H-K case, where there are two different 
possible hypotheses that might be accepted and there is no real reason to choose between 
them.48   If this conclusion were true, it would be quite bad for my theory.  Firstly, the 
                                                 
48   And, this case does not have the redeeming feature of the cancer case, where there is a 
forced-choice situation.  No one is going to die or get seriously ill if scientists decide to 
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acceptance of the Neptune hypothesis seems a prime example of a non-ad hoc act.  
Secondly, if we can construct this sort of situation in a case that clearly looks non-ad hoc, 
mightn’t it be possible to do so in other, seemingly canonical non-ad hoc cases? 
 However, the Neptune case and Maria’s H-K case are importantly different.  Here 
is how the analogy is supposed to go: in each case, there are two auxiliaries, of which 
either one could be dropped.  The minimal sets that need to be eliminated from X will 
include the hypothesis that there is no other planet and will include the hypothesis that 
there is no comet that will strike Uranus in a particular way.  Eliminating both of these 
hypotheses from X, it looks like Tc + X + E won’t entail the Neptune hypothesis, nor will 
it entail the comet hypothesis, because it allows for the possibility of either.  In this way, 
it is supposed to be similar to Maria’s case, where neither the hypothesis that her car’s 
starter was bad nor the hypothesis that her car’s battery was dead were entailed, given the 
core of her theory and the evidence.  So, it would seem, we would have to come to the 
same conclusion in the Neptune case as we did in Maria’s case, and claim that the 
acceptance of the Neptune hypothesis was an ad hoc act.49   
 The no-comet hypothesis may be construed more broadly, such as the Neptune 
hypothesis was in section V of this chapter.  Instead, the two hypotheses to be compared 
to those in Maria’s case might be the more general additional-gravitational-source 
hypothesis and the hypothesis that there are non-gravitational forces acting on Uranus.  
Again, the analogy is supposed to be that, in both the Neptune case and in Maria’s case, 
                                                                                                                                                 
hold off on reconciling Newtonian planetary theory with the perturbations of Uranus, for 
example.   
 
49   For purposes of brevity, I am omitting any discussion of the Vulcan example.  The 
purported problem can be constructed similarly for the Vulcan example, as can my 
rejection of the purported problem.   
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there are two hypotheses, either of which could be dropped.  It would then seem arbitrary 
to accept one hypothesis over another in order to reconcile the theory with the evidence. 
 There is an important disanalogy here, however.  Newton’s theory of planetary 
motions has, as a central concept, the notion that gravitational force is what determines 
the orbits of the planets, as it determines the attraction of objects on Earth towards its 
center.  Newton begins Book Three of the Principia with the following passage: 
 In the preceding books I have presented principles of philosophy that are 
not, however, philosophical but strictly mathematical – that is, those on 
which the study of philosophy can be based.  These principles are the laws 
and conditions of motions and of forces, which especially relate to 
philosophy.  I have illustrated them with some philosophical scholiums [i.e., 
scholiums dealing with natural philosophy], treating topics that are general 
and that seem to be the most fundamental for philosophy, such as the density 
and resistance of bodies, spaces void of bodies, and the motion of lights and 
sounds.  It still remains for us to exhibit the system of the world from these 
same principles. [brackets original] (Newton 793)  
 
Newton, shortly thereafter, lists the propositions he holds true concerning the system of 
the world.  They are propositions concerning the forces upon which all objects in the 
heavens are acted.  Proposition 5, theorem 5, states the common thread of all of these 
propositions quite clearly: 
    The circumjovial planets [or satellites of Jupiter] gravitate toward Jupiter, 
the circumsaturnian planets [or satellites of Saturn] gravitate toward Saturn, 
and the circumsolar [or primary] planets gravitate toward the sun, and by the 
force of their gravity they are always drawn back from rectilinear motions 
and kept in curvilinear orbits. [brackets original, italics mine] (Newton 805) 
 
That is, it is gravity and the gravitational forces between planets and celestial objects that 
keep these objects in their orbits.  Gravitational forces are the reason that planets move in 
the way that they do.  Finally, in the preliminary introduction, Newton states the 
following: 
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    In the first two books I dealt with forces in general, and if they tend toward 
some center, whether unmoving or moving, I called them centripetal (by a 
general name), not inquiring into the causes or species of the forces, but 
considering only their quantities, directions, and effects.  In the third book I 
began to deal with gravity as the force by which the heavenly bodies are kept 
in their orbits. (Newton 52) 
 
It seems clear that part of the core of Newtonian planetary theory is that there are no non-
gravitational forces at work on the planets that would determine their orbits.  So, the 
Newtonian case is different from Maria’s case, because the second hypothesis is actually 
part of the core of the theory.  As such, it is not a candidate for elimination when paring 
down the auxiliaries to create X.  So, the more general version of the Neptune hypothesis 
is entailed by Tc + X + E.  Therefore, the Neptune case ought not have the same verdict 
applied to it as Maria’s H-K case.    
 My critic might claim that I have just gerrymandered the Neptune example so that 
it still fulfills the criteria for a non-ad hoc hypothesis acceptance by pushing the 
hypothesis that there are no mechanical causes for planetary motion into the core of 
Newtonian planetary theory.  However, it is not my decision alone as to what constitutes 
the core of some theory.  There is an independent scientific test for this.  The scientific 
community must think that the removal of this part of the theory causes it to become a 
different theory than the original, unmodified one.   For Newtonian theory to suddenly 
allow mechanical causes, including, for example, different comets repeatedly hitting a 
planet to account for all the evidence, would be, I argue, for scientists of the time to claim 
that the theory being discussed no longer was Newtonian theory.   Newton was trying to 
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deny that many mechanical causes are needed to keep planets in orbit, against Cartesian 
vortex theory, which claimed precisely that.50  As he states the denial: 
    The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties.  That every 
planet by a radius drawn to the sun may describe areas proportional to the 
times of description, the periodic times of the several parts of the vortices 
should observe the square of their distances from the sun; but that the 
periodic times of the planets may obtain the 3/2th power of their distances 
from the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought to be as the 
3/2th power of their distances.  That the smaller vortices may maintain their 
lesser revolutions about Saturn, Jupiter, and other plantes, and swim quietly 
and undisturbed In the greater vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the 
parts of the sun’s vortex should be equal; but the rotation of the sun and 
planets about their axes, which ought to correspond with the motions of their 
vortices, recede far from all these proportions.  The motions of the comets are 
exceedingly regular, are governed by the same laws with the motions of the 
planets, and can by no means be accounted for by the hypothesis of vortices; 
for comets are carried with very eccentric motions through all parts of the 
heavens indifferently, with a freedom that is incompatible with the notion of 
a vortex. 
    Bodies projected in our air suffer no resistance but from the air.  Withdraw 
the air, as is done in Mr. Boyle’s vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in 
this void a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal 
velocity.  And the same argument must apply to the celestial spaces above the 
earth’s atmosphere; in these spaces, where there is no air to resist their 
motions, all bodies will move with the greatest freedom; and the planets and 
comets will constantly pursue their revolutions in orbits given in kind and 
position, according to the laws above explained[.] (Newton 939-940) 
 
Clearly, Newton is denying vortex theory and, I argue, he is clearly demonstrating that 
requiring multiple mechanical causes to maintain the orbit of a given planet would 
constitute a change to a different theory than that of Newtonian astronomy.  Thus, the 
analogy between the Neptune case and Maria’s cases falls apart.   
                                                 
50   See, e.g.: 
 
Alton, E.J.  The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motion.  New York: Amican Elsevier, 1972. 
 
Slovik, Edward.  Cartesian Spacetime: Descartes’ Physics and the Relational Theory of 
Space and Motion (International Archives of the History of Ideas, Vol. 181).  Norwell 
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.   
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XXII.  Conclusion 
 
 I have presented an account of ad hocness that, I argue, correctly captures the 
essence of ad hocness.  Hypotheses accepted in the face of disconfirming evidence are ad 
hoc if their acceptance is arbitrary.  This type of unacceptable hypothesis acceptance 
should be held in distinction from introducing some hypothesis, as different criteria might 
well apply for using a hypothesis as a placeholder than for accepting it.  The benefits of 
this account are several fold: it captures the notion that ad hocness is always a vice, 
which is how the term is used in scientific practice; it does not appeal to the psychology 
of the individual scientists accepting the hypothesis; it accurately diagnoses canonical 
examples of ad hocness, given the details of the cases.  Not only does it correctly 
diagnose canonical examples of ad hocness and non ad hocness, but it does so for the 
right reasons.  It captures the arbitrariness of accepting one hypothesis when others might 
also reconcile the theory with the evidence.  It correctly identifies the sorts of situations 
where a charge of ad hocness can be appropriate and separates these from occasions 
where a theory is being discarded or the problem is not being resolved.  This account also 
avoids the problems to which other accounts of ad hocness have succumbed because it 
does not appeal to additional testability and, so, does not fall prey to the Quine-Duhem-
Ayer problem.  It has been demonstrated that the putative objections discussed in the 
latter part of this chapter are not actually problems for this account.  All of these are good 
reasons to accept my account of ad hocness.   
  
 
 215
 Works Referenced 
 
Alton, E.J.  The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motion.  New York: Amican Elsevier, 1972. 
 
Akaike, H. “A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification.”  IEEE Transactions on 
Automatic Control, AC-19, (1974), 716-723. 
 
Akaike, H. “One entropy Maximization Principle.”  Applications of Statistics.  P.R. 
Krishniah, ed. Amsterdam: North Holland. 27-41. 
 
Akaike, H. “Prediction and Entropy.”  A Celebration of Statistics.  A. C. Atkinson and S. 
E. Feinberg, eds.  New York: Springer.  1-24. 
 
Aristotle.  On the Heavens.  Encyclopaedia Britannica Great Books: Aristotle I.  J.L. 
Stocks, trans.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. 359-405 
 
Ayer, A.J.  Language, Truth and Logic.  2nd ed.  New York: Dover Publications, inc., 
1946 
 
Bamford, Greg.  “Popper’s Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, 
and Scientific Practice.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 
2 (June, 1993), 335-355. 
 
Carnap, R. Logical Foundations of Probability.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
1950 
 
Copernicus, Nicolaus.  On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres.  Britannica Great 
Books, vol. 16.  Charles Glenn Wallis, trans.  Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.  
1987. 505-844 
 
Duhem, Pierre.  The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.  New York, Atheneum, 1962.   
 
Einstein, Albert.  “On a Heuristic Point of View Concerning the Production and 
Transformation of Light.”  Einstein’s Miraculous Year: Five Papers That Changed the 
Face of Physics.  John Stachel, ed.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.  
 
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. and Rosen, N.  Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of 
Physical Reality be Considered Complete?  Physics Review 47, Issue 10 (15May 1935), 
777-781. 
 
Fitelson, Branden and Waterman, Andrew.  “Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and 
the Quine-Duhem Problem.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
forthcoming. 
 
 216
Fitelson, Branden and Waterman, Andrew.  “Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary 
Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 56 (2005), 293-302. 
 
Forster, Malcom and Sober, Elliott.  “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less 
Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.”  The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), 1-35. 
 
Freedman, R.A. and Kaufmann, W. J.  Universe Stars and Galaxies.  W.H. Freeman and 
Co., New York: 2002.     
 
Gawiser, Eric and Silk, Joseph.  “Extracting Primordial Density Fluctuations.” Science, 
New Series, Vol. 280, No. 5368 (29 May 1998), 1405-1411.   
 
Hempel, Carl.  Philosophy of Natural Science.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice – Hall, inc., 
1966.   
 
Hitchcock, Christopher and Sober, Elliott.  “Prediction Versus Accommodation and the 
Risk of Overfitting.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55 (2004), 
1-34.  
 
Ibata, Rodrigo and Gibson, Brad.  “The Ghosts of Galaxies Past.”  Scientific American, 
April 2007.  40-45.  
 
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.  Chicago: 
Open Court, second edition, 1993.   
 
Kuhn, Thomas.  Blackbody Theory and The Quantum Discontinuity 1894-1812.  
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978.   
 
Kuhn, Thomas.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962 
 
Lakatos, Imre.  “Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes.”  Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.  Lakatos, Musgrave, eds.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
 
Leplin, Jarrett.  “The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.”  The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 33 (1982), 235-249. 
 
Leplin, Jarrett.  “The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis.”  Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5  #4 (Feb. 1975), 308-245.   
 
Milgrom, Mordehai.  “Does Dark Matter Really Exist?” Scientific American, August 
2002.  42-52.   
 
 217
Musser, George.  “Scaled-Up Darkness: Could a Single Dark Matter Particle be Light-
Years Wide?”  Scientific American, Aug. 30 2004.   
 
Newton, Sir Isaac.  The Principia.  I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, trans. 
University of California Press: Berkley, 1999.  
 
Pascal, Blaise.  The Physical Treatises of Pascal: the equilibrium of liquids and the 
weight of the mass of the air. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. 
 
Planck, Max.  “On the Theory of the Energy Distribution Law of the Normal Spectrum.”  
Annalen der Physik.  D. ter Haar, ed.  Pergamon Press, 1967.   
 
Priest, Graham.  “Gruesome Simplicity.”  Philosophy of Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Sept., 
1976), 432-437. 
 
Popper, Karl.  Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to the Logic of 
Scientific Discovery.  New York: Routledge Press, 1992.  © 1983. 
 
Ptolemy, Claudius.  The Almagest.  Britannica Great Books, Vol. 16.  R. Catesby 
Taliaferro, trans.  Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.  1987.  1-480  
 
Quine, W.V.  “Main Trends ins Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”  The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1(Jan., 1951).  20-43 
 
Reichenbach, Hans.  Experience and Prediction.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1938. 
 
Slovik, Edward.  Cartesian Spacetime: Descartes’ Physics and the Relational Theory of 
Space and Motion (International Archives of the History of Ideas, Vol. 181).  Norwell 
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. 
 
Strevens, Michael.  “The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.”  The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52 (2001), 515-537 
 
Strevens, Michael.  “The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson 
and Waterman.”  The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 56, no. 4 (Dec. 
2005), 913-918. 
 
Van Fraassen, Bas.  The Scientific Image.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. 
 
Wright, Crispin.  Realism, Meaning, and Truth.  2nd edition.  Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993.   
 
www.xycoon.com/lsrloglikelihood.htm 
 
